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At the heart of debates about the effects of globalization and the service economy on the 
welfare state is the notion of employment insecurity. It is considered a key causal mechanism 
through which cross-border movements of capital, goods and services (globalization) and 
employment shifts from manufacturing to services (deindustrialization) affect social policy. 
However, empirical research on such a causal linkage has been markedly lacking. In many cases, 
employment insecurity has been simply assumed to be the causal mechanism at work behind the 
observed relationship between economic globalization or deindustrialization and governments’ 
commitment to social protection. 
This dissertation brings the hidden causal mechanism to the fore by using employment 
protection both as an explanatory and a dependent variable. Employment protection, which 
refers to regulatory frameworks that govern hiring and firing, has a direct bearing on workers’ 
job security and can capture the politics of labor market risks. This dissertation consists of two 
projects. First, it examines how globalization and the service economy affect employment 
 
 
protection. Second, it analyzes how employment protection influences institutions of social 
protection.  
Focusing on the preferences and political strength of skilled workers, I argue that the 
effects of international trade and the service economy on employment protection depend on the 
relative scarcity of skilled labor and on the patterns of employment shifts between industries. I 
also contend that whether employment insecurity leads to expanded social protection depends on 
the social policy preference of skilled workers, which in turn, is shaped by the skill distribution 
in the economy and by pre-existing social protection institutions.  
This study finds that employment protection is both a political response to external and 
internal economic changes and a driving force for social policy change. Moreover, it highlights 
different causal processes for developed and developing economies. It offers statistical evidence 
based on two extensive cross-national time-series datasets of employment protection in the 
OECD and Latin America, and uses a case study of South Korea as qualitative evidence to 
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The notion of labor market risks has long had a central place in the literature on the 
welfare state. The emergence of the modern industrial economy drove multitudes of people into 
the national labor market, completely reorganizing their lives and commodifying their labor. 
Their livelihood became dependent on participation in labor markets that do not always function 
smoothly and efficiently. However, human beings are different from other commodities, in that a 
plummeting demand manifested in unemployment can annihilate the very existence of workers 
and their families, as Karl Polanyi (2001) pointed out. And humans that are subject to illness, 
accidents and old-age are not always able to participate in the labor market. Inevitably, the 
constant presence of labor market risks has invited collective and institutional solutions, and the 
welfare state is considered one of them (Baldwin, 1990). 
Economic globalization in recent decades has drawn attention to one particular type of 
labor market risks—employment insecurity.1 The integration of markets can shift demand curves 
for labor, causing employment to become volatile and wages to fall for some groups of workers. 
Observing the growing influence of the international economy and seemingly related labor 
market developments on worker insecurity, scholarly interest in the welfare state has 
reformulated the research question as follows: if globalization generates greater employment 
insecurity, how would it affect the welfare state? 
                                                          
1 Throughout this dissertation, I use employment insecurity and job insecurity interchangeably, and in some cases, 
broader terms such as labor market insecurity and labor market risks are also used to denote employment insecurity 
specifically. Employment insecurity encompasses two concepts: risk of unemployment and precariousness of 
employment. The risk of unemployment refers to the probability and frequency of termination of employment 
relationships at the employers’ will. Precariousness of employment refers to the risk that someone will not be 
employed on a regular, indefinite employment contract, but will have a job that is inferior in terms of duration, 




At the same time, internal transformations in the market economy have drawn attention 
as a new source of labor market insecurity (Pierson, 2001). Services have grown in importance in 
advanced industrial economies, while employment in traditional manufacturing sectors has 
declined Large scale of displacement of industrial workers, along with the noticeable rise of low-
skill, low-paying and unstable jobs in the service industry, pose new challenges for workers and 
have significant implications for the welfare state, which has been premised upon the “industrial” 
economy. 
In short, at the heart of the debates about the effects of globalization and the service 
economy on the welfare state is the notion of employment insecurity. It is considered a key 
mechanism through which cross-border movements of capital, goods and services and 
employment shifts from the manufacturing to the tertiary sector affect social policy. However, 
empirical research on such a causal linkage has been markedly lacking. In many cases, 
employment insecurity has been simply assumed to be the causal mechanism at work behind the 
observed relationship between some measures of economic globalization or deindustrialization 
and governments’ commitment to social protection. 
This dissertation brings the hidden causal mechanism to the fore by using employment 
protection as both an explanatory and a dependent variable. Employment protection refers to 
regulatory frameworks that govern hiring and firing, including labor legislation, court 
interpretations of legislative and contractual provisions and collective bargaining agreements 
(OECD, 1999: 50), and represents a policy response to economic insecurity. Since it has a direct 
bearing on employment insecurity, we should be able to observe from employment protection 
institutions the effects of globalization and deindustrialization. Moreover, if employment 




often suggested, we should also observe that change in employment protection consequently 
leads to social policy change.  
The aim of this dissertation project is, therefore, two-fold: first, to show how 
globalization and the service economy affect employment protection and second, to demonstrate 
how employment protection influences institutions of social protection across countries. I show 
that employment protection is both a political response to external and internal economic 
changes and a driving force for social policy change. Moreover, it finds that the causal processes 
centering on employment protection are different across nations, depending on the relative 
abundance of skilled labor and the pre-existing institutions of social protection in each country. I 
use two extensive cross-national time-series datasets of employment protection in the OECD and 
Latin American nations ,along with qualitative evidence drawn from the case study of South 
Korea. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, I 
provide some background on employment protection and discuss its relationship with 
employment insecurity. In the second section, I briefly review the recent attention to 
employment insecurity in the literature on globalization and the welfare state, and situate 
employment protection within ongoing debates. In the third section, I discuss the empirical 
strategy of this dissertation project. And in the last section, I provide an overview of the 
remaining chapters.  
 
  




There is a great divergence of employment protection around the world. Countries at 
varying levels of economic as well as political development have instituted employment 
protection systems. Employment protection usually comes in the form of restrictions on 
employers’ ability to lay off their employees. In countries such as the United States with a 
system of “employment-at-will”, firms rarely face financial or procedural hurdles in firing 
workers as long as it is non-discriminatory (Freeman, 2007). Anglo-American countries typically 
adopt a liberal system of labor regulation. Southern European countries tend to have strong 
regulatory protection while Scandinavian nations have relatively moderate levels of protection—
weaker than protections in Latin Europe, but stronger than in Anglo-Saxon nations.  
Most of the current regulations emerged in the postwar period, particularly after the 1973 
oil shock although some institutional foundations can be traced back to the prewar period 
(OECD, 1999; Pontusson, 2005a). It is particularly revealing that employment protection was 
strengthened in the 1970s, a time of rising unemployment which marked the end of the full 
employment era. Another set of regulations regarding so-called “atypical” jobs were introduced 
by advanced industrial democracies in the 1980s, and many other countries followed suit. As will 
be discussed in Chapter 2, the two types of employment protection—protection of regular 
workers with an indefinite employment contract and protection of atypical employment—have 
quite different logics and political implications.  
Employment protection is not exclusive to developed democracies. Indeed, many middle 
and low income countries have a long history of statutory job protection, and the level of 
protection for some of them is conspicuously high. For example, Rama (2000) notes that 
countries in West Africa have “some of the heaviest labor market regulations in the world 




security provisions (Lindauer, 1999). Latin American countries have also adopted some of the 
earliest and most protective labor codes, which do not seem to have lost much of their 
protectiveness despite years of radical market reforms (Carnes, 2008; Cook, 2007; Heckman & 
Pagés, 2004). Heckman and Pagés suggest that the reason why Latin American governments 
adopted such protective labor codes so early is because they are a relatively easy, low-cost way 
of pleasing workers, compared with social insurance that would require much higher levels of 
administrative and institutional capabilities: 
 
“Labor regulations were one way of distributing the rents from protection among 
covered workers and employers. Regulations are a low-cost way (from the point of 
government fiscal authorities) of providing social insurance to protect workers. The weak 
fiscal systems in place in the region together with the low level of income, and a tradition 
of tax evasion, corruption, and noncompliance made the social insurance schemes used in 
more developed countries prohibitively costly.” (Heckman& Pagés ibid.: 7) 
 
 
This explanation can be easily extended to other low-income countries with strong 
employment protection. Typically, labor regulations in these countries apply to only a small 
segment of privileged formal sector that affords workers other regulatory protections and welfare 
benefits. In many cases, these were the key constituencies that the ruling elites needed to court in 
the early stages of economic development or state-building (Wibbels & Ahlquist, 2011).  
Overall, cross-national variations in employment protection regimes stand out both in 
terms of the degree of variance across countries and their relative persistence over time within 
countries. A liberal system rarely moves toward tightening of rules in favor of workers. 
Conversely, even though protective regimes have come under much stronger pressure, reforming 




The stability of “varieties of employment protection regimes” is not surprising when we 
consider the main beneficiaries of such protection. In the developing world, as pointed out, it is a 
small but relatively powerful, privileged segment of workers in the formal, urban sector who 
have a vested interest in protective rules and who would register strong opposition to changing 
them. In advanced industrial economies, employment protection is also geared toward skilled, 
regular workers who are likely to benefit from it, rather than unskilled, marginalized workers 
who tend to change jobs more frequently and thus are less likely to garner immediate benefits 
from employment protection. Both in developed and developing nations, therefore, skilled and 
regular workers are potentially strong opponents of any reductions in the strength of employment 
protection. 
In spite of the high political costs of labor reform, changes did occur in a significant 
number of countries and in many other countries pressures for change have become increased in 
recent decades. For instance, the OECD officially recommended its member countries to 
undertake legislative change to make layoffs easy in the 1990s (OECD, 1994). Latin America 
underwent several rounds of liberalizing labor regulations and then restoring them, as Murillo 
(2005) has called them “deregulatory” and “regulatory” respectively. This leads to interesting 
questions. Where does the increasing pressure for change come from and what spurs 
governments to initiate reforms of employment protection? And why do reform efforts proceed 
in different ways, with varying degrees of success? I provide brief answers to these questions in 
the next section, where I situate this study of employment protection within ongoing debates of 






EMPLOYMENT INSECURITY: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 
In this dissertation, I examine two important sources of pressure for changing 
employment protection—international trade and the growth of the service industry. To explore 
their relationships with employment protection, I focus on the impact of each of these forces on 
the main beneficiary of employment protection: skilled, regular workers in the formal sector.2  
Globalization and deindustrialization have been identified as major sources of worker 
insecurity and consequently as causes of social policy change. As will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2, a great deal of research has shown the association between these external and internal 
economic forces and social policy change, but few studies have examined how the two factors 
actually affect employment insecurity. A small number of existing studies that do look into the 
linkage tend to focus on personal perception, subjective insecurity or individual voting behavior. 
These studies have provided some direct evidence that the open economy affects workers 
individually. However, given that domestic institutions such as labor market regulations play an 
important role in cushioning economic vicissitudes, whether of external or internal origins, we 
need to put individual level evidence into a broader context.  
Workers experience a markedly different degree of employment insecurity, depending on 
both individual level attributes such as skill and educational attainment and macro level factors 
such as a country’s labor market institutions and its economic position in the world market. In 
this regard, employment protection is one of the most relevant and important institutions where 
we can observe the effects of globalization and tertiarization on employment insecurity. Since it 
directly concerns job security, any substantial pressures originating from economic and structural 
                                                          
2 These three categories tend to correlate with each other. Skilled workers are likely to be employed on regular, 
permanent employment contracts in the formal sector. Unskilled workers are at a higher risk of being hired under 
atypical work arrangements and in the informal sector. The distinction between formality and informality is based 




changes must affect this particular type of labor market institution. In other words, we should be 
able to observe their impact on policy responses most immediately relevant to job insecurity 
beyond just perceptual, subjective insecurity at the individual level.  
 
The ultimate reason why political scientists pay attention to employment insecurity is that 
it could lead to greater societal demand for government-provided protection. If we focus on 
change in employment protection policy, we are able to capture how the employment insecurity 
of a particularly important group of workers influences social policy. The main beneficiaries of 
employment protection—skilled workers in the formal sector—are also a key group underwriting 
the welfare state in many countries. In less developed economies, where the welfare state tends 
to be underdeveloped, social insurance and other types of welfare benefits tend to be limited to a 
small number of privileged workers such as public employees or skilled workers in the formal 
economy in urban areas. The lessening of employment protection could threaten not only their 
job security but also their entitlements to welfare benefits, which are often contingent on having 
stable employment in the formal sector. Consequently, such privileged workers might become an 
important social force that mobilizes to transform institutions of social protection in such way 
that would better suit more insecure labor markets. 
 For the mature welfare states in advanced industrial economies, this group of workers is 
much larger in size, and constitutes the foundation of the welfare state. They could play an 
equally decisive role in shaping the course of social policy change, but in a different direction. 
Since many of major welfare programs are financed through payroll tax contributions by 
employees, the growing incidence of unstable employment and atypical work arrangements may 




contributory or occupational social insurance is a dominant mode of social protection as in 
Christian democratic countries, a downward change in employment protection may have a severe 
financial impact and consequently contribute to reductions in welfare programs.3 Rather than 
triggering social policy innovation that departs from a narrow scope of welfare provisions, 
therefore, labor market changes in developed nations might occasion of the decline of the 
welfare state.  
 
This dissertation is not the first attempt to place skilled workers at the center of analysis. 
Many scholars have emphasized the preference and political role of skilled workers in the 
development of the welfare state. There are two theoretical approaches that are particularly 
relevant. First, the skill-based approach to social policy provides useful insights to understand 
why workers have different preferences in favor of or against social policy and why countries 
have developed a distinctive set of social protection institutions, or “welfare production regimes” 
(Estévez-Abe, Iversen, & Soskice, 2001). First, this approach suggests that workers with 
specialized skills tend to have strong preference for social protection. Second, it follows that 
each country’s comparative advantage based on a unique mix of general, industry-specific and 
firm-specific skills determines the shape of social protection. While this dissertation draws upon 
the theoretical insights of this skill-based theory, it further takes note of how pre-existing 
institutions of social protection translate skilled labor’s general preference for social protection 
into actual social policy change. In some cases, skilled workers might play a key role in the 
expansion of social protection, but in other cases, they might be content with a private type of 
                                                          
3 For discussion of labor market challenges the Christian democratic welfare states in continental Europe face due to 




social protection. Change in employment protection could be instrumental in shifting their 
interest from the latter to the former.  
The second useful theoretical approach is a skill-driven explanation of international trade 
and its differential effects on labor markets in the global North and South.4 According to this 
view, globalization is likely to benefit skilled workers in wealthy trading nations in the northern 
hemisphere, but hurt their counterparts in less affluent societies in the South . Differentiating 
workers by skill levels and taking into account cross-national variation of skill distribution has 
generated interesting theoretical debates and empirical research. For example, the rising 
inequality observed across advanced industrial economies in recent decades is attributed to the 
negative effects on low-skilled workers of increased trade with low-labor cost economies. I 
propose a theoretical framework that analyzes the impact of globalization and the service 
economy on employment protection and the relationship between employment protection and 
social policy, but which gives a central role to skilled workers. As the international trade theory 
predicts, the open economy affects the fortunes of skilled labor differently in high income and 
low income countries and as a consequence will lead to more or less employment protection 
regime. I also show that the growth of the service industry has different effects on the 
employment protection system for developed and developing economies, by taking note of 
differences between them in the structural shift of employment patterns. An emerging literature 
has started exploring  the implications of fast growing services for the labor market and the 
welfare state. Going beyond its focus on tertiarization in the Western world, this study pays 
attention to the patterns of inter-industry labor movements of labor that takes place in countries 
with widely varying levels of economic development and argues that the concurrent growth of 
                                                          
4 For the debate on the distributive effects in labor markets of North-South trade, see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007), 








EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
In order to substantiate the theoretical arguments outlined above, this dissertation relies 
on mixed methods. Quantitative and qualitative analyses complement each other, enhancing the 
strength of my arguments.  
For cross-national time-series statistical analysis, I draw upon two datasets of 
employment protection for the OECD and Latin America spanning the last three decades. These 
two datasets not only provide the most comprehensive and systematic information available to 
date, but also are highly reliable. It is challenging to quantify heterogeneous, multifaceted 
national labor codes and institutional features into a one dimensional, cross-nationally 
comparable index; indeed the difficulty of compiling and constructing cross-national data has 
typically precluded statistical analysis of employment protection. But each of the two datasets 
represents a recent breakthrough, enabling me to test my hypotheses about the determinants and 
consequences of employment protection across the world. In particular, the information on Latin 
America’s employment protection systems is highly valuable since it broadens the scope of 
analysis and allows for testing the different causal processes for high and low income nations. 
One dataset covers only the OECD countries while the other includes both the OECD and Latin 





 First, I conduct econometric analysis of the determinants of employment protection and 
find the expected effects of globalization and tertiarization. Then I proceed to test the 
relationship between employment protection and the welfare state. In both sets of statistical 
examinations, I find strong evidence for a North-South divide. The quantitative analysis provides 
the first systematic evidence for the centrality of employment protection in transmitting the 
effects of the global economy onto workers and mediating between the structural transformation 
of the domestic economy and job insecurity. Furthermore, this dissertation presents the first 
quantitative evidence for the importance of employment protection as a determinant of social 
spending levels.  
After presenting initial support for my arguments from statistical tests, I use qualitative 
evidence to better understand the complex causal relationships. Specifically, I employ the case 
study method to analyze the experience of South Korea. Given that the theoretical framework of 
this dissertation assumes antipodal causal processes between skilled- labor- abundant economies 
and developing economies that are less- skilled- labor- rich. Korea is a uniquely apt case that can 
illustrate how the variables of interest work to produce heterogeneous outcomes in different 
contexts. Korea was initially a low income country with its labor force largely consisting of 
unskilled labor, but made an astounding economic leap in a short period of time. The 
unequivocal transition of its economy effectively increases the number of “within-case” 
observations, and the method of “process-tracing” is used to demonstrate how the causal 
relationship between variables shifts as if we observe two cases drawn from two separate 
samples. In addition, Korea makes a superb case since it can address concerns about Latin 
American “exceptionalism”. Because the statistical analysis hinges on data for Latin American 




have driven the results. If the case study of Korea can convincingly demonstrate the proposed 
causal processes, it will enhance the validity of my arguments. 
 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
This dissertation aims at enhancing our understanding of how employment protection 
policies mediate the link between globalization and deindustrialization and social policy. To that 
purpose, it is organized into four substantive chapters. The first two chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) 
are cross-national studies based on quantitative analysis of employment protection across the 
OECD and Latin American countries spanning from1980 to 2008. Chapter 2 examines the 
determinants of employment protection, especially globalization and the service sector 
employment. Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between employment protection and the 
welfare state. The next two chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) further examine the theoretical 
frameworks laid out in the cross-national studies using the case of Korea. Chapter 4 corresponds 
to Chapter 2 and discusses how globalization and deindustrialization have influenced workers’ 
employment insecurity, and analyzes the politics of employment protection in Korea. Chapter 5, 
echoing the theme of Chapter 3, investigates the impact of employment insecurity on social 
policy development in Korea. 
To preview each chapter, first, Chapter 2 surveys the extant literature on globalization 
and deindustrialization that has assigned particular importance to employment insecurity, and 
identifies its shortcomings in providing empirical evidence for the postulated linkage. It also 
surveys previous studies that have specifically examined employment protection laws. Finding a 




protection across the countries, Chapter 2 attempts to build a theoretical framework that 
incorporates the effects of trade and deindustrialization and makes predictions about employment 
protection policy. To test my hypotheses, I introduce employment protection data and perform a 
series of statistical tests. I find that both trade and the size of service sector employment have 
significant effects on the level of employment protection both in the OECD and Latin America. 
Specifically, trade contributes to a strengthening of employment protection in the OECD but has 
the opposite effect in Latin America. Similarly, the service sector is found to have opposing 
influences on employment protection in the two samples of nations. These results conform to my 
theory that pays attention to different processes of market integration and the transition to the 
service economy experienced by countries with differing levels of economic development. 
Chapter 3 turns to the relationship between employment protection and the welfare state, 
while taking into account the effects of globalization and deindustrialization, which the literature 
has identified as the most important determinants of social policy change. The chapter shows that 
when employment protection is taken into account, their effects are substantially diminished. 
After reviewing the literature that speaks to social policy change in relation to globalization and 
deindustrialization, I propose an alternative explanation that emphasizes the role of employment 
protection. I then present quantitative evidence from a regression analysis of social expenditures. 
Across the world, I find consistently strong effects of employment protection levels on 
government expenditures spent on social protection. As in Chapter 2, there is a systematic divide 
between the OECD and Latin America in the way social spending responds to change in 
employment protection. In order to further investigate the divide, the next chapter looks deep 




Chapter 4 examines how economic relationships with the world and internal 
transformations of the economic structure have shaped the political contestation over 
employment protection in Korea. First, it provides a methodological justification of why an in-
depth case study is appropriate for the purpose of this research project and why Korea was 
chosen as a test case. In discussing the main explanatory variables, it goes beyond inevitably 
oversimplified operationalization of statistical analysis and instead pays close attention to 
important changes that took place over an extended time period. Specifically, it focuses on 
change in the sectoral composition and skill intensity of exports to examine the effects of 
globalization, and on change in the industrial structure, productivity gaps between different 
service industries and patterns of inter-industry labor movement in order to investigate the 
effects of the service economy. Based on this discussion, I derive several testable implications 
and examine their validity by tracing out the political process of employment protection policy. 
Following the general argument in Chapter 3, Chapter 5 examines if and how 
employment insecurity was a critical factor in shaping the institutions of social protection in 
Korea. Rather than using the “level of aggregated social expenditures”, it describes the overall 
shape of the Korean welfare state and the institutional designs of various social policy programs. 
First, the chapter sketches out the development of the welfare state and the limitations of existing 
explanations. It then proposes an alternative approach that emphasizes the role of regular, skilled 
workers and examines the recent process of the welfare reform. It shows that major turns in 
social policy took place in conjunction with the political process of employment protection 
change. 
Lastly, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation. I discuss the implications of my findings and 





The Sources of Employment Insecurity:  
Globalization, Deindustrialization and Employment Protection  
 
Does international economic integration increase worker insecurity? One of the most 
consistent findings in political economy is the positive correlation between economic openness 
and social spending in industrial economies. To explain this relationship, scholars have 
highlighted the impact of globalization on worker insecurity. The conventional argument goes 
that workers who experience heightened insecurity tend to pressure their government into 
providing social protection.  
This traditional explanation has been met with skepticism ever since Torben Iversen and 
Thomas Cusack (2000) suggested that exposure to the international economy is not the primary 
source of worker insecurity. They instead argue that the culprit for growing labor market risk is 
deindustrialization. Consequently, deindustrialization, not globalization, is the real cause of the 
expansion of the welfare state, at least in Western democracies. Their theoretical challenge has 
spurred political economists to more closely examine the presumed effects of globalization on 
labor markets and to seek robust empirical evidence for the “hidden link” that supposedly 
connects globalization with the welfare state. While this new effort has shown that workers 
indeed feel more insecure in the open economy, it is still unclear how such subjective insecurity 
at the individual level translates into actual policy change. Despite recent scholarly efforts to 
establish the direct effects of globalization on worker insecurity, therefore, the debate on 




This chapter attempts to weigh in on this debate, examining the impacts of globalization 
and the growth of the service industry on employment insecurity. I part ways with both the 
“hidden-linkage” and the “subjective insecurity” approaches and turn to a politically salient 
policy that has direct bearing  on worker insecurity—employment protection legislation.  
Employment protection legislation is a political outcome, in which different groups of 
workers who are affected differently by globalization and deindustrialization have diverging 
interests. The fact that employment protection laws vary across countries and time enables us to 
examine the effects of globalization and deindustrialization on worker insecurity in a large-N 
setting. In recent years, employment protection laws have emerged as a contentious political 
issue in a number of countries, both developed and developing. Moreover, in many cases the 
controversy over employment protection has been accompanied by a debate about social policy. 
In Europe, proposals to increase labor market flexibility have been coupled with a growing 
emphasis on active labor market policy. In Latin America, labor reform was packaged with 
social policy reform. Given that the issues of employment protection seem tightly connected to 
changes in the welfare state in recent years, it is puzzling that these simultaneous developments 
have not been examined more closely. The purpose of this dissertation is to close this gap in the 
literature.  
As a first step, this chapter examines the role of globalization and deindustrialization in 
shaping employment protection regimes. Drawing on the literature in international political 
economy and comparative political economy, I develop a theory of political coalitions over 
employment protection that puts skilled workers at the center of analysis. The skill profile of a 
country’s labor force—whether a country has an abundance of skilled labor relative to unskilled 




affect skilled labor and, in turn, employment protection institutions. The primary goal of this 
chapter is to identify the causal paths though which globalization and deindustrialization affect 
labor market risks. The second goal is to outline and empirically test a political theory of 
employment protection. To test the theory, I use quantitative measures of employment protection 
for over 50 countries from the 1980s to the late 2000s.  
To sum up the findings of this chapter, both globalization and deindustrialization do 
affect employment insecurity, but in ways that are more complex than existing studies have 
suggested. First, unlike the pessimistic view of previous research, the evidence suggests that the 
effects of trade can be positive on employment protection. It seems that workers in developed 
and developing countries, however, experience different levels of job insecurity as a result of 
increased trade and expanding service sectors. Moreover, unskilled laborers, those who work 
part-time or temporarily, or who are dispatched from a work agency—so-called labor market 
outsiders—do not necessarily have the same experience as insiders in the changing economic 
environment.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section, I review the literature on 
globalization and deindustrialization that has assigned a particular importance to employment 
insecurity, identifying its shortcomings in providing adequate empirical evidence for the 
postulated linkage to employment insecurity. To analyze the politics of employment insecurity, 
in the second section, I discuss the employment protection laws that this study focuses on and 
discuss previous research on employment protection. I lay out my theoretical framework in the 
third section, connecting international trade and the service employment to employment 




developed and developing countries and then present the results of statistical analysis. I conclude 
by discussing the implications of this chapter.  
 
 
THE LITERATURE: GLOBALIZATION, DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AND 
EMPLOYMENT INSECURITY 
The extensive literature on the effects of globalization on the welfare state tends to 
highlight labor market risks as a key causal mechanism connecting a greater role of international 
markets to change in domestic policy. In comparison, research that examines the linkage itself is 
relatively scarce. This section discusses that small number of studies that pertain to employment 
insecurity. 
Rodrik (1997) developed one of the most systematic explanations of the effects of 
globalization on labor markets in the developed world. There are two channels, he argues, 
through which globalization makes workers more insecure in the labor market. First, trade with 
developing countries puts unskilled workers out of job since domestic production of low-skilled, 
labor intensive goods are now replaced by imports. Second, globalization generates instability in 
earnings and employment because market integration renders workers more interchangeable. 
This substitution effect, in principle, applies to all workers regardless of skill level, but less-
educated, less-skilled workers are more vulnerable because, by definition, they are easier to 
replace. Workers experiencing difficulties in finding a stable job and falling real wages will 
demand compensation and social protection (Burgoon, 2001). 
Rodrik does not perform a direct test of these scenarios, but instead points to the 




He finds that external risks, calculated as the product of the size of trade and the volatility of 
terms of trade, are positively correlated with the volatility of aggregate measures of income and 
consumption. However, this is not an exact test for his theoretical arguments since he has used 
aggregate income and consumption risks, rather than risks for the disadvantaged.5 Note that in 
his model less-educated and less-skilled workers are the losers of globalization and are 
vulnerable to North-North as well as North-South trade. Although he acknowledges that higher 
levels of aggregate risks might mean even higher insecurity for this group, this has not yet been 
tested empirically.  
A more direct approach to the consequences of globalization for the labor market has 
been taken by Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter (2004), whose work aims at ascertaining 
whether individual workers indeed feel insecure in the open economy. Their primary finding is 
that workers employed in industries exposed to foreign direct investment (FDI) express greater 
concerns about job security. Their interpretation of this finding is similar to Rodrik’s: FDI makes 
the demand for labor more elastic through substitution. In response to higher domestic wages or 
other factors, multinational firms can move some stages of production abroad, effectively placing 
workers in competition with foreign workers for employment opportunities.  
In contrast with the view that trade and FDI negatively impact the labor market, there is 
new evidence that the two aspects of globalization may work differently (Rama, 2001). In 
particular, a few studies have highlighted a positive role of FDI on workers. Focusing on workers’ 
rights, Mosley (2011) and Mosley and Uno (2007) argue that while trade competition tends to 
generate “race to the bottom” pressures on collective labor rights, FDI inflows might be 
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of risk within the economy. Presumably, this kind of risk is borne disproportionately by groups with low 
international mobility. Once its incidence is taken into account, therefore, the problem of external risk is likely to 




positively related to improvements in worker rights. Pinto (2004) also argues from the 
international trade perspective that workers in general are likely to benefit from FDI, and 
explains why some Leftist governments have been receptive, rather than hostile, to foreign 
capital. Pandya (2010), paying attention to the role of skill level, argues that skilled laborers are 
more likely to benefit from FDI. 
FDI could have a beneficial impact on the labor market in cases where multinational 
corporations care about the quality of labor rather than its cost. For example, when firms make 
investments in order to access specific consumer markets—which recent studies have identified 
as one of major motivations for the contemporary FDI—they often have an interest in securing 
skilled workers and would consequently be willing to pay higher wages and provide generous 
benefits to reduce labor turnover (Caves, 2007; Hanson, 2005; Jensen, 2006; Jensen & Rosas, 
2007; Kucera, 2002; Lipsey, 2001, 2002; Markusen, 1995; Moran, 1998, 2002; Moran, Graham, 
& Blomström, 2005). However, it seems less plausible that this positive effect would percolate to 
the entire labor market to such an extent that it would change the overall level of employment 
security in a host country.  
 
The majority of studies in the globalization literature followed Rodrik’s original 
formulation of externally induced economic insecurity until Iversen and Cusack (2000) 
questioned the assumption that growing economic insecurity is the result of globalization. 
Iversen and Cusack  made a forceful case that deindustrialization, not globalization, is 
responsible for labor market insecurity and, subsequently, for the growth of the welfare state. 
Increasing productivity in the manufacturing industry, changing consumption patterns and 




structure. Employment in agriculture and manufacturing has declined on a great scale over 
several decades; new jobs are now primarily generated in the service sector and require skills 
that workers in traditional sectors are not equipped with.  
This structural transformation places the government in the “trilemma” of the service 
economy, whereby the government has to sacrifice at least one of the following three goals: 
budgetary soundness, income equality, and employment growth (Iversen & Wren, 1998). 
Employment growth in the private services sector necessarily accompanies wage inequality. 
Alternatively, employment growth can be achieved in the public services sector, but this would 
put budgetary pressures on the government. A third option is to pursue budgetary soundness and 
wage equality, which would produce a stagnant job market with perpetually high levels of 
unemployment. What this trilemma ultimately means is that the structural transformation of the 
domestic economy, not the international economy, has been the chief cause of adverse economic 
environments and diverging governmental responses. 
A particularly daunting challenge that the transition to the service economy poses to 
workers is the requirement of new skills. Since skills are not easily transferrable from 
manufacturing to services, workers would have a hard time either finding a job that suits their 
skills or adjusting to a job that requires an entirely different skill set. To sum up the argument 
proposed by Iversen and his colleagues, the two most important consequences of 
deindustrialization for workers are massive scale job loss in manufacturing and the difficulty of 
adjusting to new jobs in services.  
While these challenges must have brought substantial insecurity to workers already 
employed in manufacturing, it is important to note that these are mostly transient effects which 




about thirty years starting from the 1960s as the period in which the great transformation into the 
post-industrial society took place, shocking the labor markets of wealthy nations. According to 
their understanding of labor market risks induced by deindustrialization, there is no obvious 
source of insecurity inherent to the post-industrial labor market once the transitional phase is 
passed. This interpretation, however, underestimates the challenging characteristics of post-
industrial employment which are distinguished from traditional manufacturing labor markets.  
It is well known that the lion’s share of tertiary employment comes from low-skilled 
services. Service sectors are, of course, highly heterogeneous internally, from sector to sector in 
terms of productivity and from job to job in terms of skill requirements and pay levels. Services 
can be classified into four broad sectors: business, distributive, personal, and social services 
(Esping-Andersen, 1999; Singelmann, 1978). Business services such as finance, insurance, and 
real estate require a large number of technical, professional, and managerial jobs and show high 
productivity growth rates. Distributive services include wholesale, retail, transportation, and 
communications. Personal services are characteristically labor intensive and low-skilled. Social 
services such as health and education, in contrast, are skill intensive in nature due to the large 
share of healthcare professionals and teachers, but the growing demand for personal care and 
support services, are expected to reduce skill bias within the social services industry Internal 
sectoral compositions among these highly heterogeneous services vary from country to country, 
and we can expect this variation to impact labor markets in diverse ways. But the macro effect of 
the aggregate service expansion is a significant growth of “lousy” jobs and independent 
employment, and income polarization.6 A large portion of jobs generated in expanding services 
                                                          
6 A number of studies agree with this description of the labor market development in recent decades in advanced 
industrial economies although not necessarily agreeing on its cause. See, DiPrete et al.(2006), Freemand and Katz 
(1994), Fortin et al. (1997), Golden and Wallerstein (2006), Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005), Klausen (1999), 




is low-skilled, low-paying or temporary (King & Rueda, 2008; Pontusson, 2005b). Employment 
relationships become shorter and more volatile, and they can often be terminated without enough 
notice for workers to locate employment elsewhere to maintain a steady income. Employers 
invest less in training workers and in fostering stable and long-term relationships with employees, 
and they want greater flexibility in hiring and firing.  
This description of deindustrialization is closer to the revisionist view of 
deindustrialization that is emerging in the welfare literature. Carnes and Mares (2010) identify, 
as the decisive change caused by deindustrialization, the shift from stable, contracted 
employment to more diffuse, independent employment relationships in highly heterogeneous 
services. In addition, they offer a different interpretation of the consequence of this labor market 
change for the welfare state. Unlike Iversen and Cusack, who attribute the climbing social 
expenditures to the mass dislocations of the industrial workforce, they argue that 
deindustrialization is likely to generate a strong societal impulse for universalistic, non-
contributory social policies, which are not necessarily correlated with higher social spending.  
While this revisionist approach has animated the debate over the effect of 
deindustrialization on the welfare state in a compelling and interesting way, what is still missing 
is a direct test for the causal relationship between deindustrialization and labor market risks. 
Does deindustrialization indeed cause a shift from stable, contracted employment relationships to 
unstable, un-contracted ones? There have been no attempts to address this pressing question.  
To sum up, the literature has identified several plausible causal paths through which 
globalization and deindustrialization could affect labor market insecurity. The two camps, while 
emphasizing one path over the other, both highlight the negative consequences of globalization 




insecurity Although there are valuable insights to be gleaned from existing theories on how 
globalization and deindustrialization might generate labor market risks and lead to distributional 
conflicts between domestic groups over compensation, many insights remain suggestive. For 
example, Rodrik’s theory, emphasizing trade’s devastating effects on unskilled labor, only hints 
at a possibility for political conflicts over the distribution of risks. 
 In the following sections, I develop a political theory of labor market insecurity. Going 
beyond the current literature that has treated globalization and deindustrialization in isolation as 
“the” real source of growing insecurity, I propose that the two forces affect labor market 
insecurity simultaneously but in different ways. My theory also specifies the preference and 
influence of political coalitions. The central idea of my analytical framework is that exogenous 
changes in employment security—driven by economic and technological forces—affect the 
political resources, preferences, and responses of different groups, triggering a distributional 
conflict over employment protection and social policy. Before laying out the theoretical 
framework, the next section introduces the concept of “employment protection” in relation to 




EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AS A DETERMINANT OF INSECURITY 
Background 
This section discusses the institutions of employment protection, which refer to the 
regulatory framework governing hiring and firing and include labor legislation, court 




The starting point is to make a distinction between exogenous shocks to the labor market and 
endogenously determined levels of employment insecurity. Most studies, as reviewed in the 
preceding section, focus on exogenous sources of employment insecurity. Employment 
protection is determined through endogenous political responses not only to exogenous factors 
such as globalization and the expansion of service sectors but also to other institutional and 
political factors.  
Economic and structural forces shape the preferences of different political groups about 
whether to support or oppose various employment protection policies, and affect their 
organizational capacity. The political process determines the final shape of government policies 
that influence workers’ job security. The government can intervene in the labor market through 
legislation that regulates both hiring and firing. Examples of firing regulations include 
procedural inconveniences of dismissal, requiring that employers provide employees with 
advanced notice of their dismissal, severance pay provisions and penalties for unfair dismissal. 
By making it difficult for employers to dismiss workers, such policies provide workers with 
employment protection.  
Statutory regulations on hiring aim at providing a different type of protection to a 
different group of workers. For instance, restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts and 
temporary work agencies are designed to protect non-standard employees.7 By forbidding certain 
types of jobs, it fulfills its protective purpose. Historically, legislation on atypical employment 
was introduced to counteract the widespread use of non-standard work arrangements and to 
                                                          
7 Non-standard (atypical or irregular) employment refers to “employment relationships not conforming to the 
standard or “typical” model of full-time, regular, open-ended employment with a single employer over a long time 




protect low-skilled, marginalized workers (OECD, 1999). More recently, employment protection 
has become one of the most controversial issues around the world.  
Critics argue that employment protection policies are responsible for the intractable 
problems that plague European labor markets: long-term unemployment, high unemployment 
rates among youths, and the rigidity and dualism of the labor markets (Baccaro & Rei, 2007; 
Esping-Anderson & Regini, 2000; Freeman, 2007). In particular, they underscore its distributive 
consequences for different groups of labor market participants; workers hired on regular 
contracts may enjoy a high degree of job security at the expense of their less-educated, less-
skilled and unemployed counterparts. When employers view firing costs as too prohibitive, a 
divide between labor market “insiders” and “outsiders” can take shape through two channels: 1) 
by inhibiting new hiring (as a result,  there will be fewer job opportunities for outsiders), and 2) 
by making employers seek atypical types of workers that are not subject to such high firing costs. 
The distributional effect has some empirical support, as particular groups including youths and 
women are found to be disproportionately vulnerable to strong employment protection.  
This debate has had an unusual impact on policy making. Following the 
recommendations of the famous OECD Jobs Study (1994), a number of countries initiated 
reforms to relax employment protection regulations. Mixed results, however, caused policy 
recommendations to evolve toward a more balanced view—one that recognizes the importance 
of protecting workers against labor market risks (OECD, 2004: p.62). For example, the European 
Commission has recommended that EU members “review and, where appropriate, reform overly 
restrictive elements of employment legislation The scholarly and policy debate over employment 
protection has inspired political scientists to seek political explanations for the emergence and 





Political Explanations for Employment Protection 
Employment protection has begun to receive attention only recently in the field of 
political science. Two observed trends, in particular, triggered scholarly interests in employment 
protection. First, cross-national variation in labor laws has persisted despite the growing impetus 
for liberalization around the world, and seemed to co-vary with the typology of welfare capitalist 
economies (Bonoli, 2003). Paying attention to this cross-national pattern of employment 
protection institutions, scholars in the varieties of capitalism (VoC) tradition explain strong 
employment protection as a sub-component of “coordinated market economies,” where firm-
specific skills are valued as opposed to general skills or industry-specific skills. According to this 
skills-based perspective, employment protection has an insurance function for workers who 
would otherwise make costly and risky investments in acquiring firm-specific skills. Since 
specific skills are not easily transferrable, job loss is particularly detrimental to workers whose 
skill profile is skewed toward firm-specific skills (Estévez-Abe et al., 2001). In contrast, liberal 
economies geared toward the intensive use of general skills do not require such an institutional 
mechanism. Unfortunately, this institutionalist approach is not useful in explaining recent 
changes in employment regulation and in helping us understand the “political” dynamics of those 
changes.8 
Rueda (2005, 2006, 2007) proposed one of the first “political” theories of employment 
protection. Starting from the assumption that labor market insiders and outsiders have different 
preferences over employment protection, he argued that social democratic parties promote pro-
insider policies, such as strong employment protection, to the detriment of outsiders. Although 
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his theory made a significant contribution to our understanding of the politics of employment 
protection in advanced industrial economies, his empirical evidence was rather weak and 
limited.9  
There is a separate literature that examines employment regulation in Latin America. The 
region underwent a period of extensive market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s following the 
debt crisis, and several countries liberalized their highly protective labor market systems, with 
varying results. To explain this variation, many specialists on Latin America have looked to 
party–union ties, the power of labor movements, divisions among labor unions, the influence of 
international organizations and the political legacies of earlier regimes (Cook, 2007, 2008; 
Etchemendy, 2004b; Murillo, 2005; Murillo & Schrank, 2005). Most of these studies either focus 
on specific cases of labor reform or assess regulatory changes, based on the author’s own 
typology of employment protection regimes. Consequently, it is difficult to make an objective 
comparison between countries and time periods.  
Carnes (2008) took a more systematic approach by constructing a cross-national dataset 
that measures the level of employment protection. On the theoretical front, this study also goes 
beyond stressing the usual suspects identified by the literature on Latin America and incorporates 
the insights of skill-based theories. 
In spite of this progress in research on the recent policy changes in Latin America, more 
fundamental questions remain unanswered: why did countries in Latin America adopt some of 
the most protective labor regulation systems in the first place, and why did countries in other 
regions not attempt such drastic changes? As noted, research on employment protection has 
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developed into two separate literatures, each exclusively concentrating on the OECD and Latin 
American countries. Cross-national studies overcoming this regional boundary are indeed rare.  
A notable exception is the investigation of labor market regulations in 85 countries by 
Botero et al. (2004). The authors argue that legal origins—that is, legal systems inherited from 
colonizers—explain a country’s approach to labor regulation better than any other variable, even 
government partisanship. Specifically, countries with French legal origins tend to have the most 
protective labor laws, and countries with common law have the least protective labor laws, with 
German and Scandinavian systems falling in the middle. But an obvious weakness of this 
argument is that it cannot explain changes in employment protection laws over time.10 
Colonizers may have left their distinctive stamp on labor law systems during the state formation 
period, but we definitely need different theoretical frameworks to explain why some countries 
have departed from their inherited system while others have had a harder time doing so.  
 
Another group of scholars turn to more recent experiences of the developing world to 
explain the emergence of employment protection policies. They tend to find that the effect of 
democracy is positive and significant with regard to collective labor rights such as freedom of 
association, the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike (Caraway, 2009; Mosley, 2000, 
2008, 2011; Mosley & Uno, 2007). On the other hand, employment protection has not 
necessarily improved with democratization (Caraway, ibid.).  
There are two explanations for why democratization has not fostered job protection 
legislation. First, the institutional legacy of authoritarianism might have a resounding negative 
effect on the level of employment protection (Caraway, 2004). Second, the transition to 
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democracy in many developing countries coincided with market reforms (so-called “dual 
transitions”) and took place in the context of growing competitive pressures emanating from the 
global economy (Bermeo, 1994; Cook, 2008; Etchemendy, 2004a). The economic imperative 
inhibited the newly instituted democratic governments from strengthening individual worker 
protection in employment contracts. The extensive literature on market reform has investigated 
specific contexts of the “dual transitions” but it falls short of providing a systematic and 
compelling political theory that can account for patterns of both continuity and change beyond 
the domain of specific reform cases.  
Many countries had already adopted very different labor market systems before the 
waves of democratization hit their shores. Consider countries in Latin America and East Asia. As 
noted above, many Latin American countries developed highly protective employment 
regulation systems quite early, whereas East Asian countries were known for their flexible labor 
markets (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008). A considerable difference between the two regions has 
persisted despite a series of radical political changes. Nonetheless, the degree of change in labor 
regulation within each region has been quite considerable and does not seem to be accounted for 
by regime type.  
Finally, a more promising approach that departs from the dominant trend in the literature 
on developing nations is found in a recent study by Wibbels and Ahlquist (2011). They argue 
that developing countries institutionalized distinctive social policies including employment 
protection as part of broader development strategies, which were conditioned by structural 
economic constraints such as the relative abundance of labor, rural land inequality and the 
domestic market size. According to this theory, Latin America’s protective labor market 




scarce labor, high inequality and a large domestic market. Similar to the coalitional approach in 
the international political economy literature, underlying factor endowments of land, capital and 
labor shape patterns of political coalitions. Since owners of scarce factors benefit from 
protectionism, relatively scarce labor colluded with scarce domestic capital and pursued 
protectionist policies at the expense of land owners in Latin America. The other two structural 
factors—high rural inequality and large domestic markets—determined whether such autarkic 
policies could persist In labor-abundant East Asian countries, in contrast, protectionist 
developmental strategies were not sustainable due to small domestic markets and a relatively 
equitable distribution of land ownership. Labor, therefore, could not implement policies such as 
strong employment protection which are incompatible with export-led development and were 
opposed by capitalists. Wibbels and Ahlquist’s argument is empirically supported by initial 
patterns of social policy and employment protection. Although their study does not specifically 
deal with employment protection, it gives us valuable insights into the underlying political 
dynamics that govern labor regimes. It also makes a theoretical breakthrough in emerging 
research on the welfare state in the developing world by identifying causal linkages between 
political coalitions, development strategies and social policies.  
 
To sum up, there is a dearth of theoretical and empirical work that specifically focuses on 
employment protection. Existing studies have emphasized as determinants of employment 
protection regulations international and domestic economic pressures, government partisanship, 
labor movements, party–union relationships and regime type. Each study proposes a partial 
explanation for specific cases of labor regulations, but none of them systematically examines the 




attention had been paid to employment protection, either as a dependent variable or as an 
independent variable.  
The main assumption of this dissertation is that employment insecurity is the key variable 
that connects globalization and deindustrialization to social policies. Although it is 
acknowledged that employment protection has direct impacts on employment insecurity—the 
key concept in most of the welfare state literature—few attempts have been made to look into 
how the politics of employment protection affect social policy. In the following section, I outline 
a theoretical framework that puts employment protection at the center of empirical investigation. 
 
 
SPECIFYING THE THEORETICAL MODEL  
The Setting 
To conceptualize the effects of globalization and deindustrialization on domestic labor 
markets, imagine a world in which there are two countries, one developed and one developing. 
Furthermore, the advanced industrial economy is highly endowed with skilled labor, whereas the 
less developed economy has a greater abundance of unskilled labor. I also assume that there are 
three sectors in each country: high-skill-intensive manufacturing, low-skill-intensive 
manufacturing and low-skill-intensive services. The two manufacturing sectors are tradable, but 
the service sector non-tradable. The assumption that services are low-skill-intensive is in line 
with the literature, which has shown that a low-skill bias is a definitive feature of the service 
economy in general.  
Postponing analysis of how deindustrialization affects employment protection, I first 




international trade theory. A standard result in international economics is that trade affects the 
returns to factors of production (Mundell, 1957; Stolper & Samuelson, 1941). Political scientists 
have developed political theories to explain the formation of trade policy coalitions and the 
patterns of trade policy based on this idea (Alt, Frieden, Gilligan, Rodrik, & Rogowski, 1996). 
Broadly speaking, they tend to take either of two contrasting approaches, depending on 
assumptions regarding factor specificity—i.e.  how costly it is for factors of production such as 
capital and labor to move between sectors in response to trade-induced change in returns. If 
factor specificity is high, inter-industry movements are costly. If factor specificity is low, it is 
relatively easy to move factors between different uses and industries. One approach, based on the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, assumes low-factor-specificity; in other words, the approach assumes 
that reallocating the resources needed for production—such as capital and labor—to another 
sector is not costly. Under such circumstances, trade benefits and strengthens owners of 
abundant factors while hurting owners of scarce factors within the domestic economy.11 Since 
countries will have a comparative advantage in and therefore export the goods that use 
intensively their relatively abundant factors, the owners of abundant factors benefit from trade. If 
we apply this approach to our imagined world, trade between the two countries would benefit 
skilled labor and hurt unskilled labor in the rich country, and the result would be the opposite in 
the poor country.  
Now let’s consider how adding a political dimension might shed light on the formation of 
political coalitions over employment protection. Skilled labor generally possesses political 
                                                          
11 The specific mechanism is as follows. If it is easy to move factors of production between sectors, factor returns 
are eventually equalized throughout the economy. Thus the fortunes of owners of a particular factor rise and fall 
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sector-based, cross-class ones. A famous application of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem is Rogowski (1987a, 1987b, 
1989). Recent studies attempt to relax the assumption of specific versus mobile factors and to theorize a model by 




advantages over unskilled labor in both countries. Their political strength derives from the fact 
that they are likely to have more bargaining power vis-à-vis employers due to their specialized 
skills. Workers with homogenous skills are easier to substitute for one another and thus do not 
enjoy such bargaining power. In some cases, such as in tight labor markets, employers and 
skilled workers will have overlapping interests because employers will tend to view securing and 
training workers as an investment (Swenson, 2002, 2004).  
Skilled labor also tends to have an organizational advantage. It is easier for skilled 
workers to overcome the collective action problem due to their relatively small size. Even in the 
high-skill-intensive country, skilled workers are likely to be fewer in number than the unskilled. 
They are only “abundant” when compared to the other country. The desire to protect their “skill-
premium” would lead them to develop institutional mechanisms to foster collaboration so as to 
negotiate with employers collectively. The recent literature from the VoC perspective has 
explicitly framed the economic rationale for various coordinating institutions as stemming from 
the need to protect workers’ investment in skill formation. Union organizations at the industrial 
level could grow out of such a need. In addition, there are other factors that promote collective 
action among skilled workers, such as an improved working environment or longer job tenure 
with the same employer.  
On top of these intrinsic political advantages, it is important to remember that, as 
discussed above, in countries where skilled labor is scarce, a closed economy would provide 
skilled laborers with additional benefits. Thus, the combination of autarky and political 
advantages generated by skills would definitely favor skilled workers over unskilled workers in 





Then, what will happen under conditions of economic openness? As noted, opening up 
the domestic market to international trade will benefit skilled workers in the rich nation The 
result would be increased political power and, as a result, the creation of policies in their favor. 
In contrast, their counterparts in the country with proportionally more unskilled workers would 
likely lose some of their political power due to the contraction of the industry where they were 
employed, which would take place with market integration. 
In summary, the Heckscher-Ohlin approach gives us insight about the direction of policy 
change under conditions of globalization. All else being equal, countries with proportionally 
more high-skill workers are likely to have policies that benefit skilled workers. In economies 
with an abundance of unskilled labor, however, globalization will tend to threaten the interests 
and status of workers with specialized skills. In the following paragraphs, I describe actors’ 
preferences regarding employment protection and discuss the impact of economic openness on 
their political power. 
 
Preferences and Political Influence 
In the earlier section on employment protection, I made the distinction between standard 
and atypical forms of employment protection, which provide qualitatively different things for 
workers. For analytical purposes, I only consider the former type of employment protection, 
which governs the firing of “regular” workers.  
I assume that skilled labor has a direct interest in employment protection. This 
assumption about skilled labor’s preference is in line with skill-based theories of social policy 
preference. Because workers with specialized skills would have a harder time finding a new job 




makes sense that they would like to have an institutional guarantee that their job is secure 
(Iversen & Soskice, 2001). On the other hand, to the extent that employment protection increases 
non-wage labor costs and thereby hurts their chances of employment, unskilled workers would 
prefer lower levels of employment protection but otherwise they do not have an immediate 
interest in employment protection. Now let’s consider how economic openness affects the 
political influence of these two groups. For reasons suggested in the previous section, skilled 
labor commands more political resources to affect policy, and autarkic conditions would bestow 
skilled workers with even more political power, especially when skilled labor is scarce. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, under autarky, the level of employment protection is likely to be 
higher in the poor country where skilled labor is scare. How would opening up the economy 
affect employment protection policies? The stylized model in the preceding section implies that 
openness will weaken the political power of skilled workers in the poor country while 
empowering their counterparts in the rich country, decreasing n employment protection in the 
former while increasing it in the latter.  
 
The Effect of Deindustrialization 
So far, I have only considered the effect of economic openness. To analyze the impact of 
deindustrialization, we need to go back to the assumption, discussed earlier, that there are three 
sectors. When the two countries start trading with each other, each nation will concentrate on 
producing those goods for which it has a comparative advantage. The rich country will tend to 
produce high-skill-intensive goods, whereas the poor country will tend to produce low-skill-
intensive goods. This will lead to changes in the relative size and economic fortune of the sectors 




in the poor country; however, openness will have the opposite effect on low-skill-intensive 
manufacturing. All else being equal, the shift in the relative size of each sector will translate into 
increasing or decreasing political influence. Assuming that skilled labor strongly prefers having 
employment protection, their greater political influence will result in stronger employment 
protection in the rich country. In contrast, skilled labor in the poor country will have a harder 
time obtaining employment protection.  
Deindustrialization means the growth of the non-tradable service sector, which is caused 
by exogenous factors, such as technological progress, demand conditions and shifting 
consumption patterns (Iversen & Cusack, 2000). Because the service sector uses unskilled labor 
intensively, exogenous changes would prompt the skill composition of each economy to shift 
toward a higher ratio of unskilled to skilled labor. As a result, it is expected that such structural 
pressure on the labor market’s skill composition will lead to changes in policy. With the 
expansion of the service sector, skilled labor will find it increasingly difficult to hold sway over 
employment protection policies, and as a result, all else being equal, employment protection will 
weaken.  
 
Predictions for Employment Protection 
To understand the effects of the international economy and deindustrialization on 
employment protection, I began this section with a hypothesized world with only two 
countries—one with proportionally more skilled laborers than the other—and three sectors. In 
general, skilled labor prefers higher levels of employment protection. And international trade 




sector is expected to weaken the pro-protection coalition and, as a result, lead to lower levels of 
employment protection.  
These theoretical predictions seem to resonate with the ways in which globalization and 
deindustrialization have influenced political conflicts over job protection in the real world. The 
relaxation of employment protection has emerged as one of the most contested and divisive 
political issues in both developed and developing countries. On one hand, proponents of liberal 
labor reform point to the growing importance of flexibility for firms to survive in an increasingly 
competitive international market. However, heightened fears of job loss have reinforced workers’ 
demand for governments to protect them from such economic and political pressures. Skilled 
workers in relatively well-organized trade unions have been, in many countries across the globe, 
actively and collectively engaged in defending themselves against intensifying assaults on 
existing job protection policies. Despite organized labor’s universal opposition to liberalization, 
however, I predict that trade plays a role in producing different outcomes of the political 
contestation over employment protection according to the nation’s skill distribution. My 
expectation is that trade will tend to strengthen the political clout of skilled workers in countries 
where they are relatively abundant, thus making liberalization difficult. Conversely, skilled 
workers in the developing world will find it increasingly more difficult to defend themselves 
against the drive to liberalize.  
In either case, labor unions that represent skilled workers are often criticized on the 
grounds that strict employment protection policies negatively affect unskilled workers, who are 
inordinately vulnerable to begin with. One of the most striking developments in recent decades 
has been the increasing prevalence of atypical employment which is not sheltered by standard 




to be trapped in “bad” jobs that expose them to greater risks, such as job loss and income 
instability. Although the jury is still out regarding the role of employment protection in 
producing adverse labor market outcomes, there is a general agreement that in advanced 
industrial economies, technological and structural transformations has contributed to 
employment instability and the rise of atypical employment.  
Decreasing job security has pushed policymakers to come up with new institutional 
solutions to protect workers in atypical employment arrangements. Restrictions on fixed-term 
contracts and on the types of work and the industries for which atypical work arrangements are 
permitted represent such policy responses. However, the same structural forces that have ushered 
in institutional protections against new labor market risks  are so overwhelmingly powerful that, 
in some countries, they do not strengthen, but weaken, the level of employment protection As 
Table 2-1 illustrates, a great number of advanced countries have carried out liberal reforms that 
reduce protection for non-standard employees. There are comparatively fewer changes that have 



















Belgium 1997 Restrictions on TWA were reduced and FTC were made renewable - 
    
Denmark 1995 Since the mid-1990s the role of TWA has been recognized by social 
partners and their scope increased 
- 
    
France 1990 The list limiting the circumstances in which the use of FTC and TWA 
is permissible is restored and the maximum total duration of FTC and 
TWA was reduced 
+ 
    
Germany 1994 TWA legislation was loosened - 
    




    
 2002 Maximum total duration of TWA was brought to 24 months - 
    
 2004 The limit on the maximum total duration of TWA was lifted - 
    
Greece 2003 PD 81/2003 changes FTC and TWA - 
    
Hungary 2003 The amended labor code introduced stricter regulations on renewal of 
fixed-term contracts 
+ 
    
Ireland 2003 The Protection of Employees act tightened regulation on valid cases for 
FTC and limited their maximum overall duration to 4 years 
+ 
    
Italy 1997 Treu package on FTC widened the number of valid cases for the use of 
FTC 
- 
    
 1998 TWA were permitted - 
    
 2000 Reform of TWA 2000 extended the use of TWA and removed the 
restrictions concerning unskilled workers 
- 
    
 2001 Legislative Decree no. 368/2001 expanded valid cases for the use of FTC - 
    
 2003 Reform of TWA 2003 (Law no. 30/2003) extended further the use of 
TWA 
- 
    
Japan 1996 The use of TWA was extended to 26 occupations - 
    
 1999 The use of TWA was extended to all occupations with some exclusions - 
    
Korea 1998 TWA were liberalized - 
    
Netherlands 1999 The flexibility and security law increased the maximum possible number 
of FCT and lengthened the maximum total duration of contracts with 
TWA 
- 
    





    
Norway 1995 TWA legislation was eased - 
    
 2000 TWA legislation was further eased  
    
Poland 2002 The new labor code lifted some restrictions in the use of FTC 
(from 2 renewals permitted to unlimited – until accession) 
- 
    
 2003 A new law tightened regulations on temporary work agencies limiting 
the cases when TWA contracts are allowed and reducing their maximum 
total duration 
+ 
    
Portugal 1996 A strategic social plan between social partners was agreed to widen the 
use of FTC and TWA 
- 
    
 2004 New Labor Code came into force in December 2003 - 
    
Spain 1994 Rules governing renewals of FTC were tightened and temporary work 
agencies permitted 
- 
    
 2001 Law 12/2001 tightened the rules governing valid cases for the use of FTC + 
    
Sweden 1993 TWA were permitted - 
    
 1997 FTC were made possible without objective reason - 
    
Great Britain 2002 Maximum total duration of FTC was reduced to 4 years (from unlimited) + 
 
Note: FTC = fixed-term contracts, TWA = temporary work agencies 
          (+) indicates stronger protection; (-) indicates weaker protection. 
















To summarize the predictions based on my theory,  
1. Trade openness and employment protection will be positively associated 
in developed countries and negatively associated in developing countries. 
2. All else being equal, deindustrialization, understood as the growth of low-
skill services, will have a negative impact on standard employment protection. 
3. All else being equal, deindustrialization, understood as the growth of low-





This section tests the main hypotheses derived from my theory using two datasets on 
employment protection. To my knowledge, this dissertation is the first in the field of political 
science to use them to analyze the politics of employment protection. These two are the most 
comprehensive and systematic datasets currently available.  
The first dataset is the OECD’s Indicators of Employment Protection (2008), which 
covers 30 OECD countries for the period between 1985 and 2008. The most useful feature of this 
dataset is that it contains annual information on both regular and atypical employment protection 
policies.12 It calculates the strictness of three features of regular dismissal protection: 1) 
procedural inconveniences that employers face when starting the dismissal process, such as 
notification and consultation requirements, 2) notice periods and severance pay, which tend to 
                                                          
12 In addition to information regarding regular and atypical employment protection, the dataset also includes 
information on the costs incurred from restrictions that governments impose on employers who dismiss a large 
number of workers at one time, such as additional delays and  notification requirements. Because the data on 




vary by the tenure of the employee and 3) difficulty of dismissal, as determined by restrictions 
on the circumstances for which dismissing workers is permitted as well as the financial and 
procedural penalties for unfair dismissal.  
The dataset also compares the strictness of legislative measures designed to protect 
workers from deteriorating conditions of atypical employment, such as: 1) restrictions on the 
types of work for which fixed-term and temporary work agency contracts are allowed and their 
duration, 2) regulations governing the establishment and operation of temporary work agencies 
and 3) requirements for firms to provide regular and temporary agency workers with equivalent 
treatment and pay.  
The availability of cross-national and yearly information on these two separate 
dimensions of protection allows me to test the hypothesized causal relationships between 
globalization and deindustrialization and worker protection. I have argued that globalization, as 
defined by increased trade volume, does not necessarily work against job protection. In some 
cases, workers who have a keen interest in job protection may be able to successfully defend or 
even push for stronger policies that reduce job instability. In other parts of the world, skilled 
workers may find that, as economic openness causes their political influence to decline, they are 
unable to defend the protection that they have enjoyed. As discussed above, the crucial factor 
that determines which of these two paths will be taken is the relative scarcity of skilled labor. 
Relative to other countries, the member countries of the OECD obviously have a greater 
abundance of skilled labor, so it is possible to test whether increased trade indeed has had a 
positive effect on workers in high-skilled countries.  
On the other hand, I have argued that the growth of low-skill-intensive services 




impact on employment protection policies.13 With the growth of the low-skill service sector, 
employment relationships are more likely to become atypical, shorter and less stable. We can use 
the OECD data to empirically determine how deindustrialization has generated pressures in both 
areas of labor market protection. I expect that deindustrialization will have a negative effect on 
both regular and atypical employment protection policies in OECD countries. 
 
The other dataset that I analyze comes from Heckman and Pagés (2004). They have 
constructed an extensive dataset covering both the OECD and Latin American countries for the 
period of 1980-1998. As already mentioned, cross-national data on employment protection is 
very rare. Even in comparison to the cross-sectional data of Botero et al. (2004), this dataset is a 
great advancement in that it provides yearly information regarding the effects of globalization 
between developed and developing countries over a considerable period of time. One major 
difference between this and the OECD data is that the former does not cover atypical 
employment. But for regular employment protection, the correlation between the two datasets is 
high (0.65), which suggests that they are reliable. The average level of employment protection in 
Latin America tends to be higher than in OECD countries. At first glance, the data do not show a 
radical break from the protective institutions during this period. Following the debt crisis, many 
countries in this region went through economic recessions and painful structural adjustments, 
characterized by an opening up of their domestic markets and the toppling of the protective trade 
regimes that they had inherited from the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) period. It will 
be quite interesting to see whether the causal connection between trade and employment 
protection is borne out by the data. 
                                                          
13 “While in an industrial economy,” write Carnes and Mares (Carnes & Mares, 2010: 13), “the modal type of job is 




The effect of deindustrialization on employment protection is less obvious. 
Deindustrialization, i.e. the growth of the service sector, is generally considered as taking place 
in advanced industrial economies, but it also takes shape in many developing countries. Carnes 
and Mares (2010) argue that structural changes in Latin America and OECD economies have 
been comparable in size and equally transformative in their impact on the welfare state. However, 
a closer look at the patterns of growth in service employment reveals that Latin America has 
undergone structural changes of quite a different nature.  
The following figures illustrate the trends of industrial and service employment in OECD 
and Latin American countries between 1980 and 2008. Figures 2-1 and 2-2 clearly demonstrate 
that the rise of service employment in OECD nations was highly correlated with the decline of 
industrial employment. As the term “deindustrialization” implies, employment shifted from 
industry to services. However, for Latin America, Figures 2-3 and 2-4 show that this 
“deindustrialization” did not take place. Although employment in services was trending more or 
less upward, industrial employment did not decrease markedly. The region did not exhibit any 
noticeable pattern of employment shifts from manufacturing to services and certainly did not 













Figure 2-1. Industrial Employment in OECD (% of total employment), 1980-2008 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators  
 
Figure 2-2. Service Employment in OECD (% of total employment), 1980-2008 
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Figure 2-3. Industrial Employment in Latin America (% of total employment), 1980-2008 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators  
 
Figure 2-4. Service Employment in Latin America (% of total employment), 1980-2008 
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To make a more accurate assessment of the service economy in Latin America, Table 2-2 
shows pair-wise correlation coefficients between jobs in service, industry and agriculture. The 
correlation coefficient between service and industry is small and positive, suggesting that in 
Latin America, the growth of the service sector was not attributed to industrial decline. 
Agricultural decline seems to have driven the expansion of both manufacturing and service 
(negative coefficients between agriculture and industry and between agriculture and service). In 
sum, Table 2-2 confirms that deindustrialization, as such, did not take place in Latin America. 
Consequently, when we examine how the service economy affects employment protection, we 
will have to exercise caution; growth in the service sector cannot be equated with 
deindustrialization. The expansion of the service sector represents a fundamentally different 
process in Latin America.  
Finally, in both datasets higher scores on the employment protection variable indicate the 
presence of stronger protection policies. The list of countries included in my analysis is provided 
at the end of this chapter in Appendix 2-1. 
 
Table 2-2. Pair-wise Correlations of Employment in Service, Industry and Agriculture, 1980-
2008 
 
OECD Service Industry Agriculture 
Service 1   
Industry -0.7586 1  
Agriculture -0.8697 0.3572 1 
 
Latin America Service Industry Agriculture 
Service 1 
  Industry 0.0448 1 
 Agriculture -0.9121 -0.4013 1 
 




Main Explanatory Variables 
To examine the relationship between globalization and employment protection, I use two 
standard measures of globalization: trade (sum of imports and exports as % of GDP) and capital 
movements (total private capital flows as % of GDP). My theory predicts a significant effect of 
trade, but does not make any specific predictions about capital movements. Based on the theory 
presented above, I expect trade to have a significant and positive effect on worker protection in 
OECD countries, but not in Latin America. Although there is some evidence that some types of 
international capital may make workers less secure (Frieden, 1991; Mosley, 2003; Simmons, 
1999), globalization has not been theorized as having so large and systematic an effect on 
national labor markets that would bring about legislative changes regarding employment 
relationships.  
Following Iversen and Cusack, I operationalize deindustrialization as 100 minus the 
combined percentage of workers in manufacturing and agriculture r as a percentage of the 
working-age population. Alternatively, we could use service employment data, which by 
definition, is equivalent to this operationalization. Indeed, they are almost identical 
(correlation=0.99). However, note that in Latin America, this variable does not necessarily 
represent “deindustrialization” as such; it merely indicates the size of the service sector. All of 
the data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 
Other Control Variables 
Besides the two main explanatory variables, I control for other factors that might also 
influence employment protection. We can reasonably assume that government partisanship may 




Leftist parties tend to promote employment protection for labor market insiders, who  are the 
core constituency. Although he provides some empirical evidence for a positive association 
between Leftist governments and employment protection, he does not test for its effect on 
atypical employment, which is a central part of his thesis on the insider–outsider divide. Armed 
with comprehensive data on atypical employment, I test for the potential influence of a 
governing party’s ideological orientation with respect to economic policy, a variable provided by 
the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck, Clarke, Groff, & Walsh, 2001). 
A second control variable is union density, which is a standard measure of the strength of 
organized labor (Golden, Wallerstein, & Lange, 1999). To the extent that it represents the 
interests of skilled workers, union density is expected to have a positive effect on employment 
protection. With respect to atypical employment, then, it follows that it will not have a 
discernible effect on employment protection. Data on the size of union membership in 
developing countries is sparse and not highly accurate due to the intrinsic difficulty of collecting 
data in these areas. The most reliable information for advanced industrial countries is the Union 
Centralization Dataset provided by Golden et al. (2009), which is limited to twenty advanced 
industrial countries. To compensate for the unavailability of information on Latin American 
countries, I instead rely on the percentage of wage and salaried workers in the total workforce. 
Since workers employed in the formal sector tend to unionize better and to be better positioned 
to take collective action such as protests against labor reform than self-employed or other types 
of independent workers, this measure is used as a proxy for union organization. 
The literature has also emphasized the importance of skill investments for coordinated 
market economies and singled out employment protection as one of the institutional solutions 




influence of training on employment protection, the average years of schooling for the 
economically active population has been included in the regressions. 
To control for economic conditions that might influence the context of labor reform, most 
of the regressions include unemployment rates and GDP growth rates. The effect of 
unemployment could be positive or negative; a deteriorating job market might create the pressure 
for liberal reform for the sake of job creation, or it might incite stronger resistance from workers 
against such moves. Economic growth could work similarly in the politics of employment 
protection. 
Lastly, to control for economic and political heterogeneity within Latin America, I 
include additional variables such as the strength of democracy and the level of economic 
development. The source of the data for these independent variables appears in Appendix 2-2. 
 
Estimation Results 
To test the hypotheses on the causal relationships between globalization, 
deindustrialization and employment protection, I estimate cross-sectional time-series models for 
a diverse set of countries over the last three decades. I employ ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation with panel-corrected standard errors, a standard method in comparative political 
economy. Cross-sectional time-series data present a particular set of challenges for estimation 
(Beck & Katz, 1995, 2011). But the panel-corrected standard errors recommended by Beck and 
Katz (1995) have been widely adopted by researchers to correct for panel heteroskedasticity and 
spatial contemporaneous autocorrelation. For potential problems of serial autocorrelation within 




The results of analyses using the OECD data for regular and atypical employment 
protection in the developed world are presented in Tables 2-3 and 2-4, respectively. Using 
Heckman and Pagés’ data on regular protection in the OECD and Latin America, I show several 
models in Table 2-5 that test for the differential effects of the main independent variables on the 
developed and developing worlds. In all models, positive coefficients imply a positive impact on 






















Table 2-3. The Determinants of Regular Employment Protection in the OECD  
 (OECD Data) 
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N 544 544 239 239 239  
𝑹𝟐 0.90 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.92  
 
Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05The dependent variable for regular employment protection ranges from 0 
(least protective) to 6 (most protective).  












Table 2-4. The Determinants of Protection of Atypical Employment in the OECD  
 (OECD Data) 
 


















































































       
Union Density 
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GDP per capita 
 
    -0.439 
(0.419) 
 
       
Democracy 
 
    -0.769*** 
(0.222) 
 
       
 
 
      














N 544 544 239 239 239  
𝑹𝟐 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.80 0.78  
 
Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
The dependent variable for atypical employment protection ranges from 0 (least protective) to 6 (most protective).  












Table 2-5. The Determinants of Regular Employment Protection in the OECD and Latin 
America (Heckman and Pagés Data) 
 




















































































































       
GDP per capita 
 






       
Democracy 
 






       
Salaried Workers 
 






       
Latin America 
 
   2.747*** 
(0.397) 
  
       
 
 
      















N 349 559 428 428 210 166 
𝑹𝟐 0.83 0.63 0.69 0.71 0.51 0.79 
 
Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 








The estimated models in Table 2-3 were designed to describe how globalization and 
deindustrialization affect skilled workers in high income countries. Among the variables, the 
coefficients of trade and deindustrialization are the most consistent, are highly significant and 
have the expected signs, giving credence to my theory. First, trade has a positive impact on 
employment protection for regular workers, even in models that include other political and 
economic control variables. Second, deindustrialization reduces job security in all models, as 
shown by its highly significant negative effect. And this effect also does not disappear due to 
other factors such as the governing party’s ideological orientation or the strength of trade unions.  
Compared to trade, other factors such as cross-border movements of private capital do 
not have much of an impact on domestic institutions of employment protection. The emerging 
literature on foreign capital has been trying to establish a causal mechanism through which it 
affects workers’ welfare, but thus far there has not been much evidence to support such a link. 
With respect to employment protection, the results presented here suggest that there might be a 
small positive impact on skilled workers in high income countries.  
While the strength of trade unions does not seem to have a particular influence on the 
level of protection, having a Left-leaning government does, as indicated by positive coefficients 
in Models 3, 4 and 5 in Table 2-3. This is in accordance with the prediction of insider–outsider 
labor politics. 
 
Table 2-4 presents the determinants of atypical employment protection in OECD 
countries. As in the case of regular protection, I have included various controls to rigorously 
assess the effects of the main variables. The results lend support to my theoretical prediction that 




deindustrialization should be an important factor. In Models 1 and 2, the trade variable is 
significant and has a positive sign; however, this effect disappears when other factors are taken 
into account (Models 3, 4 and 5). These results are in stark contrast with the consistent 
significance of trade in Table 2-3.  
In addition, the performance of the deindustrialization variable provides further empirical 
support for my theory. In all models, its coefficients are highly significant and consistently 
negative, regardless of whether other variables are included. The combination of significant 
deindustrialization and insignificant trade effects, therefore, confirms the hypothesis that 
deindustrialization, not trade, is responsible for producing new labor market risks characterized 
by the growing presence of unstable, low-paying, low-skill or atypical jobs. Growing service 
sectors put mounting pressure on existing regulations on atypical employment, and post-
industrial economies have been moving, overall, toward lifting restrictions on atypical 
employment. Moreover, neither Leftist governments nor trade unions have been able to slow the 
expansion of atypical employment, as indicated by the insignificant coefficients of both variables 
in Models 2, 3, 4 and 5. The insignificance of government partisanship contrasts starkly with its 
positive effect on employment protection as reported in Table 2-3. 
 
I used the Heckman and Pagés data on employment protection both for the OECD and 
Latin America to test the various hypotheses for the developed and developing worlds. As a 
result, the models presented in Table 2-5 were estimated with a different sample of countries, but 
for the sake of comparison, Model 1 is limited to the OECD countries. The following three 
models include all countries in the dataset. Models 5 and 6 focus on Latin America and the 




and salaried workers instead of trade union density due to the lack of reliable data for the Latin 
American countries. 
The first thing to note is that the estimates in Model 1 are strikingly consistent with the 
findings from the earlier regressions in Table 2-3 with the OECD’s Indicators for Employment 
Protection data. Compared with Model 3 in Table 2-3, the coefficients for trade, capital flows, 
deindustrialization, Left government, and schooling perform in an almost identical way, in terms 
of both statistical significance and direction of effects. Obtaining similar results from two 
separate datasets lends great support to the findings.  
The next most striking result is that the effects of trade and deindustrialization are totally 
different for the world outside the high income nations. In Latin America, trade is negatively 
associated with employment protection while deindustrialization is found to have a positive 
influence (Models 5 and 6). Due to these conflicting effects, the analysis of an enlarged sample 
including both the OECD and Latin America accordingly returns inconsistent estimates for the 
variables (Models 2, 3 and 4). Consistent with my theory, the sign of the trade variable is 
negative; trade has been hypothesized to weaken skilled labor in developing countries and, as a 
result, skilled workers are likely to lose protections that they enjoyed under a closed economy. 
The effects of deindustrialization are also reversed for Latin America; its positive 
association with employment protection suggests that in Latin America, the service sector has 
grown for different reasons than equivalent growth in advanced industrial economies. As noted, 
whereas in the developed world the service sector has grown as the industrial sector has 
contracted, this has not been the case in Latin America. Employment growth tended to take place 
simultaneously in the service and manufacturing sectors. The implication for labor markets is, 




There could be two possible explanations for the positive impact of service employment 
on employment protection. First, the movement of workers from the agricultural to the urban 
sector might represent a modernization of employment, which might imply an increase in 
regulatory oversight. Unlike the agricultural sector, which tends to be  outside employment 
regulations, employment in the urban sector fosters workers’ need for regulatory intervention. 
The transition from the former to the latter could contribute to the strengthening of employment 
protection. 
Second, a large inflow of unskilled workers into urban sectors might lead workers in the 
formal sector to seek stronger employment protection to strengthen their position.  
Because these two explanations are only suggestive, it is clear that we need more detailed 
research into how the service sector grows across countries. In Latin America, the growth of the 
service sector does not necessarily imply a greater strain on skilled workers in the formal sector 
as is the case with high income countries. On the contrary, the influx of unskilled labor from 
rural areas may even work to the advantage of skilled workers in the industrial sector.  
Finally, the positive coefficient of salaried workers suggests that the (potential) 
organizational capacity of workers is likely to promote strong employment protection policies.  
In sum, the evidence from the cross-sectional time-series models gives credence to the 
hypotheses developed in this chapter. Trade does not always have a negative effect on workers’ 
job security. The growing importance of the service sector also seems to have different 
implications for employee protection in the OECD and in Latin America. Workers in developed 






IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WELFARE STATE 
Why did some countries fail to liberalize employment protection while others succeeded? 
The competitive pressures from the global economy have been presumed to make it increasingly 
more difficult to maintain strong policies that protect workers. However, the divergent outcomes 
of attempted labor reforms and the continued diversity of labor protection regimes between 
countries call into question the conventional wisdom about the “race to the bottom.” To provide 
a better explanation, this chapter has proposed a theoretical framework that can help us 
understand how the global economy and the rise of the service economy affect national labor 
markets. Trade was hypothesized to change the relative strength of skilled workers by expanding 
or contracting the size of sectors that require different degrees of skill. Skilled workers, who are 
the primary beneficiaries of employment protection, are better able to pressure governments to 
adopt protective labor policies in wealthy democracies than in less developed economies. 
Empirical support for the different consequences of trade has been found in the statistical 
analyses in this chapter.  
The theory also incorporates the latest findings from literature on the welfare state—the 
effects of deindustrialization. I have examined the simultaneous effects of external and internal 
evolutions of the market economy. My cross-national time-series analysis supports the argument 
about the transformational role of deindustrialization. Lastly, another contribution of this study is 
to provide an analytical framework that differentiates developed and developing economies. 
Workers are experiencing different levels and types of labor market risk depending on their skills 
and their economic environment. The transitions from closed to open economies and from 
agricultural or industrial to post-industrial economies produce tremendous changes in labor 




institutions across countries at different levels of development and across different types of labor 
market risk. 
Taken together, the empirical evidence of this chapter shows that changes in employment 
protection strongly correlate with economic factors, both external and internal. Existing work on 
the welfare state assigns an unusual degree of importance to market integration and post-
industrialism. The strong correlation between these factors and employment protection that were 
reported in this chapter raises the possibility that changes in employment protection play a role in 
the evolution of social policy. The next chapter provides and tests a theory that connects 
























































































Appendix 2-2. Data Sources 
 
Dependent Variables (Regular Employment Protection and Atypical Employment 
Protection) 
OECD Indicators for Employment Protection, Version 2, Updated 2010-09-24, 
Accessed at http://www.oecd.org/employment/protection 
 
Heckman, James J. & Pagés, Carmen (2004), Law and employment  
Data obtained from authors through personal communication. 
 
Trade 
World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
Accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
 
Capital Flows 
World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
Accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
 
Unemployment 
World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
Accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
 
GDP Growth 
World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
Accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
 
GDP Per Capita 
World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
Accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
 
Left Government 
Beck et al. (2001), Database of Political Institutions, Updated Dec 2010, 
Accessed at http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40 
 
Union Density 
Golden et al., Union Centralization among Advanced Industrial Societies: Update to 2000, 
Version 4.1. Updated 2009-07-01, 
Accessed at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/ 
 
Democracy 
Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010. Version 2010, 
Accessed at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
  
Schooling 
Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset, Updated 2011, 




World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 













































Explaining the Divergent Paths of the Welfare State: 
The Role of Employment Insecurity 
 
This chapter explores how employment protection shapes  government responses to 
demands for social protection. The main thesis of this dissertation, once again, is that 
employment protection is a policy response to labor market risks generated by economic, 
structural forces. The previous chapter established that both international trade and the growth of 
the service sector have contributed to cross-national as well as temporal variation in employment 
protection. Now we turn to the relationship between employment protection and social policy in 
the context of globalization and deindustrialization.  
Because changes in employment protection affect different labor market groups in 
different ways, it is unlikely that all workers will have the same preference regarding social 
protection. In particular, relatively high skilled, regular workers with indefinite contracts, 
immediate beneficiaries of employment protection are pivotal in determining the direction of 
social policy change. In addition, pre-existing institutions of social protection influence whether 
they will  seek compensatory government intervention or not when faced with a decrease in 
employment protection. This study engages in the debate on the etiology of the welfare state by 
exploring how employment protection affects spending on social policies.  
The findings of this chapter suggest that many studies in the current literature may have 
exaggerated the impacts of globalization and deindustrialization on the welfare state. They do not 
have as strong of an effect on social spending as has often postulated; there are not monotonous 
increases or decreases in social spending across countries. Rather, a series of statistical analyses 
67 
 
support the position that the governments of less developed countries tend to enact social policies 
that differ from those of higher income countries.  
To explain the divergent paths of social policy around the world, I extend the theoretical 
reasoning developed in Chapter 2 by using employment protection as an explanatory variable. 
Through cross-national time-series analysis, I show that employment protection has consistently 
strong effects on adoption of social policies across countries, explaining away the effects of 
globalization and deindustrialization. By attending to the political process through which 
economic and technological influences percolate into the employment protection system—and, 
in turn, into changes in broader social policies—this study reigns in the exaggerated emphasis on 
exogenous factors.  
I rely on a measure of total social expenditures to operationalize governmental 
commitments to social protection. Using the level of social spending is a standard choice in the 
literature, though not without some obvious drawbacks.14 In particular, the level of social 
expenditures cannot adequately capture qualitative changes in social policy.. Keeping in mind 
the limitations of statistical tests based on the level of social spending, therefore, I offer a 
nuanced analysis in this chapter, and in the following chapters I use in-depth case studies to 
illuminate the dynamics of qualitative policy changes that cannot be fully captured by statistical 
testing.  
I begin by reviewing the literature that uses globalization and deindustrialization to 
explain changes in social policy and then discuss the major arguments about the role of 
                                                          
14 There are a number of scholars who have criticized the use of aggregate levels of social expenditures. Esping-
Anderson (1990) suggests that we pay attention to distinct patterns and institutional arrangements of different types 
of the welfare state. Mares (2004, 2005) discusses the weakness of the level of social spending as an appropriate 
measure of social protection. Hacker (2002), in his study of the US healthcare system, points out that governments 
across the world have adopted a different mix of private and public provisions of protection. Estevez-Abe (2008) 
argues that Japan has developed comprehensive institutions of social protection, or “functional equivalents. Which 
social expenditure data cannot adequately capture. 
68 
 
employment insecurity. Many of these arguments were touched upon in the previous chapter, but 
here I focus on employment insecurity as an explanatory variable, a driving force for social 
policy change. I then present a theory that helps us understand how employment protection can 
shape welfare states around the world. As in Chapter 2, I attend to the difference between mature 
welfare states in the developed world and less developed social protection systems in other parts 
of the world. The empirical section tests the theory with cross-national time-series data on social 
expenditures from 1980 to 2008, the same period covered in the preceding chapter. After 




In the field of  international political economy, more ink has been spilled on the link 
between globalization and the welfare state than on any other topic. A literature review on this 
subject would typically start with a mention of David Cameron’s study of some thirty years ago 
on 18 OECD countries (Cameron, 1978). Since his discovery of a positive relationship between 
trade and government size, many scholars have followed suit in attributing the postwar growth of 
the welfare state to the need to protect citizens from risks inherent to economic openness. 
“Embedded liberalism” is the term that international relations scholars used to describe the 
international–domestic linkage that was essential to the continuation and flourishing of the 
postwar free trade regime (Ruggie, 1982). With former communist countries and other 
developing nations joining the world trade regime in the 1980s and 1990s, scholars in 
globalization started to produce a voluminous number of studies and endeavored to discover new 
causal mechanisms linking global processes to domestic social policies.  
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While some of the early studies focused on how external economic forces might bring 
about increased government protection, more nuanced studies have tried to establish an 
important intervening role for domestic political institutions. First, the governing party’s 
ideology has received attention for its role in staving off the economic pressure that supposedly 
would force governments to retreat from the market. Garrett (1998), in particular, argues for the 
importance of both organized labor and left-wing parties in shaping domestic responses to global 
economic forces. Within the welfare state literature, the power resources approach has 
emphasized that labor movements play an essential role in producing a generous welfare state 
(Esping-Anderson, 1985; Korpi, 1983, 2006). According to this perspective, strong, well-
organized trade unions are better able to prevent the loss of social protections even if unrestricted 
capital flows and accumulating public debt make it increasingly difficult for the government to 
maintain generous social programs.  
The revisionist view challenges this class-based approach. Based on recently uncovered 
evidence for employers’ tacit support for social insurance in some cases of welfare policy 
development, the revisionist view instead focuses cross-class alliances and sector-based 
coalitions (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Mares, 2003; Swenson, 1991, 2002). Globalization, according 
to this sector-centered perspective, could sharpen the political cleavage between tradable and 
non-tradable sectors (Frieden, 1991). If we are to accept the basic premise that globalization 
implies greater economic risks, sectors exposed to competition with foreign producers are likely 
to advocate for increased social protection while the producers of non-tradable goods and 
services will potentially oppose social protection if they must share its cost.  
Linking policy outcomes to political coalitions—whether class- or sector-based—
assumes that governments inevitably respond to societal demands. Endogenizing this assumption, 
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Boix and Adsera (2002) consider a situation in which responsiveness to external risks is 
contingent on political openness. This point is particularly relevant for many developing 
countries where democracy is not a given. Similarly, Rudra (2005) argues that in developing 
countries, open economies do not always produce social safety nets; democracy often plays a 
role. 
Aside from regime type, it is also important to distinguish between the paths taken by 
developed and developing countries in establishing the welfare state. Many of the conditions 
postulated as important for the development of the welfare state—dominance of social 
democratic parties, strong labor movements, corporatism, and democratic institutions—are 
lacking in the developing world.15 By attending to such differences, an emerging literature is 
examining whether the association between globalization and social spending extends beyond 
the developed world.  
The evidence is inconclusive. While Rodrik (1997)—using a global sample that included 
developing countries—found a positive association between external risks and government size, 
many subsequent studies have disputed his findings and have offered alternative explanations for 
contrasting outcomes in developing countries. For example, Rudra (2002) argues that whether 
globalization will increase social spending depends on the size of skilled labor relative to 
unskilled and surplus labor. She finds that the relative abundance of unskilled, surplus labor 
seems to hamper collective action in defense of social protection. Similarly, Kaufman and 
Segura-Ubiergo (2001) find a negative association between globalization and social expenditures 
in Latin America, and they claim that partisan variables or the presence of democracy do not 
                                                          
15 The flip side of this point points to a crucial weakness of the traditional literature on the Western European 
welfare state. Since many of these variables tend to co-vary among themselves—that is, social democratic countries 
tend to have strong labor movements, corporatist institutions, sizable trade sectors, proportional representation, and 
a big government, it is hard to pin down a causal mechanism. 
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make a discernible difference on social spending. To explain why social spending does not rise 
with economic openness in developing countries, Wibbels (2006) emphasizes yet another 
dimension, namely, international economic factors that discriminate against developing countries 
and constrain their fiscal capacity to finance welfare programs.  
Not surprisingly, many of the analyses focusing on total social expenditures have 
produced pessimistic results about developing countries’ ability to protect their citizens from 
labor market shocks. Once total spending is disaggregated into different components, however, 
we obtain a more variegated, nuanced picture. Human capital investments such as education and 
health care spending may behave differently than spending on more traditional welfare programs 
(Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Wibbels, 2006). Even when 
severe fiscal constraints reduce total spending, governments have some flexibility to reassign 
priorities to different types of social programs. Overall, it seems that developing countries—even 
with their limited fiscal resources—have incorporated different aspects of the welfare state that 
align with their social and political priorities.  
Recent comparative regional studies have started to illuminate the socioeconomic and 
political conditions that determine a country’s priorities: their economic position in the world 
market, factor endowments, developmental strategies, initial levels of inequality and political 
dynamics within the governing coalition In particular, a nation’s developmental strategy seems 
strongly correlated with the size of the welfare state (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Wibbels & 
Ahlquist, 2011). Again, Latin America and East Asia provide classic examples of import-
substituting industrialization (ISI) and export-oriented development strategies, respectively. Each 
region also contrasts starkly with respect to the welfare state. East Asian nations tend to be small, 
minimalist welfare states, whereas beginning as early as the 1920s, Latin America countries 
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began to develop occupationally-based welfare systems modeled along European lines (Mesa-
Lago, 1978). On the other hand, East Asian countries have invested significant resources in 
public primary education and basic health services, which have contributed to rapid 
improvements in their human capital and a relatively equitable development process.  
Given that the social protection policies of each region were designed to reach different 
segments of the population, globalization is expected to have impacted the welfare states in each 
region in different ways. For example, when Latin American governments tried to cut back on 
spending by privatizing financially unsustainable social security policies, the primary 
beneficiaries of occupationally-based programs experienced great hardships. The privatization of 
social security systems in the region has received a good deal of scholarly attention (Brooks, 
2007; Madrid, 2003). A number of cross-national time-series analyses also find that social 
security has been the most vulnerable social expenditure (Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; 
Wibbels, 2006). This trend for liberalization aside, there has been a separate trend of policy 
reform that has broadened the scope of social protection to include things like improved basic 
health services for the poor (Kaufman & Nelson, 2004; Mesa-Lago, 2007; Weyland, 2007). It 
appears that the welfare systems that predate globalization have contributed to the dynamics of 
policy change, creating social policy winners and losers.  
There have also been significant changes to social policies in East Asian countries. The 
minimalist welfare states—while still small in size compared to their peers at similar income 
levels—have moved toward providing greater protection from market insecurity. South Korea, 
with its drastic reforms of social insurance, is an outstanding example; within a very short span 
of time, it introduced or significantly expanded protections in several major areas—social 
security, unemployment and health. Accordingly, social expenditures have grown considerably, 
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but the breadth of this change cannot be fully captured by measures of total spending. Due to 
numerous instances of major policy changes carried out by less developed countries, we should 
exercise caution in accepting the pessimistic results of quantitative studies about the 
sustainability of the welfare state, which are derived from the analysis of  social expenditures at 
highly aggregated levels. Much is concealed by these aggregate measures, and we have yet to 
fully understand the scope, not to mention the determinants, of change.  
 
In summary, most theories that concern the emergence of the welfare state were built 
with only a small number of developed countries in mind. As a result, these theories do not 
adequately account for how the welfare state might differ in developing countries that have 
different historical experiences and socioeconomic characteristics. Many scholars have argued 
that the lack of democratic institutions, unified labor organizations and strong left-wing parties 
explain why developing nations have such low levels social protection. This reasoning has led 
many to conclude that the welfare state in these countries is much more vulnerable to global 
economic changes and that workers are likely to face greater labor market risks.  
These studies  have other limitations, however. Due to the difficulty of getting reliable 
data for many important variables, researchers have devised many alternative measures. For 
example, to measure the political power of workers, in place of trade union density, Rudra used 
“potential labor power”—the ratio between skilled labor and the sum of unskilled and surplus 
labor. Although this would capture labor market conditions that are probably conducive to 
getting political elites to be sensitive to workers’ demands, this is not exactly the same thing as 
capacity of labor to organize. Not only do macro variables such as regime type, on the other hand, 
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explain little of the variation in social spending in most statistical analyses, they also explain 
little about what is really going on within the system.  
More qualitatively oriented studies have suggested that the causal linkage between 
globalization and social policy may be more complicated than macro analyses typically assume. 
These studies highlight conflicting trends both within and across countries, some of which 
indicate expansion of the welfare state. As an effort to distinguish between causal mechanisms, 
recent studies have attended to the initial economic and structural conditions of welfare regimes, 
which seem to have been played a large role in shaping and prioritizing various social policies. 
In addition, pre-existing institutions of social protection and political coalitions affect the 
policies that governments produce in response to external shocks.  
 
What are the key variables that intervene between globalization and social policy? 
Focusing on the differences between coordinated and competitive market economies, Hays (2009) 
argues that labor market institutions affect how the domestic economy responds to trade-related 
shocks, generating demands for compensation and protection from the government. When 
comparing competitive and coordinated labor markets, trade is found to generate greater 
employment volatility in the former because trade-related shocks are passed on to workers in 
through changes in employment levels, and trade makes the demand for labor more elastic. In 
other words, labor market institutions, such as coordinated wage bargaining, can insulate 
workers from unemployment risk.  
Hays’ (2009) argument that unemployment risk is the key determinant of social 
protection policies resonates with the approach of this dissertation research. Though Hays 
emphasizes that labor market institutions transmit the effect of trade to unemployment risk,  
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however, my view gives much greater prominence to the labor market institution of employment 
protection in explaining the cross-national difference in governments’ response to unemployment 
risks generated by international trade. Unemployment risk, which he defines as “the risk that 
someone will become unemployed over a given span of time,” is precisely why employment 
protection policies emerge. We have already seen in Chapter 2 that there is significant cross-
national variation in the degree to which labor market institutions provide protection. It is thus 
reasonable to expect that this variation will affect social policy. More specifically, in countries 
where there are strong labor market institutions, trade in itself may not have a noticeable effect 
on social policies. To the extent that employment insecurity is the driving force behind workers’ 
demands for social protection, it is the institutions of employment protection that determine a 
government’s level of commitment to social welfare systems.  
 
Do we have sufficient evidence that employment insecurity indeed causes individuals and 
groups to seek changes in social policy? The existing literature provides some evidence that 
individual workers respond to greater employment risks. For example, a number of studies have 
examined how employment insecurity can shape their voting patterns (Kayser, 2007). Insecure 
workers are more likely to vote for a challenger than for an incumbent, for a left-leaning party 
than for a conservative one and for anti-establishment parties (Anderson & Jun, 1997; Golden, 
2004; Hellwig & Samuels, 2007; Mughan, Bean, & McAllister, 2003; Mughan & Lacy, 2002). 
Provided that labor market institutions affect the level of employment insecurity (as claimed by 
Hays), such findings suggest that electoral pressures can push politicians to respond to 
employment insecurity with changes in social policies.  
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In addition to electoral mechanisms, the literature provides another analytical tool that is 
useful for capturing the relationship between employment protection and social policy. The 
coalitional perspective posits that different groups have different preferences over policy. As 
reviewed in Chapter 2, Rueda (2005, 2006, 2007) suggests that opposing interests between labor 
market insiders and outsiders explain why employment protection, passive labor market policy 
and active labor market policy differ under social democratic governments compared to Rightist 
or Centrist ones. He further argues that the effect of globalization on unemployment benefits and 
active labor market programs is negligible compared to the interaction between employment 
protection and government partisanship. This is the first empirical evidence suggesting that 
employment protection, independent of globalization variables, impacts broader social policies.  
 
Scholarly interest in the relationship between deindustrialization and the welfare state is a 
more recent phenomenon. The revisionist view challenges the globalization literature, framing 
the growth of the welfare state in the developed world as a response to new labor market risks 
associated with the expanding service sector (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Iversen & Cusack, 2000). 
Scholars have also pointed out that governments can cope with deindustrialization by choosing 
from among several policies. Depending on a government’s priorities—which are shaped by a 
constellation of ideological and political factors—policies may emerge that favor income 
equality, private employment growth or an expansion of public services employment (Iversen & 
Wren, 1998). This suggests that we might not necessarily observe a positive association between 
deindustrialization and total social expenditures. Rather, deindustrialization might impact the 
developing world by reallocating funds among different social policies that would not be 
apparent by examining overall levels of social spending (Carnes & Mares, 2010).  
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However, from just observing a comparable percentage of workers in the service sector, 
it would be premature to conclude that developing countries are experiencing the same type of 
economic transformation as advanced industrial economies. The analysis of the previous chapter 
confirms that there are systematic relationships between the size of the service sector and 
employment protection in both developed and developing countries, but also found that the 
relationships run in opposite directions for the two groups. I have proposed an explanation that 
the contrary effects of the service economy may be due to different process of the service 
expansion in Latin America. While for high income democracies the growth of the service sector 
is associated with the decline of manufacturing and the rise of atypical employment in services, 
the growth of services in developing countries seems to have more to do with decline in the 
agricultural sector. Thus, in terms of producing social policies, the governments of developed 
and developing countries are unlikely to respond to the growth of the service sector in the same 
way.  
 
To sum up, previous studies have tended to frame globalization as directly bringing about 
the welfare state. Some emerging research, however, has explored the role of pre-existing 
domestic institutions as well as how differences between developed and developing countries 
engender different choices with respect to social policies. Such research offers a convincing 
theoretical challenge to the globalization camp. Taking note of how the rise of the service 
economy in Western democracies has generated labor market risks, emerging research attends to 
a variety of political responses within advanced industrial economies. However, studies that look 
at countries with lower income levels are sparse. Their experience in terms of inter-industry 
labor movements may be markedly different and have different implications for social policy 
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change. To fill in the theoretical and empirical gaps identified by this section, in the next section 
I extend the analytical framework introduced in Chapter 2 and present a theory that analyzes the 




THEORY: EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND SOCIAL POLICY 
The purpose of this section is to provide a political explanation that accounts for 
differences in government commitment to social protection. The basic assumption is that 
employment insecurity is the key mechanism that causes political actors to seek out and produce 
changes in policy. I argue that both international trade and deindustrialization can potentially 
affect the size of the welfare state, but that employment protection plays a larger, more 
substantial role. In addition, pre-existing institutions of social protection influence the 




To develop a model of social protection, I make the same assumptions about international 
trade and deindustrialization that I made in the previous chapter. First, international trade, as 
suggested by the Samuelson theorem, benefits skilled labor in advanced industrial economies, 
while it adversely affects skilled workers in less developed countries. These changes are 
associated with changes in political power and, as a result, changes in social policy. In the case 
of employment protection, therefore, international trade will strengthen employment protection 
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in the developed world and weaken it in less developed countries. To the extent that skilled 
workers benefit from and thus prefer social protection, the effect of trade on skilled workers’ 
relative strength will also translate into more extensive social policies. In developed countries, 
trade tends to empower skilled workers, and this power will likely translate into higher levels of 
social protection. In developing countries, trade has the opposite effect on skilled workers, thus 
producing lower levels of government intervention.  
This conceptualization relies on two assumptions. First, I assume that globalization 
affects social policy indirectly, through the distributional consequences of international trade for 
skilled and unskilled labor in the North and the South. Specifically, the relative scarcity of 
skilled labor determines whether economic openness will benefit or harm high-skilled workers. 
This assumption, as in Chapter 2, derives from international trade theory, particularly from the 
work of Wood (1995). Dividing workers into three different skill categories, Wood suggested 
that trade would affects each group differently depending on whether a country has a relative 
abundance or scarcity of skilled labor. This theory has been widely drawn upon to explain rising 
skill premiums and falling real wages for low-skilled workers in advanced industrial economies. 
Political scientists have theorized that increased economic risks promoted the growth of Western 
welfare states. According to this theoretical model, however, it is low-skilled workers who lose 
from trade and who are responsible for the expansion of social protection. In contrast, I argue 
that in developed economies it is the winners (skilled labor), not the losers (unskilled labor), who 
foster the welfare state. 
Previous studies based on Wood’s distinction between skilled and unskilled labor, 
however, has not adequately explained the emergence of the welfare state in the developing 
world. If the theoretical framework based on this distinction is correct, then increasing trade 
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should benefit unskilled laborers in developing countries, and yet, this seems not to be the case. 
For example, Rudra (2002) argues that the negative association between economic openness and 
social spending in the developing world controverts the prediction that unskilled labor benefits 
from trade and, as a result, can pressure the governments into allocating more resources toward 
social protection.   
My view is that the negative association can be accounted for when we consider the 
important role of skilled labor and the nature of pre-existing welfare programs. Many developing 
countries have developed a small welfare state that caters to a small segment of workers in the 
formal, public or privileged sectors. If globalization weakens skilled labor as Wood’s theory 
would suggest, then it could lead to cutbacks to existing welfare programs.  
My second assumption is that skilled labor has an immediate interest in social protection 
and is a key actor in changing policy. Recent studies shed light on what makes skilled workers an 
important political force for the development of the welfare state. Most famously, Iversen and 
Soskice (2001) have developed a skill-based explanation of individual preferences concerning 
social protection. In short, skilled workers generally prefer a higher level of social insurance due 
to asset-specificity, which makes it difficult for them to find a new job if they lose their current 
one. Not only are they interested in having social insurance, skilled workers also tend to have the 
political capacity to effectively pressure the government. Even if we account for the fact that pre-
existing social policies and a government’s administrative capacity to collect contributions and 
deliver benefits may cause skilled workers to prefer privatized insurance as opposed to 
government provisions, this assumption generally seems to hold true.  
In summary, I have discussed two relationships in this section. First, trade benefits skilled 
labor in developed nations, but harms them in developing nations. Second, as a group, skilled 
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workers are instrumental in expanding social policies. It follows, then, that economic openness 
will expand social policies in developed countries, but curtail them in developing countries, all 
else being equal. 
 
Deindustrialization 
To understand the effect of deindustrialization on the welfare state, I follow the same 
reasoning used to analyze the relationship between the service economy and employment 
protection. In the previous chapter, I argued that deindustrialization—that is, the growth of the 
service sector—entails two different processes for developed and developing countries. Whereas 
the expansion of service employment in developed countries is typically associated with the 
contraction the industrial sector, in developing countries, it is associated with the contraction of 
the agricultural sector. As evidence, I have shown that deindustrialization produces opposing 
trends for employment protection in Latin America and the OECD. Existing literature has 
suggested that deindustrialization accompanies greater labor market risks and could be the 
driving force for the expansion of social policy, as expressed by increased social expenditures or 
more extensive social programs.  
Let us first consider deindustrialization in developed countries. In analyzing labor market 
insecurity induced by the service sector in developed countries, I have  distinguished between the 
risk of job loss and the growth of atypical employment. There could be two opposing forces. 
First, because skilled workers face greater risks, they will demand a greater level of social 
protection. Second, since deindustrialization implies the contraction of manufacturing—which 
employs a great number of skilled workers—it can weaken the political coalition that undergirds 
the welfare state. In order to determine which of these two forces is stronger, we need to consider 
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the nature of pre-existing social protection programs. Since social protection policies tend to be 
expansive in mature welfare states, they are often financially burdensome, leaving little room for 
a further expansion (Pierson, 2001). Furthermore, declining regular employment implies a less 
stable tax base, making it more difficult to increase social spending. In other words, in the 
developed world, we are likely to see that social spending declines with the growth of service 
employment.  
For many developing nations, the growth of the service sector does not mean that there is 
a decline in manufacturing. Rather, it could indicate a shift from rural, agricultural work to both 
services and manufacturing. The transition to these modern sectors and the formal economy 
enlarges not only the organizational base of workers demanding social protection, but also the 
tax base that is necessary to finance welfare programs. Therefore, in developing countries, the 
growth of the service sector will likely lead to an increase in social spending.  
 
The Role of Employment Protection 
A central claim of this dissertation is that employment protection has a strong impact on 
the welfare state, independent from trade and deindustrialization. I have shown in the previous 
chapter that trade and deindustrialization influence policies that protect workers from risks 
associated with job loss. This chapter addresses how both of these factors affect the welfare state. 
In describing the causal pathways through which changes in trade volume and industrial 
structure lead to changes in social policy, I have placed skilled workers at the center of analysis. 
In short, exogenous factors such as increased trade and the emergence of post-industrialism 
affect the job security of key political actors in the modern capitalist economy—skilled workers.  
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Obviously, employment protection has the most important influence on job security. 
Though researchers have long recognized the importance of collective wage bargaining and 
corporatist institutions, they have given very little attention to  employment protection. Rueda’s 
studies are a rare exception. Focusing on the insiders—who are assumed to prefer employment 
protection over unemployment benefits or active labor market programs—he predicts that strong 
employment protection will have a negative effect on social spending that is specifically 
designed to benefit outsiders. His theory emphasizes the link between social democratic parties 
and insiders to explain why policies typically do not reflect the interests of outsiders.  
Similarly, I emphasize the effect of employment protection on social policy, but enlarge 
the scope of social policy beyond labor market programs and extend the analysis by including 
political systems that lack a strong tradition of social democratic movements or close ties 
between social democratic parties and union organizations. I argue that labor market insiders can 
develop a strong preference for government-provided protection in broad areas such as old-age, 
sickness and unemployment, and they will act to pressure the government to enact policies that 
they prefer. In my view, Rueda’s assumption that skilled and unskilled laborers will necessarily 
have opposing policy preferences is too rigid and static. When we consider the broader 
consequences of employment insecurity, it would seem more appropriate to predict that 
employment protection policies will be positively associated with broader social policies. The 
reason why labor market insiders can develop strong interests in social policy in general—not 
just limited to passive and active labor policy—can be understood by considering the expected 
consequences of losing a job. According to the skill-based perspective, skilled workers would be 
interested in social insurance for the same reason that they would prefer strong employment 
protection: because their specific skills make them subject to a potentially long spell of 
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unemployment or a significant decline in income in the event of job loss (Iversen & Soskice, 
2001). Empirically, we are likely to find a positive association between employment protection 
and social insurance. If employment protection is liberalized, the political coalition that supports 
social protection will decline in size and power, thus leading to a contraction of the welfare state.  
In some cases, however, a decrease in employment protection could lead to an expansion 
of social policy. A decrease in employment protection implies that the division between insiders 
and outsiders has become more fluid and weak. This increases the possibility that a new political 
coalition will form that favors changes in social policy. If pre-existing social policies are not 
suited to cover increased labor market risks, workers will have an incentive to demand changes 
in social policy. Typically, this is the case with countries that have a less developed welfare state 
where there is room to increase social spending. More generally, liberalization of the labor 
market can spur workers to demand government protection. This can be an opportunity for 
policy innovation and the qualitative transformation of social programs that do not assume stable 
employment relationships within a closed labor market.  
In short, changes in employment protection will produce one of two possibilities—the 
outcome being determined by pre-existing institutions of social protection. On the one hand, 
when social protection already covers a variety of labor market risks and reaches a significant 
proportion of workers—as in the Western welfare states—the weakening of employment 
protection reduces the size and political power of skilled labor, thus destabilizing the foundation 
of the welfare state and making it difficult to maintain the level of social protection. The level of 
employment protection co-varies with the level of social spending.  
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On the other hand, small welfare states in the developing world tend to provide limited 
protection to skilled workers—a small, but privileged, group. The weakening of employment 
protection could become an opportunity to expand social protection by changing their preference  
In this section, I have sketched out how the global economy, the growth of the service 
sector and employment protection shape the welfare state. The following section tests these 




Dependent Variable  
To test the proposed arguments about the effect of employment protection, globalization 
and service sector employment on social policy, I use cross-national time-series data from IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics from 1980 to 2008. The sample includes OECD and Latin 
American countries, the same set of nations as in the previous chapter, and the time period was 
determined by the availability of data on employment protection. I operationalize each 
government’s level of commitment to social protection as the ratio of government spending on 
social protection to total government spending.16 While social spending is a standard way to 
assess the magnitude of a government’s responsiveness to social needs, I will note my 
reservation about using this measure before proceeding.  
The most important criticism is that spending measures do not capture the political 
dynamics inherent in social policy; such aggregate measures cannot capture divisive aspects of 
welfare policies such as distributions of benefits. Since my arguments emphasize the importance 
                                                          
16 I have estimated the models using alternative measures of social spending. Using OECD’s social expenditures as a 
percentage of total government expenditures and as a percentage of GDP produces more or less similar results. The 
correlation coefficient with IMF’s data used here is 0.81 for the former and 0.66 for the latter. 
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of pre-existing social protection institutions in shaping current policies, the disadvantage of using 
this measure can be potentially severe. In interpreting the results, therefore, we need to keep this 
point in mind and take into consideration the design of social policy and the political context. To 
complement these results, I devote the following two chapters to in-depth case studies.  
 
Explanatory Variables  
The operationalization of most of the explanatory variables is identical to that in Chapter 
2. To test for the effects of employment protection on broader social policies, I use three 
measures that were used as dependent variables in the previous chapter. The information on 
regular employment protection for the OECD comes from the OECD’s Indicators for 
Employment Protection; the information for Latin America comes from Heckman and Pagés 
(2004). To evaluate the effect of atypical employment regulations on social policy, I rely on the 
OECD’s indicators. Unfortunately, data on this variable are not available for Latin America.  
The theory discussed in the preceding section suggests that skilled workers are 
particularly interested in social policies that protect them from the severe consequences of job 
loss. Not only do they have a strong preference for social protection, but also they tend to be well 
organized and can take collective action to pressure the government to enact particular policies. 
In other words, skilled labor has traditionally been a strong political base and advocate for the 
welfare state in advanced industrial economies. The weakening of employment protection 
represents an erosion of the support base of the modern welfare state. Therefore, changes in 
broader social policies will likely mirror changes in employment protection in these countries.  
Emphasizing the differences in the institutions of social protection, the theory predicts 
rather different outcomes in less developed countries. Skilled workers in the formal sector are 
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traditionally protected by strong labor regulations and social insurance. If exclusive protection 
for them is eliminated, they are likely to change their preference from the existing policy regime 
premised on strong insider protection toward social policy with a more inclusive, universalistic 
bent, which can better protect them from new risks in a more flexible labor market. Conversely, 
as long as insiders are comfortably trenched in a segregated labor market, there is less of an 
incentive for them to forge political alliances with outsiders or to seek changes in social policy 
orientation. In this type of labor market system, employment protection is likely to correlate 
negatively with social policy.  
While previous studies have recognized that employment insecurity connects 
globalization and deindustrialization to social policy change, there is little empirical research that 
tests the impact of employment protection. I predict strong and consistent effects of this 
particular labor market institution, which has the most direct, immediate bearing on employment 
insecurity, on social spending. I expect that regular protection will be positively associated with 
social spending in OECD countries, and negatively associated with social spending in Latin 
American countries.   
The logic of atypical employment regulation is different from that of regular employment 
protection. Since it is concerned with unskilled workers, atypical employment protection has no 
obvious relevance for the argument of this chapter, which focuses on skilled workers with 
organizational capacity. Since a liberalization of atypical employment poses greater labor market 
risks to unskilled workers and is likely to produce greater numbers of unskilled workers in the 
labor market, it is plausible that the demand for social protection will increase. However, 
because the very nature of atypical employment makes it harder for workers to organize, I 
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anticipate that changes in atypical employment protection will not have an identifiable impact on 
social spending.  
 
In agreement with the established proposition in the literature, I hypothesize that 
globalization could have systematic effects on the welfare state, but once the effects of 
employment protection are accounted for, its effects will be diluted or disappear. In the earlier 
discussion, I argued that because international trade affects skilled workers, it will indirectly 
affect social policies. As per the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in international economics, skilled 
workers in advanced industrial economies benefit from international trade because industries 
intensively using high-skilled labor will expand, thereby increasing the political power of skilled 
laborers, who will then be better able to pressure their government into providing social  
protection.  
The political power of skilled labor in skill-poor economies, however, will decline with 
international trade. Social spending will, in turn, be reduced. These contrasting predictions with 
regard to developed and developing countries are in line with the literature. Scholars have found 
that globalization tends to accompany cuts to social spending in the developing world, whereas it 
promotes the welfare state in Western countries. Focusing on skilled workers, I test these  
hypotheses controlling for the effects of employment protection and deindustrialization. Because 
some studies have reported that openness of capital markets adversely affects the sustainability 





Likewise, the growing service sector puts different pressures on developing and 
developed countries. In Chapter 2, I argued that deindustrialization pressures labor markets by 
requiring more flexible employment relationships and creating a greater number of low-skill jobs. 
I demonstrated that deindustrialization is negatively correlated with employment protection in 
developed countries. In developing countries, however, growth in service employment is 
primarily attributed to surplus labor in rural areas, rather than jobs shifted away from 
manufacturing. Employment in manufacturing in much of the developing world has in fact 
increased or stayed the same. Therefore, tertiarization accompanies the transition to the modern, 
formal economy with more workers on the payroll.17 I showed in the previous chapter that in 
Latin America, this change has led to stronger employment protection, while in the OECD 
nations, it has led to weaker protections for both regular and atypical workers. By extension, I 
expect that in the OECD, a greater number of service jobs will decrease  social spending, 
whereas in Latin America it will increase spending. 
 
Other than the three main variables, I use similar controls that were used in Chapter 2, 
since most of them have been identified as influential in the literature. First, a great number of 
scholars have argued that when Leftist parties come into power and advocate the interests of 
workers, they tend to spend significantly more on social protection than Centrist or Rightist 
parties. Furthermore, many studies argue that the welfare state under social democratic 
                                                          
17 There is actually a complication in this process of transitioning into a formal economy, Latin American economies 
have experienced an increase in informality during recent decades (OECD, 2009a, 2009b). Many economists have in 
fact criticized strong employment protection as its cause. The growth of the informal economy, however, is much 
greater in other parts of the world, notably Africa, although it is difficult to obtain an accurate estimate of informal 
employment (Jutting & de Laiglesia, 2009). I presume that if employment growth in the formal manufacturing and 
services is not large enough to absorb surplus labor, then it would result in the rise of informal employment in 
industries and services. The result is likely to be a transition from rural to urban areas with the informal employment 




governments is more resistant to international economic pressures. On the other hand, it has been 
questioned whether partisanship makes a difference in developing countries, where fiscal 
constraints are more severe and political parties are supposedly less accountable to voters and 
their constituencies. In Latin America, for example, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) found 
that partisanship has no effect on social spending. Other research goes even further to argue that 
Leftist governments can safely pursue fiscal austerity because they have an advantage due to 
their close relationship with constituents (Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin, 1999; Stokes, 2001; 
Weyland, Madrid, & Hunter, 2010). Therefore, the variable on government partisanship may 
have different signs for developed and developing countries. The data I use come from the World 
Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001). It is a measure on the governing 
party’s ideological orientation with respect to economic policy. Alternatively, using Leftist 
parties’ share of cabinet portfolios—which are only available for a small number of OECD 
countries—the results (not presented here) are similar to what I report below.  
Power resource theories stress strong labor movements for the success of welfare states 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 1983). Many studies on welfare states in developing countries 
also take this perspective to explain why the openness–bigger government nexus is hard to find. 
Unfortunately, the data on union density is only available for OECD countries. Therefore, for the 
analysis of Latin American countries, I use the size of waged and salaried workers as a proxy for 
the strength of skilled labor.  
I also include economic variables to control for the effects of economic conditions that 
might elicit or suppress government spending. High levels of unemployment could increase 
government spending because a greater number of the population becomes dependent on 
unemployment benefits and other social expenditures. Therefore, I expect that high 
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unemployment will cause social spending to take up a greater share of total government 
expenditures. GDP growth rate is expected to have the opposite effect on social spending. Since 
improved economic conditions will simultaneously generate more revenue for the government 
and lessen the need for social protection, the coefficient of GDP growth rate should be negative. 
Government debt, which is only available for OECD countries, has been presumed to decrease 
social spending. However, in reality, since government deficits tend to be “sticky,” it may not 
produce a negative coefficient. To avoid the possibility of reverse causality and to take into 
account the fact that the economic and fiscal conditions of the previous year affect the current 
year’s social spending, I use a lag for all three economic variables. For the Latin American 
sample, I have included the strength of democracy and the level of economic development as 
additional controls. Data sources for the explanatory variables are listed at the end of the chapter.  
 
Results  
I estimate cross-sectional time-series models for OECD and Latin American countries 
from 1980 to 2008 to test my arguments about the relationship between employment protection 
and the welfare state in the context of global market integration and structural changes associated 
with the service sector.   
As in the previous chapter, I employ OLS estimation with panel-corrected standard errors 
to control for panel heterosckedasticity and spatial contemporaneous autocorrelation. In addition, 
I assume a panel-specific autoregressive process (AR-1). 
I present three tables, one for OECD countries with two employment protection variables 
(Regular Protection and Atypical Protection based on the OECD data (Table 3-1), one for the 
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global sample and the OECD sample using the Heckman and Pagés data on regular employment 














































Table 3-1. The Determinants of Social Spending in the OECD 
(Using the OECD data for regular and atypical employment protection variables) 
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     6.172** 
(2.63) 
       
Democracy 
 
      
       
 
 
      















N 505 496 466 466 197 197 
𝑹𝟐 0.86 0.88 0.92 0.95 0.97 0.96 
Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 








Table 3-2. The Determinants of Social Spending in the Global Sample and the OECD 
 (Using the Heckman and Pagés data for employment protection) 
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Salaried Workers 
 
  -0.147*** 
(0.042) 
   
       
Union Density 
 









    -0.821** 
(0.36) 
 














N 429 429 319 192 163  
𝑹𝟐 0.78 0.77 0.88 0.94 0.97  
Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 






Table 3-3. The Determinants of Social Spending in Latin America 
(Using the Heckman and Pagés data for employment protection) 
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Salaried Workers 
 
   -0.351*** 
(0.104) 
  
       
Schooling 
 
    2.734*** 
(0.975) 
 















N 126 126 124 87 124 124 
𝑹𝟐 0.64 0.68 0.64 0.34 0.68 0.93 
Note: ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 








The results in Table 3-1 for high income countries strongly support my arguments about 
the effects of employment protection on social spending. Regardless of the inclusion of various 
control variables, regular employment protection has a highly significant and positive effect on 
social spending in all models. This supports the theory advanced in this chapter that skilled 
workers with job stability are the basis of the welfare state.  
On the other hand, atypical employment protection does not have a statistically 
significant effect on government spending across all models. Model 2 reveals a significant 
positive effect on this variable, but this effect is insignificant when other variables are added to 
the equation. Increased risk in the labor market for low-skilled, temporary contract, part-time, or 
dispatched workers does not necessarily lead to greater protection in the form of social insurance, 
income transfers, etc. These types of workers are disadvantaged not only in their contractual 
relationships with their employers but also by their lack of a collective voice regarding social 
policy. 
In line with my expectations, capital movements do not have a significant effect on social 
spending (as some theorists would posit), suggesting that globalization primarily operates 
through international trade. The coefficients on trade are positive and statistically significant 
(p<0.05), but interestingly they become insignificant in models with controls for government 
partisanship and union density (Models 4 and 5). Moreover, trade does not have as robust of an 
effect on social spending as employment protection. It appears that the findings of earlier studies 
have exaggerated the globalization–welfare-state nexus by failing to account for crucial political 
contexts such as employment protection, the ideological orientation of governments and the 
political representation of labor. As expected, deindustrialization has a positive and significant 
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on social spending, except in Model 5. It is noteworthy that the number of observations is 
significantly reduced in Model 5 due to a smaller coverage of union density data.  
Turning to economic factors, the size of government debt has a statistically significant 
and positive association with social spending. I have considered two explanations of this 
relationship: 1) government debt inhibits politicians’ ability to increase spending on welfare 
programs, or 2) governments that spend more on social protection tend to accrue long-standing 
debts. It appears that empirical evidence supports the second scenario. Unemployment and GDP 
growth do not seem to have consistently significant effects on social spending. 
 
Table 3-2 has different models that test the hypotheses with the global sample (Models 1, 
2 and 3), which includes both the OECD and Latin America, and the OECD sample (Models 4 
and 5) for the purpose of comparison. Since the Heckman and Pagés data do not provide 
information on atypical employment, all the models except Model 5 include only the regular 
protection measure. Model 5 was estimated with atypical employment protection from the 
OECD data.  
First of all, comparing Models 4 and 5 with the results from Table 3-1 reveals that 
employment protection still has a highly significant and positive effect on social spending even 
when we employ an alternative source of data for employment protection. Trade also registers 
significant and positive effects as in Table 3-1. However, the results for deindustrialization do 
not conform to the pattern in Table 3-1. In Model 4 there is an insignificant negative effect on 
social spending; in Model 5, the negative effect is statistically significant. We saw in Table 3-1, 
too, that when the union organization variable is added, deindustrialization is negative and 
insignificant. The effects of deindustrialization, therefore, do not seem as robust as are generally 
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assumed. The significant and positive coefficients on union density in both tables indicate that 
organized labor can effectively pressure the government to provide social protection.   
Models 1, 2 and 3 show the results for the entire sample encompassing both Latin 
America and the OECD to give a sense of divergence between the two groups. Each has a 
different set of control variables, with government debt and union density dropped from 
estimation due to the lack of information for Latin America. Most importantly, trade and 
employment protection appear to have different effects as shown in its changed signs on the 
coefficients.  
 
The differences between high income OECD members and the Latin America become 
clearer when we look at Table 3-3. First, employment protection seems to have a negative 
relationship with social spending in Latin America unlike in the OECD countries. Substantively 
speaking, this means that a decrease by one standard deviation in employment protection leads to 
an increase in social spending as a share of total government expenditures by 6.5%.18 Whereas in 
the developed world, weakening employment protection accompanies cuts to social spending, it 
leads Latin American governments to spend more on social programs. This interesting finding 
seems related to recent events in the region. A number of studies report that many countries in 
the region have carried out welfare reforms, and characterize those reforms as attempts to 
broaden the coverage of social protection. The political forces driving the shift are still under 
debate. The results from this analysis suggests that growing labor market risks for formerly 
secure workers motivate them to seek social policy changes to reduce their new vulnerability.  
Turning to the effects of globalization, we find negative effects of trade on social 
spending. Although statistically significant, the magnitude of its impact is much smaller than   
                                                          
18 This and following calculations of marginal effects are based on Model 3 in Table 3-3. 
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that of employment protection. A decrease in imports and exports as a percentage of GDP by one 
standard deviation would lead to about 3% growth in spending on social protection as a 
percentage of the total budget. This finding confirms the results of previous research on 
globalization’s effects on Latin American welfare states. Capital movements do not seem to be 
significantly related to changes in social policy. 
All models support my argument about the relationship between the service sector and 
Latin America’s welfare states. The deindustrialization variable is highly significant (p<0.001), 
and its predicted impact is a little weaker in magnitude than that of employment protection 
(about 6%). As expected, growing services are correlated with an increase in social expenditures. 
I interpret these results as evidence for the theory that the concurrent transfer of domestic labor 
from the agricultural sector to the industrial and service sectors increases the demand for social 
protection, enlarging the political base of collective action to change the orientation of social 
policies.  
Government partisanship does not seem to have much of an impact on social spending. 
When a measure of executive partisanship is used in place of the governing party’s policy 
orientation, the effects are still insignificant (results not shown). This result also confirms earlier 
findings that partisanship affects social policies in different ways in Latin America versus 
advanced democracies. In addition, neither national income nor the robustness of democratic 
institutions appears to have much of an impact on welfare spending in Latin America. The last 
column presents a model that includes country fixed effects to check the robustness of my 
findings. Most importantly, the coefficient on employment protection remains significant and 





To sum up the findings of this section, employment protection emerges as the strongest, 
most consistent predictor of social spending across all countries in the sample. As hypothesized, 
I find that international economic factors—especially trade—and internal economic change play 
a weaker role in shaping social policy. In addition, empirical evidence in this chapter suggests 
that welfare states in the developing world respond to these factors quite differently than welfare 
states in more advanced economies. I have provided an explanation of different political 
dynamics that vary according to skilled labor’s employment insecurity. A series of direct tests 
for the impact of employment insecurity using measures of employment protection institutions 
strongly support my hypotheses.  
 
 
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
While the statistical tests in this chapter support my arguments about the importance of 
employment protection as a determinant of social policy, there could be some concerns and 
objections regarding the validity of the statistical evidence I have provided.  
First, some could argue that it would be more appropriate to use more disaggregated 
measures because welfare programs such as unemployment benefits, active labor market policy, 
healthcare, pensions or income support for the poor might respond differently to changes in the 
main independent variables. Indeed, some studies have shown that there is substantial cross-
national variation in the budgetary priority among these programs, and some programs are more 
sensitive to economic conditions than others. Disaggregating social expenditures into different 
categories might reveal politically salient patterns. But the primary motivation of this study on 
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employment protection is to find initial evidence that this important labor market institution—
thus far overlooked in the literature, but most immediately relevant for employment insecurity—
does have crucial effects on the overall shape of the welfare state and governments’ commitment 
to providing social protection for citizens. I have found such evidence and empirical support for 
my argument. Having established the relevance of employment protection for the politics of 
social policy, I leave the analysis of disaggregated data for future research projects. 
On the other hand, using the “level” of social spending for the dependent variable could 
have limitations in capturing qualitatively more crucial aspects of social policy change. I have 
emphasized that pre-existing social protections constrain social policy change, arguing that 
differences in pre-existing social policies explain much of the differences in social spending in 
the OECD and Latin America. Unfortunately, the level of spending does not appropriately 
capture this dynamic. In a way, this could mean a “hard” test if we are to find a statistical 
relationship based on this imperfect measure. Despite the fact that the spending measure has this 
intrinsic weakness, my analysis did find a robust relationship between employment protection 
and social spending. To provide a more nuanced explanation that captures the hypothesized 
causal relationship in a way not revealed in numbers, I adopt a case study method in the next two 
chapters. 
A second limitation is that the Latin American sample does not contain the union density 
variable. Given that welfare state scholars, particularly from the power resources perspective, 
have stressed the power of trade unions in shaping the welfare state, not controlling for this 
factor might generate misleading results, one of which is an overstatement of the true effect of 
employment protection. Indeed, the coefficients on union density in Table 3-1 and 3-2 are 
statistically significant and positive. Yet the coefficients on employment protection remain 
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significant with the same sign in those models. When I use the average years of schooling as a 
proxy for labor strength for the Latin American sample, Table 3-3 shows that the effect of 
employment protection on social spending remains the same. Previous studies of developing 
countries in comparative political economy in general suffer from a dearth of reliable data on 
labor movements. Consequently, scholars have relied on alternative measures that are 
hypothesized to approximate labor’s potential power, such as years of schooling and the ratio of 
skilled labor to unskilled and surplus labor. None is entirely satisfactory. Therefore, we need to 
exercise caution in drawing conclusions from statistical results based on imperfect proxies. 
A third possible criticism is that statistical analyses of this chapter, like most econometric 
studies, only prove correlation, not causation. As such, we must be cautious in using statistical 
analyses as definitive evidence for theory. As a remedy, the following two chapters will use case 
studies to provide detailed accounts of the political processes that the statistical correlations in 
this and previous chapter suggest.  
Finally, the results presented in this chapter might come under suspicion due to the 
possibility of Latin American exceptionalism. Although using data on Latin America has 
substantially broadened the theoretical and empirical scope of the literature, it may be difficult to 
generalize my conclusions to other parts of the world. Admittedly, Latin America has its 
idiosyncratic political and socio-economic legacies. To assess the robustness of the proposed 
relationships between employment protection, globalization and deindustrialization, I carry out 
an in-depth analysis of a completely different case—South Korea—to demonstrate the logic 








Appendix 3-1. Data Sources 
 
Dependent Variable: Social Spending (% of Total Government Spending) 
IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (various years) 
 
Regular Employment Protection/ Atypical Employment Protection (OECD) 
OECD Indicators for Employment Protection, Version 2, Updated 2010-09-24, 
Accessed at http://www.oecd.org/employment/protection 
 
Regular Employment Protection (Latin America) 
Heckman, James J. & Pagés, Carmen (2004), Law and employment  
Data obtained from authors through personal communication. 
 
Trade 
World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
Accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
 
Capital Flows 
World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
Accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
 
Unemployment 
World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
Accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
 
GDP Growth 
World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
Accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
 
GDP Per Capita 
World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
Accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
 
Left Government 
Beck et al. (2001), Database of Political Institutions, Updated Dec 2010, 
Accessed at http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40 
 
Union Density 
Golden et al., Union Centralization among Advanced Industrial Societies: Update to 2000, 
Version 4.1. Updated 2009-07-01, 
Accessed at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/ 
 
Democracy 
Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2010. Version 2010, 





Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset, Updated 2011, 
Accessed at http://www.barrolee.com/ 
 
Salaried Workers 
World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 
Accessed at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
 
Government Debt 
World Bank, World Development Indicators Database 






































The Politics of Employment Protection in Korea, 1980-2008 
 
In this chapter, I examine how South Korea’s relationship with the global market and the 
internal transformation of its economic structure have shaped the political debate regarding its 
employment protection policies during the last three decades. With its democratic transition in 
1987, reforming labor laws became a central topic of political debate. Within a decade, laws 
concerning employment protection emerged as one of the thorniest issues—a debate which is 
still far from being resolved. During the same period, Korea went through tumultuous changes 
not only in the political sphere—culminating in its successful transition to democracy in 1987—
but also in the socioeconomic sphere. Although its GDP per capita was barely over a quarter of 
the OECD average in 1980, the country was able to join the OECD only in less than two decades.  
Following the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, however, its economy experienced a 
dramatic setback. But it rebounded quickly and now stands as the world’s 12th largest economy. 
While Korea has grown into a global industrial powerhouse, its economy faces some serious 
structural challenges. The population is ageing at an unprecedented rate, and employment in its 
industrial sector is rapidly and prematurely shifting toward the service economy. Facing greater 
competition with its rapidly industrializing neighbors, Korea’s manufacturing industries are 
having difficulty maintaining competitiveness in the export market.  
The conflict over employment protection at the levels of national politics and industrial 
relations has developed against this backdrop, making Korea an ideal case to help us understand 
the long-term process through which domestic economic structures and political coalitions 
interact with the global economy to produce distinct policy equilibria concerning employment 
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protection. Furthermore, negotiations over labor reform among the government, labor unions and 
the business community unfolded amidst negotiations over the Korean welfare state. For the 
purposes of this dissertation project, therefore, Korea presents a unique opportunity to examine 
my core thesis about the relationship between employment insecurity and social protection.  
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the 
methodological strategy of this and next chapters. Reviewing the limitations of statistical 
analysis, it explains why Korea is a suitable case for in-depth analysis. The next two sections 
address Korea’s experience over the last three decades in terms of my main independent 
variables—trade openness and deindustrialization. Going beyond an oversimplified 
operationalization of the two variables, I pay close attention to important changes that a simple 
measure of trade openness and the size of the service sector are unable to reveal. Specifically, I 
focus the effects of globalization on changes in  the sectoral composition and skill intensity of 
Korea’s exports, 2)  To understand the role of deindustrialization in labor politics, I investigate 
change in the industrial structure, productivity gaps between its different service industries and 
patterns of inter-industry labor movement. I derive expectations of outcomes for employment 
protection from the assessment of the two independent variables and then consider the mediating 
effects of Korea’s political history and pre-existing social protection policies, which could 
potentially moderate or even counteract the effects of the main independent variables. I then 
compare my proposed hypotheses with the actual outcomes observed in Korea, examining the 
evolution of politics concerning employment protection. The concluding section provides a 






This case study is intended to complement Chapter 2 where I used large-N analysis to 
demonstrate the relationship between macro variables. Cross-national time-series data analysis 
enables researchers to confirm the existence and pattern of systematic relationships between 
variables of interest across different contexts. Chapter 2 provides the first systematic evidence 
linking the global economy, service employment and job protection. However, there are obvious 
limitations to using statistical evidence.  
First of all, it can only establish correlations between independent and dependent 
variables, not causation. To establish a causal relationship, we need “relevant, verifiable causal 
stories resting in differing chains of cause–effect relations,” which can be acquired by tracing  
cases over time (Tilly, 1997).19 The preceding chapters have shown that the relationships among 
globalization, deindustrialization and employment protection institutions depend on specific 
contexts, such as the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers. . I have hypothesized that pre-existing 
social protection policies and differing political interests of skilled and unskilled labor offer 
additional context. Given the difficulty of capturing statistical interactions among globalization, 
tertiarization and domestic variables, an in-depth case study is a useful and appropriate way to 
keep track of complex causal pathway and to assess the validity of my argument premised on the 
interaction between variables.20 
Second, cross-national time-series analysis constrains researchers to a limited range of 
options for operationalizing variables. For instance, globalization is a complex process of 
engaging with the international economy. Changes in types of products exported and imported 
                                                          
19 Process tracing is a method, well-suited to testing theories in a world marked by multiple interaction effects, 
where it is difficult to explain outcomes in terms of two or three independent variables (Hall, 2003). 
 
20 Statistical analysis can incorporate simple interactions. Interpreting more complex interaction effects, however, is 
trickier and in many cases not highly informative. See Braumoeller (2004). 
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may have much greater impacts on the labor market and the politics of employment protection 
than overall openness of the economy as measured by gross trade volume.  
Similarly, deindustrialization can produce markedly distinct outcomes in each country. 
Because the service sector contains highly diversified industries, low-productivity industries 
such as food service and small-scale retail will experience different changes than high-
productivity industries such as financial services. The timing and speed of the structural shift 
also matters; some countries, particularly in the developing world, experience a concomitant 
growth of manufacturing and services whereas early industrializers witness employment 
primarily shifting from the manufacturing to the tertiary sector. A simple measure of total service 
employment cannot adequately capture the dynamics and the qualitatively different nature of this 
process. To overcome these limitations, in Chapter 2, I divided the sample into two sub-groups 
and demonstrated that the distinction based on the skill distribution of the economy indeed 
matters. Qualitative analysis can further illuminate how globalization and deindustrialization 
operate differently in different contexts.  
Third, some of the limitations of statistical analysis come from the limited data on the 
dependent variables. The two datasets employed in this dissertation are the most extensive and 
innovative; the Heckman and Pagés data are particularly useful in broadening the scope of theory 
and analysis to Latin America. Unfortunately, their dataset leaves out some important aspects of 
employment protection such as regulations on atypical employment and collective dismissal. 
Atypical employment has grown in importance not only in many OECD countries but also in 
Latin America. The balance between regular and atypical employment protection exhibits 
distinct national patterns and has generated important distributional consequences across labor 
markets. The overall tendency for many OECD countries has been to leave the former intact and 
109 
 
to liberalize the latter, a strategy that seems to contribute to labor market inequality (OECD, 
2004). Argentina, among others in the region, also experimented with liberalizing atypical 
employment following the Spanish model, but when the number of atypical workers soared, the 
Argentinian government reversed its policy, just like Spain did under similar circumstances 
(Heckman & Pagés, 2004). In Korea, too, atypical employment and labor market duality have 
become major concerns in recent policy discussions (Grubb, Lee, & Tergeist, 2007).  
Similarly, changing rules regarding collective dismissals can be socially disruptive due to 
the impact on the political power of labor unions and industrial relations. As we will see, it 
produced the country-wide strikes that were the largest in South Korean history. Despite its 
importance, regulatory strictness regarding collective dismissals is not incorporated into the 
Heckman and Pagés data and is only available for a single year in the OECD dataset. More 
fundamentally, both datasets, as is usually the case, tend to oversimplify complicated codes of 
each country to make them comparable and quantifiable. What a simple numeric value means for 
actual distributional conflicts is, therefore, best understood in qualitative contexts.  
Another limitation of the data is concerned with whether Latin America is representative 
of the developing world more generally. Many countries in Latin America, as pointed out earlier, 
have developed a welfare system geared toward  employees in the formal sector with strong 
employment protection and occupationally-based social insurance systems. We might draw an 
erroneous conclusion about the developing world by exclusively relying on Latin America’s 
experience. 
Taken together, this discussion points to the need for an in-depth case study that can 
show the proposed causal process that varies with levels of skill distribution in the economy. An 
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ideal candidate for the “within-case analysis” 21would 1) have considerable variation in 
independent variables over time to allow us to observe their effects on outcome variables, 2) be 
able to illustrate the different causal pathways for developed and developing countries, and 3) 
not be subject to the idiosyncrasies of Latin American countries. 
By these three criteria, Korea is a superb case. I stressed two independent variables in the 
statistical analysis of employment protection—globalization and the service sector—and Korea 
satisfies the first condition with sufficiently great variation of both variables. The fact that both 
exports and imports have risen constantly indicates Korea’s growing dependence on trade. Not 
only has the trade volume increased greatly from 1980 to 2008, but export and import profiles 
have shifted considerably.  
With respect to the second independent variable—the service sector—Korea’s industrial 
and employment structure was also transformed dramatically. It started off with a still sizable 
primary sector in 1980, with employment being a third of the total labor force, but by 2008, 
employment in manufacturing and the tertiary industry overwhelmed that of the primary sector 
in terms of employment and value-added. Great variations on these two major independent 
variables, along with the salience of labor market reform in national politics during this period, 
make Korea an important case with which I can test the causal relationship between changes in 
economic structure and employment protection policy. 
Furthermore, Korea is a rare case that meets the second and third conditions. It went from 
developing country status in 1980—with its GDP per capita similar to that of Brazil—to being an 
OECD member comparable to Spain in 2008—four times richer than Brazil. The economic 
development, of course, accompanied a shift toward higher-technology industries and a marked 
                                                          
21 The difference between process-tracing and within-case analysis is explained in George and Bennett (2005). But 
as done in this dissertation, they are often combined. 
111 
 
improvement in the skill profile of the labor force. This temporal variation increases the number 
of observations and allows me to assess the hypothesis about different causal processes for high- 
and low-income economies through within-case methods. In addition, this strategy helps 
controlling for factors specific to Latin America, adding confidence to my argument about the 
developing world proposed in the previous chapters.  
 
 
GLOBALIZATION IN KOREA 
In this section, I will discuss Korea’s participation in the global market. During this 
period, Korea became more integrated with the international economy, not only in terms of trade, 
but also in terms of its participation in the global networks of production and capital market 
openness. This section will focus on the effects of international trade on the Korean economy 
and show its importance in determining labor market insecurity. Although I do not spell out a 
cut-off year that represents its transition from “developing” to “developed,” I will provide 
quantitative evidence that such a transition did take place during this period. Korea in 2008 is a 
very different country than it was in 1980. Korea specialists in social sciences tend to divide the 
period into three sub-periods marked by two crucial events—democratization in 1987 and the 
financial crisis during 1997-1998. Whereas the importance of these two events is evident, the 
analytical distinction that identifies Korea either with developing or developed countries can be 
located sometime in the 1990s. A rough indicator of the shift is, of course, the level of economic 
development. Korea reached the long aspired goal of $10000 GDP per capita in 1996 and joined 
the OECD to mark its success. Substantively, the process of economic growth meant a great 
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magnitude of internal change in the Korean economy which suggests a different logic of 
connecting the international economy to labor market protection. 
The authoritarian government of Chun Doo Hwan inherited an export-led, heavy 
manufacturing-based developmental strategy from the previous government of Park Chung Hee 
when it came to power in 1980. While the entire economy was initially, as under Park’s rule, 
geared toward maximizing exports with substantial restrictions on imports for domestic 
consumption, trade policy gradually moved toward liberalization over time. Korea’s economic 
openness can be confirmed with various measures. First, both exports and imports have grown 
enormously in volume. Accordingly, the contribution of exports to the national income has 
expanded from 32% to 53% of GDP between 1980 and 2008. From a policy point of view, most 
of the remaining restrictions on imports were removed as indicated by a composite index of 
import liberalization rising from 65.9% in 1980 to over 90% in 1999 (Koh, 2008). Given the 
theoretical framework suggested in this dissertation, the growth of international trade could have 
strengthened high-skilled workers or have had the opposite effect. The increase in total trade 
volume, however, masks sectoral information that could help us decide between the two 
possibilities. Leaving the analysis of the service sector to the next section, I here consider 
manufacturing only, which is most pertinent to trade.  
I demonstrate the transformation of Korea’s export industries in three steps. First, I show 
that the Korean economy has become more technology-based. Next, this economy-wide 
transformation is shown to have accompanied change in Korea’s export profile. Korea’s 
comparative advantage has shifted toward skill-intensive production, and the skill distribution 
among its labor force has also become increasingly skewed toward high-skilled workers. Lastly, 
I present evidence that the shift from labor-intensive, low-skill industries to high-skill industries 
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strengthened skilled workers in the dominant export industries, making them a powerful 
advocate for employment protection.  
 
Change in Export Profile 
First, I will look at change in Korea’s export profile. To detect changes in export 
industries, it is useful to distinguish industries by skills and technologies required to produce 
goods. Table 4-1 groups industries into High, Medium-High, Medium-Low, and Low technology 
industries and presents disaggregated information on industries within each of the four categories 
in order of skill intensity. It shows how the composition of Korea’s exports changed between 
1992 and 2004 in terms of each industry’s share in total exports and comparative advantage. It is 
evident that exports of goods using high and medium-high technology expanded greatly while 



























Table 4-1.Change in Korea’s Exports: Sectoral Share and Revealed Comparative Advantage 
 
 Share (%) Revealed Comparative Advantage 
 1992 2004 Change 1992 2004 Change 
Manufacturing       
High technology and ICT* products 25.8 39.2 +13.4 1.33 1.63 +0.30 
    Aircraft and spacecraft 0.9 0.2 -0.7 0.28 0.11 -0.17 
    Pharmaceuticals 0.4 0.3 -0.1 0.26 0.11 -0.15 
    Computers and office products 4.0 9.0 +5.0 0.91 1.73 +0.82 
    Semiconductors and electronic valves 10.6 11.0 +0.4 3.62 2.30 -1.32 
    Radio, TV and communications equipment 8.5 15.3 +6.8 2.31 3.19 +0.88 
    Medical, precision and optical instruments 1.3 2.4 +1.1 0.39 0.65 +0.26 
Medium-high technology 20.4 35.2 +14.8 0.60 1.10 +0.50 
    Electrical machinery 2.2 3.2 +1.0 0.59 0.77 +0.18 
    Chemical products 7.2 10.2 +3.0 0.99 1.26 +0.27 
    Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 5.8 13.6 +7.8 0.50 1.33 +0.83 
    Other transport equipment 0.2 0.2 0 0.35 0.29 -0.06 
    Home appliance and machinery equipment 5.0 8.0 +3.0 0.46 0.91 +0.45 
Medium-low technology 18.7 17.3 -1.4 1.45 1.43 -0.02 
    Shipbuilding and repairing 5.4 6.4 1.0 5.77 8.45 +2.68 
    Coke and petroleum products 0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.30 0.20 -0.10 
    Rubber and plastic products 2.8 2.4 -0.4 1.15 0.96 -0.19 
    Non-metallic mineral products 0.8 0.6 -0.2 0.52 0.44 -0.08 
    Basic and fabricated metal products 9.7 7.7 -2.0 1.30 1.12 -0.08 
Low technology 31.6 8.8 -22.8 1.44 0.49 -0.95 
    Textile, apparel and footwear 25.4 6.1 -19.3 2.99 0.92 -2.07 
    Food, beverages and tobacco 2.1 1.1 -1.0 0.35 0.20 -0.15 
    Wood and paper products 1.0 0.6 -0.4 0.22 0.19 -0.03 
    Other misc. manufacturing products 3.2 1.0 -2.2 1.03 0.35 -0.68 
Non-manufacturing 1.5 0.4 -1.1 0.18 0.03 -0.15 
*ICT: information and communication technology 
Source: Kim et al. (2006), Trade, Investment and Economic Interdependence between South Korea and China, 










By 2004, high-skill industries contained the most important Korean export: radio, TV and 
communications equipment, motor vehicles and trailers, and semiconductors and electronic 
valves are the top three export categories. The ranking based on revealed comparative advantage 
is slightly different, but all in all provides a similar picture. According to the table, Korea 
became more competitive and specialized in shipbuilding, TV, semiconductors, computers and 
the like. Since this table only compares 1992 and 2004, I provide further information that dates 
back to the 1980s to examine the longer-term trend.  
Table 4-2 presents a comparison of different export categories. The most drastic change 
took place between 1990 and1995 in the textile, semiconductor and automobile industries, but 
the industrial decline in the textile industry and growth of semiconductor and automobile 
industries were already set in motion in the 1980s. 
 
Table 4-2. Korea’s Sectoral Composition in Exports (%) 
 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco 2.56 1.83 2.21 1.62 1.29 
Textiles, Textile Products, Leather and Footwear 23.87 21.71 24.97 14.35 9.73 
Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Printing and Publishing 0.74 0.47 0.64 0.88 0.99 
Chemicals and Chemical Products 9.33 9.25 6.67 8.85 8.42 
Fuel Products 0.55 3.15 1.57 2.09 5.09 
Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 1.93 0.96 0.78 0.42 0.44 
Basic Metals 8.05 5.76 5.42 4.75 4.23 
Metal Products 4.30 5.17 3.28 2.30 1.46 
Machinery 1.09 0.90 2.42 3.89 3.92 
Semiconductors 2.21 2.97 5.81 13.58 12.00 
Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 2.44 2.71 4.07 4.72 4.61 
IT Products 4.82 7.08 9.90 8.04 10.46 
Home Appliances 0.26 0.86 1.04 1.13 1.14 
Motor Vehicles and Trailers 0.62 2.21 2.79 6.72 7.15 
Other Transport Equipment 3.33 6.42 3.23 4.32 5.82 
Precision, Medical and Optical Instruments 1.23 0.98 1.06 1.13 3.28 
Other Misc. Manufacturing Products 6.16 5.06 3.60 1.77 1.30 
Source: KDI (2003), Comprehensive Study of Korea’s Industrial Competitiveness: Statistics, p. 65 
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Table 4-3. Korea’s Sectoral Trade Specification Index (TSI) 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco -0.40 -0.22 -0.34 -0.40 -0.40 
Textiles, Textile Products, Leather and Footwear 0.75 0.72 0.70 0.49 0.54 
Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Printing and Publishing -0.46 -0.56 -0.54 -0.44 -0.19 
Chemicals and Chemical Products -0.04 -0.05 -0.29 -0.07 0.06 
Fuel Products -0.80 -0.12 -0.48 -0.34 0.10 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.51 -0.01 -0.23 -0.42 -0.21 
Basic Metals -0.02 -0.07 -0.23 -0.32 -0.19 
Metal Products 0.47 0.58 0.49 0.33 0.34 
Machinery -0.85 -0.83 -0.69 -0.55 -0.25 
Semiconductors -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.41 0.12 
Electrical Machinery and Apparatus -0.25 -0.24 -0.05 0.03 0.01 
IT Products 0.20 0.34 0.49 0.35 0.37 
Home Appliances 0.27 0.83 0.54 0.68 0.74 
Motor Vehicles and Trailers -0.17 0.41 0.31 0.57 0.75 
Other Transport Equipment -0.25 0.47 0.14 0.18 0.47 
Precision, Medical and Optical Instrument -0.19 -0.41 -0.51 -0.59 -0.11 
Other Misc. Manufacturing Products 0.78 0.72 0.39 -0.07 0.04 
Source: KDI (2003), Comprehensive Study of Korea’s Industrial Competitiveness: Statistics, p. 71 
 
 
Another measure of the degree of specialization or competitiveness of an industry is the 
trade specification index (TSI), alternatively called the “competitiveness index.” Table 4-3 
presents each industry’s TSI. As the number approaches one, this indicates that an industry is 
more specialized in exports; as it approaches negative one, this implies increasing specialization 
in imports. We can get a sense of trade dependence of various industries from this table. For 
example, between 1980 and 1985 car manufacturing shifted from imports to exports as indicated 
by a change in sign, and by 2000 the automotive manufacturing became the most export-
dependent of all industries. The table also shows that in 1980 the labor-intensive textile and 
apparel industry, with a score of 0.75, was the most significant export , but declined continuously 
thereafter through 2000, giving way to other, more skill-intensive exports. The biggest decline 
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took place between 1990 and 1995. In sum, from 1980 to 200, Korea transitioned from a low-
skilled, labor-intensive economy to one characterized by higher-skill industries.  
 
Consequences for the Labor Market 
What does the change in Korea’s industrial structure and export profile mean for its labor 
market? There were two important corollary developments in the labor market. First, whereas the 
average level of skill increased significantly, the demand for skilled workers increased much 
faster, leading to a shortage in the supply of skilled labor. Second, as the export industry became 
more specialized in products that were more skill-intensive, skilled workers grew more powerful 
in these industries. 
Korea has substantially elevated the skill level of its labor force during the three decades. 
Analytically, it is helpful to distinguish two types of skills—general skills and industry- or firm-
specific skills. General skills, usually acquired through schooling, are useful for all sorts of 
occupations and are thus portable from job to job. Specific skills, on the other hand, are only 
valuable in performing a certain type of task and are not easily transferable beyond the specific 
job or industry where they are used. Workers tend to accrue specific skills with job tenure. A 
common proxy for general skill levels is the educational attainment. With respect to educational 
progress, Korea is a stellar performer. Table 4-4 gives a sense of the swift progress that Korea 
has made since 1970. Although primary education was already a universal phenomenon in 1980, 
only 20% of the relevant age group were enrolled in high schools. Impressively, by 2007 upper 
secondary education become the norm, and about 70% of the relevant age cohort entering 
universities. The extent of Korea’s investment in education becomes more evident when 
compared to other OECD countries. Table 4-5 ranks countries according to the ratio of 
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population educated at tertiary and secondary levels by age group as of 2009. The difference 
between the two most economically active age groups shows that Korean workers are becoming 
highly educated, surpassing every other advanced industrial economy. The percentage of people 
with post-secondary education was 44% for the older group but it arose to 63% among the 
younger group, placing Korea at the top of the list.  
By these measures, it is clear that Korea now has an abundant reserve of highly educated 
workers and with a skill profile that is potentially heavily skewed toward general skills. 
Increased levels of educational attainment are obviously closely related to the change in Korea’s 
industrial structure and comparative advantage. Beginning in the 1980s and continuing until the 
economy started to experience a labor shortage in booming manufacturing, low-skilled, labor-
intensive manufacturers were able to compete in the international market by taking advantage of 
the abundance of relatively less educated, cheap laborers from rural areas. The transition to 
higher skill industries in which the Korean economy now has a comparative advantage, of course, 






















Table 4-4. Enrolment rates for relevant age cohorts in Korea 
 
Year Primary (%) Lower Secondary (%) Upper Secondary (%) Tertiary (%) 
1970 92.0 36.6 20.3 5.4 
1980 97.7 73.3 48.8 11.4 
1990 100.522 91.6 79.4 23.6 
2000 97.2 95.0 89.4 52.5 
2007 99.3 96.0 91.3 69.4 










Table 4-5. Educational Attainment among the OECD Countries 
 
 Tertiary Education Upper Secondary Education and above 
Ranking  Age 25-34 (%) Age 35-44 (%) Age 25-34 (%) Age 35-44 (%) 
1 Korea (63) Canada (56) Korea (98) Korea, 
Czech Republic,  
Slovak Republic (94) 
2 Canada,  
Japan (56) 
 
Japan (49) Slovak Republic (95) Estonia,  
Poland (92) 
3 Ireland (48) 
 
 
Israel (47) Czech Republic (94) Canada,  
Sweden (91) 
4 New Zealand, Norway 
(47) 
 





5 Australia, UK (45) 
 
 
US (43) Canada (92) Germany (87) 





                                                          
22 This is probably due to early enrollment of children. 
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Having discussed general skills, I move on to examine trends in the distribution of 
specific skills in order to get a complete picture of Korea’s skill system. Estevez-Abe et al. (2001) 
suggest a typology of industrial economies according to the relative importance of general and 
specific skills. They argue that the observed emphasis on formal education implies an economy’s 
specialization in general skills-based production. If education levels are any indication, Korea is 
definitely on track to become a general skills-based production system. Sung Jae Cho (2008a) 
argues along this line that the rapid expansion and strength of the information technology 
industry—an industry that typically requires a level of technological knowledge that can only be 
attained at the university level or beyond—has driven the growth of highly educated, skilled 
workers in Korea and, as a result, a general skills system. However, the national typology that 
fits an entire economy into one category or another oversimplifies the pattern of skill distribution 
among diverse industries in each country, not to mention how such typologies might change over 
time due to fluctuations in the composition of industries and in the type of skills that are in 
demand. Except for a handful of stereotypical cases, most countries are difficult to categorize as 
anything but mixed-cases. Since the rise of the IT industry is a recent phenomenon and explains 
only a small portion of Korea’s industrial characteristics, we need to investigate how the specific 
skills of its labor force have evolved.  
There are a number of ways to measure the level of industry- and firm-specific skills, but 
for our purposes, the most simple and straightforward measure is the proportion of employment 
in different industries. If the share of employment in high skill-intensive manufacturing has 
increased, it may well signify specialization of workers’ skills. Figure 4-1 summarizes the 




Note the prominent decline in low-skill industries, and the rise of high-skill industries. 
Labor-intensive industries such as textiles, apparel and footwear have contracted to half their 
initial size while high-skill industries producing semiconductors, chemical products, motor 
vehicles and the like have become a key part of the Korean economy in terms of employment. 
Behind this transition to high-skill industries was the Korean government’s initiative to promote 
heavy manufacturing. A big push for capital- and skill-intensive production such as metal, 
shipbuilding, and chemicals was started in 1973, and an important part of the plan was to 
reorganize the labor market to that purpose. To cope with a growing shortage of skilled workers, 
the government introduced a system of mandatory vocational training programs which required 
firms either to provide their employees with in-house vocational training or to contribute to the 
government’s vocational training fund. This system was the backbone of the Korean vocational 
system from the late 1970s until it was replaced in 1999 by more effective active labor market 
programs (Chang, 2009). 
To sum up, the level of worker skills—both general and specific—increased considerably 
as the industrial structure shifted from low-skill to high-skill manufacturing. This transition 
places Korea squarely among unskilled-labor abundant developing countries in the beginning of 
the period and among skilled-labor abundant industrial economies in the later period, as 
postulated in the opening of this chapter. I have argued that in an open economy, skilled labor 
has an advantage where it is abundant and a disadvantage where it is scarce. If this theory is 
correct, we can expect that as the average skill level increased, Korean workers would have 





Figure 4-1. Employment Size by Industry 
 





From Skills to Collective Power 
How do we know if skilled workers gained political power as a result of increased trade? 
First, union density by industry is a rough indicator of each industry’s political influence. Table 
4-6 compares trade unionism for the three largest manufacturing sectors in Korea: textiles, 
chemicals, and metalworking.  
From the discussion about the shift of comparative advantage from low-skill-intensive 
sectors such as the textile and garment industry to high-skill-intensive manufacturing such as the 
automobile industry, we should be able to observe union activities falling in textiles and rising in 
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started climbing in the early 1980s and expanded exponentially after the democratic transition, 
which contrasts starkly with declining unionism in the textile industry since the late 1970s (Kim, 
2008). These divergent trends in union membership fit with accounts that young female workers 
in the textile and garment industries were the most powerful labor movement force in the 1970s, 
but male skilled workers in heavy manufacturing such as automobiles and steel gained political 
traction during the highly militant labor movement in the 1980s (Choi, 1997; Koo, 2001). 
Although unionization rates have declined rapidly in all three sectors after reaching a peak in 
1988-89,23 the widened gap between textiles and metalworking has been maintained quite stably. 
Union membership data, however, provide only limited information about skilled labor’s 
collective power and cannot shed light on important aspects of the interplay among exports, 
industrial structure and skilled workers. Here, we need to pay attention to the sudden drop of 
union membership across all industries following a brief period of heightened activity during the 
democratization period. It is not surprising that membership soared with the arrival of democracy, 
but why did it fall so rapidly?  
There are many convincing explanations, but one of the important factors is Korea’s 
unique enterprise unionism. The Chun Doo Hwan government, upon taking power in 1980, 
completely banned unions at the level of industry, restricting them to the firm level only. This 
would turn out to have a lasting and decisive effect not only on Korea’s future labor movement 
but also on labor politics in general. Even under democratic governments that were more 
permissive about trade unionism, enterprise unionism has continued to take hold among workers 
and labor movements. The fragmentation of the labor movement into company unions led to a 
rapid downfall of the political power of organized labor all together. In addition, there was 
                                                          
23 Trade unionism was most active in the years immediately following democratization when it got out of tight 
control of the government. 
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another important development within the increasingly marginalized labor movements. In 
combination with Korea’s unusually concentrated industrial structure centering around the 
chaebol, labor activism started to show a disparity between big firms and smaller sized firms. 
Workers in the former are highly militant, powerful, well-organized and able to obtain 
concessions in wage negotiations with their employers drawing on their ability to organize. In 
contrast, labor unions in small firms tend to have greater difficulty in organizing workers and in 
wresting wage and other concessions from their employers. 
Table 4-7 shows a widening gap between firms of different sizes. With respect to the 
labor market structure, job growth shifted from big to smaller sized employers between 1993 and 
2005. The number of workers employed by manufacturers with less than 50 employees has 
increased by 15% while employment in the largest manufacturers with more than 1000 
employees dropped by 55%. That means that decent jobs with better pay and working conditions 
provided by big firms became scarce.  
In terms of unionization, unions in small firms lost a majority of their members. The 
smallest firms saw union membership falling by 70%. While the decline in unionization is 
universal across firm sizes, unions in bigger firms were better able to control the damage. More 
importantly, despite the loss of union members in absolute term, the unionization rate at big 
firms itself went up and its importance in Korea’s labor movements grew as evidenced by its 
increased share in union membership. Increasingly scarce employment opportunities and higher 
unionization rates in large firms produced the most defining characteristic of the contemporary 
Korean labor movement: powerful labor unions  concentrated in large manufacturers. The 
growing disparity in workers’ power between small and large enterprises is further evidenced by 
the widening gap in wage levels. 
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Union Membership Wage Workers 
1993 2005 Change % 
 
1993 2005 Change% 
Number Share % Number Share % Number Number 
1-49 23,839 3.2 7,083 1.7 -70.3 1,626,297 1,870,531 15.0 
50-99 28,404 3.8 16,091 3.9 -43.3 395,045 404,855 2.5 
100-299 113,049 15.3 67,801 16.4 -40.0 524,284 484,813 -7.5 
300-499 64,704 8.8 35,178 8.5 -45.6 192,604 136,416 -29.2 
500-999 117,250 15.9 52,953 12.8 -54.8 276,210 140,888 -49.0 
1000 & more 392,148 53.0 233,977 56.6 -40.3 921,246 413,390 -55.1 
Total 739,394 100.0 413,083 100.0 -44.1 3,935,686 3,450,893 -12.3 
Source: Cho (2008), The Korean Economy and Change in the Labor System, p.99. 
 
 



























































Figure 4-2 confirms that workers employed in big firms were indeed able to translate 
their organizational power into higher wages in recent years. The wage gap between male 
workers at firms with 10-99 employees and those at over 1000 employees  widened  with 
democratization in the late 1980s and the gap has been growing since mid-90s. In summary, 
workers in large firms are better organized, more powerful and, as a result, better paid. 
Having established the political strength of workers hired by large manufacturers, the 
next question is whether there is a correlation between firm size and the skill-intensiveness of 
work. My main thesis has been that international trade tends to strengthen the power of skilled 
workers in economies endowed with high-skilled labor. Given that Korea has become a high-
skill-abundant country as evidenced by greatly improved skill levels and comparative advantage 
in skill intensive production, we should be able to observe this causal process unfolding. If there 
is a positive relationship between firm size and skill intensity, it would serve as good evidence 
that skilled workers employed by large manufacturing firms indeed have benefited from 
international trade. Indeed, there is ample evidence of skill gaps between small and large firms in 
Korea. For example, Ahn’s study (2006) provides strong support for a correlation between firm 
size and skill level. It shows that small firms are concentrated in low-skill industries and that the 
skill differentials between small and large manufacturers have been widening since at least 1990. 
By 2003, 90% of firms in low-skill manufacturing were small ones while the proportion of small 
firms was less than 50% in high-skill industries (Ahn, 2006: 55). This finding supports the 





What do these findings imply for the politics of employment protection? First, workers 
employed in larger firms would have strong preferences for employment protection. In general, 
skilled workers are interested in preserving the returns to their investment in skills. Since large 
manufacturers tend to belong in high-skill industries and require a large proportion of skilled 
workers, and since their employees tend to have strong collective power, I expect that labor 
unions in large manufacturing firms and high-skill industries will be powerful advocates for 
employment protection.  
 
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, workers at large firms prefer strong employment 
protection, and the unions representing them will be strong advocates for policies that 
provide such protection.  
Second, the discussion leads us to predict that the disparity between small and large firms 
would contribute to a distributional conflict over employment protection. I have shown that 
employment opportunities for larger firms have narrowed, while the wage differentials between 
them and small employers have widened. This will make skilled workers at large manufacturing 
firms defensive about their job and pay. Therefore, we should be able to observe that 
employment protection becomes a major source of political conflict as the disparities among 
firms increase in terms of productivity, wages and worker unionization.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Disparities between firms of different sizes will intensify the political 





DEINDUSTRIALIZATION IN KOREA  
In the previous section, I discussed how changes in the industrial structure and pattern of 
exports shaped Korea’s labor market, and I considered the political implications that this 
transformation might have on employment protection policies. In this section, I address broader 
structural changes in the economy, paying attention not just to shifts within the manufacturing 
sector, but also to the growth of the service sector between 1980 and 2008. As in the previous 
section, where I assumed that a structural change took place during this period that shifted the 
causal relationship between the global economy and employment protection, I assume that the 
causal linkage between deindustrialization and employment insecurity changed in a fundamental 
way. It is easier to define a cut-off year that marks a structural change in this case. If we accept 
the definition of deindustrialization as a shift in employment from manufacturing to services, the 
share of manufacturing employment started to decline in 1989. Until that point, both 
manufacturing and service employment experienced growth, absorbing laborers from the 
primary sector such as agriculture, fishery and mining. I have argued that a mere increase of 
service employment does not necessarily represent what we call “deindustrialization.” Beyond 
the employment share in services, it is essential 1) to explore whether the growth of services was 
a result of the contraction of the primary sector or of manufacturing and 2) to examine variation 
within the service industry. Whereas “deindustrialization”—that is, labor movements from 
manufacturing to services—tends to increase labor market insecurity, if the rise in service 
employment is primarily caused by migration from the primary sector, it would have a different 
consequence. However, even in the former case, the composition of services could have a 
noticeably different impact on employment insecurity. Within the service industry, different 
sectors are distinguished by labor productivity and skill requirements. In particular, if low 
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productivity sectors grow disproportionately, this would present more challenges to labor 
markets. 
To summarize important characteristics of Korea’s service industry, the growth of 
services in the 1980s was facilitated by the rapid decline of the primary sector. Because the 
Korean economy experienced a concurrent expansion of manufacturing during this period, it did 
not pose serious challenges to job insecurity. However, things started to change in the 1990s, and 
Korea’s employment structure followed in the footsteps of the advanced industrial economies: 
the decline of manufacturing and the rise of services. However, the industrial composition within 
services in Korea was much worse than in many of the OECD countries. The overall productivity 
growth in services has been sluggish and low-productivity services, such as small-scale retail, are 
more successful than high-productivity, high-skill-intensive services, such as business services. 
The combined effect of these two developments has negatively impacted job stability. Below, I 
will provide evidence supporting my argument and propose hypotheses 
 
The Growth of the Service Sector in the 1980s 
Despite its aggressive push for industrialization during the 1970s, in 1980 Korea was still 
an agrarian economy with a large portion of its population working in the primary sector. Table 
4-8 shows Korea’s employment structure by industry between 1960 and 1989. As a share of total 
employment, employment in agriculture, fishery and mining decreased from 38.5% in 1980 to 
24.8% in 1989. Both manufacturing and services continued to grow during this period. Among 
services, wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels take up the biggest proportion, reaching 50% of 
total service employment in 1989. To understand the characteristics of employment growth in 
services during this period and to prove that it did not mean the growth of low-skill, low-paying 
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jobs, in Table 4-9 I compare workers’ skills across industries, using the average educational 
attainment of workers for each industry as a proxy.  
On average, workers in the service sector had the highest level of education. When we 
look closely into the sub-categories of the service sector, as we might expect from the 
heterogeneity of services, there is a high degree of variation, ranging from low-skilled wholesale, 
retail, restaurants and hotels to high-skilled finance, insurance, real estate and business services. 
Despite the intra-industry variation, however, many of the jobs were created in relatively high 








Table 4-8. Change in the Employment Structure (%) 
 
 1960 1966 1970 1975 1980 1983 1986 1989 
Agriculture, Fishery 65.9 57.2 50.8 49.0 37.8 33.3 28.2 24.4 
Mining 0.7 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.4 
Manufacturing 6.8 12.0 14.3 17.4 22.1 21.1 23.3 25.2 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 
Construction 1.7 2.4 4.6 3.8 5.2 6.3 6.4 6.8 
Wholesale, Retail, Restaurants and Hotels 9.3 10.0 12.6 13.6 16.2 19.0 20.4 21.5 
Transport Storage and Communications 2.1 2.1 3.2 3.4 4.3 4.8 4.8 4.8 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and 
Business Services 
0.8 0.8 1.0 1.2 2.3 3.0 3.5 4.2 
Community, Social and Personal Services 11.6 14.1 12.0 10.8 11.1 11.4 12.3 12.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 











Table 4-9. The Level of Education for Workers by Industry (%) 
 
Industry Education  1970 1975 1980 1983 1986 1989 
Agriculture and 
Fishery 
≤Primary 87.9 84.5 80.0 73.3 87.6 87.0 
Secondary 11.6 15.4 19.4 25.6 11.0 11.8 
≥Tertiary 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.4 1.1 
Manufacturing ≤Primary 50.2 43.3 30.8 23.8 46.6 40.5 
Secondary 42.1 49.0 61.4 65.7 41.1 47.6 
≥Tertiary 7.7 7.7 7.8 10.5 12.3 11.8 
Services ≤Primary 42.3 37.5 27.6 23.5 41.2 38.7 
Secondary 42.9 46.7 56.6 58.6 39.5 42.6 
≥Tertiary 14.8 15.8 15.8 17.9 19.3 18.7 




Service Employment since the 1990s 
Now we move on to the employment structure of Korea after 1990 when manufacturing 
employment began to trend downward. My expectation is that the effect of deindustrialization 
would have taken hold and that the growing number of jobs would have been created in low-
productivity service sectors.  
The most noteworthy feature of Korea’s deindustrialization is the rapidity of the decline 
in manufacturing. Reaching its highest level at 27.8% in 1989, it took less than 15 years for 
manufacturing employment to fall below 20%, the shortest time among industrial countries. 
Table 4-10 shows how many years it took for manufacturing to drop in various industrialized 
countries from its peak share of total employment to below 20%, an illustration of the unusual 
speed of deindustrialization in Korea. Deindustrialization arrived in Korea quite prematurely as 
judged by the level of economic development. In comparison with earlier industrializers, where 
the national income per capita was around $14,000 at the start of deindustrialization, Korea’s 
GDP per capita was only $9,000 in 1989 (in 1995 dollars).  
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Table 4-10. Decline in Manufacturing Employment 
 
 Peak Year (A) 
(manufacturing employment,  
%)  
First Year Falling Below 
20%, (B) 
(B)-(A) (years) 
Korea 1989 (27.8) 2003 14 
US 1953 (32.3) 1983 30 
Germany 1970 (38.1) 2003 33 
Japan 1973 (27.4) 2001 28 





More importantly, it is wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels that take up the biggest 
share of employment among services in Korea. In terms of employment, this sector is unusually 
large compared to other high income countries. While it comprises only about 25% of 
employment for G7 members averaged over 1980-2002, employment in this sector hovered 
around 50% in Korea during most of the period (Ahn, 2006). Despite the large number of jobs 
generated in this sector, its value-added is much smaller in Korea, suggesting that there is a 
serious problem of low productivity and that the types of jobs that were created in this sector 
were not favorable to workers. The sluggish productivity growth in services during this period 
contrasts starkly with growth during the earlier period. This fact is confirmed when we compare 
Korea’s labor productivity with that of other nations. Whereas productivity of manufacturing has 
constantly improved, the labor productivity of Korea’s services has not improved much over the 
period, causing it to lag behind other nations (Hwang, 2009). In particular, the productivity of 
consumer services is notoriously low, even behind Mexico. Therefore, a defining characteristic 
of Korea’s tertiarization is the expansion of low productivity services. This presents a daunting 
challenge to Korea’s labor market. I showed in the previous section that big manufacturing firms 
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are reducing hiring while small manufacturers, characterized by low productivity and less 
favorable pay and working conditions, are becoming an important source of job creation (Table 
4-7). Since high productivity manufacturing jobs are disappearing, workers have to find a job 
either in low-paying, low-skilled, small manufacturing firms or in low-productivity services, 
where entering and exiting the labor market is relatively easy.  
Deindustrialization tends to increase the returns of formal education and skew the 
national skill profile toward general skills as opposed to specific skills. It is well known that 
countries with a traditionally sizable service sector such as the United States and Canada have an 
educational system that emphasizes general knowledge rather than vocational training (Estévez-
Abe et al., 2001). In those countries, the average years of schooling tend to be longer, with 
higher premiums on post-secondary education than in specific-skills systems. As shown by its 
extraordinarily high level of university education, Korea is becoming more like a general-skill-
based economy, a tendency that seems tightly associated with deindustrialization. Indeed, wage 
premiums on education, which had been steadily falling during the big push for industrialization, 
started to rise in the mid-1990s and went up rapidly since the financial crisis (Cho, 2008a: 115). 
The rise of educational premiums in combination with deindustrialization are likely to exacerbate 
labor market inequality in terms of employment and wages between high-skill, high-productivity 
services such as finance and low-skill, low-productivity services such as retail trade. However, 
unlike skill-intensive manufacturing, which requires a certain level of job stability for workers to 
learn firm-specific skills,24 high-skill services do not necessarily require job stability and long 
tenure since jobs tend to utilize professional knowledge that travels easily between firms. In 
other words, the nature of skills is different. Employers in skill intensive manufacturing may find 
                                                          
24 The reason why job stability is required for skill-intensive manufacturing is that Korea does not have coordinated 
institutional mechanisms geared toward “industrial skills” such as authoritatively certified industrial skills 
recognized by any employer within a specific trade. 
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themselves having to give in to workers’ demands for employment security because they share at 
least some interest in job stability with their employees due to the need for securing skilled 
workers, but in the case of services, the nature of skill requirements could make workers more 
vulnerable to employment insecurity. 
Employment insecurity comes not only from greater risk for job loss, but also from 
different modes of hiring, which typically tend to fall short of regular labor contracts in terms of 
wages, working conditions, social insurance and other regulatory protections. Service workers 
are particularly vulnerable to the latter type of insecurity due to the difference in skills between 
the manufacturing and service sectors. While general skills are easily transferrable between firms 
and employers, this portability implies that workers can to a great extent be viewed as 
interchangeable. Workers with a low level of general skills or low educational attainment are 
particularly subject to atypical employment since they are easier to replace. Indeed, data show 
that among the OECD countries, Korea’s workforce has the largest percentage of temporary 
workers and has increased rapidly, from 16.6% in 2001 to 29.7% in 2004 and 28.8% in 2006. 
When we analyze the incidence and distribution of temporary employment by industry, the 
service sector records much higher numbers in both measures than the industrial sector as shown 
in Table 4-11.  In addition, temporary employment tends to be concentrated among the less-
educated. Workers with low educational attainment are at a greater risk of having a temporary 












Table 4-11. Incidence and Distribution of Temporary Employment by Industry (%) 
 
 Industry Korea (2005) EU-15 average (2005) 
Incidence 
Agriculture 75.0 35.4 
Industry 18.7 13.2 
Services 32.1 14.0 
Distribution 
Agriculture 2.5 4.1 
Industry 15.0 25.6 
Services 82.5 70.3 




The growth of various services has brought significant changes to labor movements as 
well. Labor movements in Korea were traditionally led by workers in manufacturing. And within 
manufacturing, trade unionism became stronger skill intensive, large-sized firms in accordance 
with the change in the industrial structure. With the service sector gaining importance in the 
economy, however, labor activities also grew in the services. Table 4-12 shows that union 
membership in the service sector has generally expanded over time. The services that boast the 
largest number of union members are transportation, finance and insurance and education. Also 
note that the upward trend in finance and insurance was reversed in 1997-8, reflecting industry-
wide restructuring as a result of the Asian financial crisis. The growing presence of unionized 
service workers in the Korean labor movement and the particular labor market risks they are 























































































1981 45.0 31.5 11.4 26.9 6.5  0.8 4.9  15.9 100.0 
1982 42.7 30.2 10.5 27.4 7.7  0.8 6.1  15.4 100.0 
1983 43.7 30.4 11.4 26.0 8.3  0.7 6.1  15.3 100.0 
1984 41.7 27.7 12.2 26.5 9.0  0.8 6.1  16.0 100.0 
1985 41.1 26.5 12.7 26.7 9.4  0.8 6.2  15.8 100.0 
1986 40.8 26.0 13.1 27.7 9.4  0.8 6.3  15.0 100.0 
1987 43.4 24.0 18.1 24.6 9.9  0.9 5.2  16.0 100.0 
1988 48.0 22.5 23.6 20.5 8.5  1.1 4.0  17.8 100.0 
1989 47.4 22.2 23.2 20.7 9.0  1.2 3.7  17.9 100.0 
1990 46.3 21.5 22.8 19.7 10.8  1.4 4.0  17.8 100.0 
1991 44.7 20.7 21.9 20.8 11.0  1.5 4.4  17.7 100.0 
1992 44.0 18.8 23.1 20.1 11.7  1.5 4.7  18.0 100.0 
1993 40.5 17.5 21.6 22.1 12.5 0.5 1.4 5.0 1.8 16.2 100.0 
1994 33.1 16.6 15.2 22.7 12.4 0.6 1.3 1.9 1.8 26.2 100.0 
1995 29.8 15.6 13.0 22.4 12.7 0.6 1.3 2.2 2.0 28.9 100.0 
1996 28.3 14.7 12.5 21.2 13.4 0.7 1.2 2.3 2.1 30.8 100.0 
1997 34.8 12.7 21.1 24.4 14.0 0.7 1.2 2.4 2.9 19.7 100.0 
1998 34.1 12.6 20.8 25.6 12.2 0.8 1.7 2.4 2.9 20.3 100.0 
1999 31.8 11.4 19.7 28.1 10.9 6.4 1.8 2.1 2.6 16.3 100.0 
2000 31.0 11.1 19.3 26.7 9.8 7.4 1.7 2.1 3.0 18.4 100.0 
2001 30.6 10.7 19.3 25.9 9.6 7.7 1.7 2.1 2.7 19.8 100.0 
2002 30.4 10.8 19.0 25.8 10.2 8.3 1.8 2.2 3.0 18.3 100.0 
2003 30.3 11.0 18.7 26.2 9.9 8.4 1.9 2.4 3.0 17.9 100.0 
2004 29.2 10.2 18.4 24.6 9.7 6.6 1.9 4.5 3.0 20.5 100.0 
2005 28.9 10.0 18.3 23.9 10.1 7.9 1.9 4.7 2.9 19.9 100.0 
Source: Kim (2008), Labor Union Organizations in Korea: Analysis of Union Membership (Union Density), p.56 




Based on my discussion on the structural change of the Korean economy since 1980, 
what can we expect about the politics of employment protection? First, I expect that the growth 
of services in the 1980s did not pose a particular challenge to the institutions of employment 
protection. I have shown that the service growth up until 1989 had a very different pattern than in 
the later period when deindustrialization process hit its stride. Employment growth in services 
was propelled by the labor supply from the primary sector, and the service sector made 
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significant progress in improving productivity comparable to manufacturing throughout the 
1980s. The service growth since the 1990s, in contrast, features labor flows from manufacturing 
and overall low productivity. This will create a downward pressure on employment protection. 
And as a result, the deindustrialization effect will intensify a political conflict over employment 
protection and we should be able to observe the emergence of employment protection as a major 
political issue after the 1990s.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Low-productivity services will employ a high proportion of atypical 
workers. 
 
The service industry requires qualitatively different skills than manufacturing. The 
emphasis on general skills makes employees more vulnerable to job insecurity. While it tends to 
put great pressure on workers in general, workers in high-skill, high-productivity services are 
likely to be interested in employment protection. On the other hand, relatively unskilled workers 
with low educational attainment are particularly vulnerable to atypical employment. Korea’s 
deindustrialization process is characterized by a disproportionate growth of low-productivity 
services. This should pose a particular challenge in providing regulatory protection to less 
educated, more vulnerable workers. If my argument based on skill differences between 
manufacturing and services is correct, we should observe regulations of atypical employment as 
being more protective of workers in manufacturing than in services. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Workers in high-skill, high-productivity services are likely to have a 
strong interest in employment protection. 
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Hypothesis 5: Regulation of atypical employment is likely to be more protective of 




In the previous sections I derived hypotheses regarding the politics of employment 
protection, based on the consequences of changes in trade and industrial structure for different 
social groups. But I did not take into explicit consideration Korea’s political institutions. I now 
discuss briefly some of the political variables that might have played a role in shaping the 
politics of employment protection in Korea. As mentioned above, there are at least three 
domestic variables that could be potentially crucial: democracy, government partisanship and 
organized labor. In Chapter 2, I tested the effects of these three variables and found that 
ideological orientation of government has a systematic effect on regular employment protection 
in the OECD countries. Although the other two variables were not statistically significant in the 
regressions, there might be substantial effects that the particular models of estimation could not 
capture but might be revealed through qualitative investigation. 
First, regime type could have played a crucial role in the development of employment 
protection. Korea experienced a democratic transition in 1987 after a long period of authoritarian 
rule. The Chun Doo Hwan government inherited policy legacies from the Park Jung Hee 
government and continued to drive industrialization through exports. This developmental 
strategy leads us to predict that the Chun government took a repressive stance on worker 
protection and democracy increased employment protection. On the other hand, it is also 
possible that the authoritarian government did not need to honor labor codes, meaning that the 
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existence of employment protection laws does not reflect the de facto level of employment 
protection. If this is the case, we would not see much change in de jure employment protection 
as a result of regime change. Therefore, there are two opposing possibilities. More fundamentally, 
however, regime type would not be a viable theoretical explanation unless the internal political 
dynamics are cogently articulated, specifying who wants employment protection, who opposes it 
and how authoritarian and democratic systems might influence de jure and de facto protection. I 
paid attention to structural changes in trade, industry and the labor market to answer these 
questions. The type of government constitutes the broad context where important actors interact 
and where preferences translate into actual policy, but as theory it is rather incomplete.  
Second, would government partisanship have any predictable effect on employment 
protection in Korea? The partisan theory argues that Leftist governments cater to workers and 
therefore tend to produce policies that favor workers. I have tested for this partisanship effect and 
found that Leftist governments are associated with strong protections for regular workers, but do 
not significantly affect protection for irregular workers. Korea, after the democratic transition, 
had five different governments—three of them conservative and two liberal. According to the 
partisan theory, we should be able to observe that liberal governments provide workers with 
better employment protection. As we will see, this was not the case. Despite sustained efforts, 
the first two conservative governments failed to weaken employment protection, and it was 
finally lowered under a liberal government. In fact, the conservative Kim Young Sam 
government almost succeeded in liberalizing employment protection, but eventually had to step 
back in the face of immense opposition from workers. 
Lastly, the strength of organized labor could be a significant factor in the politics of 
employment protection. However, rates of unionization are not likely to predict employment 
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protection very well. Union density has been consistently low in Korea. Even at its peak 
immediately after the democratizing phase, it never reached 20%. With the repressive Chun 
government’s disbandment of industrial federations in 1980, the rate went from 14.7% in 1980 to 
12.3% in 1986. The arrival of democracy led the unionization rate to reach its highest at 18.6% 
in 1989, but it continued to decline throughout the 1990s and remained stagnant around 10% in 
the 2000s (Kim, 2008). This low level of unionization contrasted starkly with frequent reports of 
labor militancy in Korea. Many scholars attribute Korean workers’ militancy to the authoritarian 
roots of repressive policy and enterprise unionism. Enterprise unionism makes collective 
bargaining difficult and industrial relations confrontational, and it leads workers to resort to their 
collective power to get the most out of bargaining with their employers. One consequence of 
enterprise unionism is a great disparity in labor unions’ organizational power and resources 
depending on firm size, as discussed above. In other words, the aggregated unionization measure 
is not very helpful in assessing the influence and role of organized labor in the politics of 
employment protection. Rather, as argued earlier, firm size and characteristics of the industry 
provide more useful information about workers’ preference for or against employment protection 
and their ability to act on that preference.  
To sum up, although the three candidates—democratization, government partisanship and 
the strength of organized labor—shed light on Korea’s political context, they do not seem to 
elicit highly illuminating theoretical predictions regarding employment protection in Korea. 
Their limitations reinforce the importance of sectoral analysis that pays attention to differences 
between industries. In the next section, I assess the validity of my hypotheses regarding political 




ASSESSMENT OF CONGRUENCE 
In this chapter, I have extended my argument about the causal linkages between 
globalization and deindustrialization and employment protection, and developed “observable 
implications” of the theory in the context of Korea, based on internal changes in its industrial 
structure and on the labor market associated with trade and the service economy. With the 
growing interaction with the global economy through trade, Korea’s industrial structure has 
evolved in such a way that we can identify a key group of workers as having a clear interest in 
strong employment protection. Similarly, different characteristics of the service sector expansion 
since the 1990s lead us to predict the direction of change in employment protection and who will 
be a key player in the process of policy change. This section will examine the validity of my 
predictions.  
 
Before the 1990s 
Korea left a legal provision on employment protection unchanged from its inception in 
1953 to the late 1990s. The Labor Standards Act, which regulates employment contracts and 
working conditions, stipulates the conditions under which the termination of an employment 
contraction is considered legal, and defines the circumstances where employment contracts other 
than open-ended permanent contracts are allowed. The clause of the old Labor Standards Act on 
“Restrictions on Dismissal,” which prohibited dismissals “without justifiable reasons,” was long 
considered a legal basis for Korea’s “permanent employment system,” but later became an 




The old law also provided regulatory grounds for fixed-term employment, but it was only 
after the 1990s when its modification was widely called for and led to a fierce political battle 
among workers, employers, and political elites. Before we consider how labor politics changed 
in the 1990s, it’s important to ask why the regulatory framework for job protection remained so 
stable for so long. Labor-related laws concerning collective rights underwent frequents changes 
amidst Korea’s turbulent political history, but the expansive job protection law remained 
unchanged for a long time. Does this mean that the political dynamics of job protection were 
somehow unique, or should we exercise caution in reading into changes of the labor code?  
Scholars have suggested ways in which individual workers’ rights might have a different 
political logic than collective labor rights. A few of them have argued that authoritarian 
governments might be willing to provide relatively generous individual labor rights to 
compensate for the repression of collective labor rights (Caraway, 2009; Koo, 2001). Along this 
line of arguments, Choi (1997) differentiates labor-related issues according to the degree of an 
authoritarian government’s intervention and permissiveness. When the potential political cost 
involved is high, we are likely to see the most direct and repressive intervention in areas such as 
workers’ collective activities, but when the ruling elite does not perceive a significant threat to 
their political power—as in individual employment protection—we are likely to see a relatively 
permissive and indirect mode of intervention. Going beyond the authoritarian regime, Carnes 
(2008) suggests four broad labor regulation regimes, characterized by individual versus 
collective protectiveness, and he argues that skill level and labor’s ability to organize determine 
an economy’s labor regulation mode, regardless of regime type. The relative generousness of 
worker protection at the individual level could also come from the fact that there is a 
considerable distance between legal labor rights and the actual enforcement of such rights. The 
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gap is presumably much larger for individual rights than for collective rights and in non-
democracies than in democracies. Indeed, there is evidence that this was the case for Korea’s 
Labor Standards Act.  
The 1953 Labor Standards Act, in fact, contained highly protective and unrealistically 
generous components, such as short working hours (8 hours per day and 48 hours per week) and 
generous paid leaves, which almost seem to have presupposed non-enforcement. The Act was a 
result of the transplant of foreign legal systems at the time of constitution writing. Despite its 
initial inability to regulate labor relations, however, as the economy developed, it eventually 
grew in importance as an enforceable regulatory mechanism. By the 1960s, employers started 
voicing concerns about the strictness of worker protection as public sectors and large companies 
found it increasingly difficult to totally disregard the law (Kim, 2007).25 In other words, while 
the law remained unaltered during this period, its relevance grew for employers and employees 
in the formal sector.  
When the Chun government seized power in December 1980, it initiated swift and 
sweeping revisions of labor-related laws, demonstrating its readiness to intervene in worker-
related disputes by producing an extremely brutal and repressive labor policy. The new labor 
code introduced flexible working hours, but the Labor Standards Act—including the unfair 
dismissal clause—remained largely the same. Despite the Chun government’s repressive policy, 
workers’ collective power grew constantly during this period amidst changes in Korea’s 
industrial structure and improvements in the skill level of its people. Once the democratic 
                                                          
25 Dong-A Ilbo (daily newspaper) editorials at the time, which called for the newly instituted military government of 
General Park to relax the law in line with the actual business environment, reflect the concerns that small and 
medium-sized employers had about the overly strict Labor Standards Act. See, “Unrealistic Labor Standards Act,” 
Dong-A Ilbo on 1961, 12,6 and “Labor Standards Act that Small and Medium-sized Firms can observe” on 1962, 
3,11. For other evidence, the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry filed a petition with the government for a 
revision of the Labor Standards Act in 1964 (Kim, 2007). 
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transition created political space for workers, the labor movement revealed its latent power 
through the rapid expansion of unionization, prompting the eruption of heated labor disputes. 
The most significant measure of the Chun government that would define the future course of 
labor politics after democratization was to restructure labor movements into decentralized 
company unions. The purpose was, of course, to cripple workers’ organizational power. While it 
was effective in suppressing the labor movement as long as the government exercised tight 
political control, another development in the economy generated an unintended consequence. 
That is, the concentration of wealth  into a small number of large companies in important export 
industries that required a large proportion of skilled workers led to the empowerment of those 
skilled workers on the shop floor. 
 The industrial concentration that deepened during this period had important political 
implications. The aggressive drive for rapid industrialization and the promotion of exports in 
heavy manufacturing products, which the Park government adopted and the Chun government 
intended to continue using all kinds of policy instruments, started to present some serious 
problems to the Chun government. The government tackled the increase in economic 
inefficiencies and growing fiscal strain on the government through rationalization of select 
industrial sectors and unprecedented fiscal austerity. To check the overgrown chaebol’s 
economic power and industrial concentration, the Chun government also decided to take a set of 
significant measures. It is noteworthy that the new government introduced the Fair Trade Act 
upon coming to power in 1980, well before the most advanced industrial economies adopted 
such antitrust measures, not to mention developing countries (Koh, 2008). At the same time, the 
government adopted other policies to promote smaller producers, such as strengthening statutory 
requirements for banks’ loans to small and mid-sized firms. Despite these measures, Korea’s 
145 
 
dependence on large firms and industrial concentration was not significantly reduced, and at the 
same time those large employers’ became increasingly dependent on the international economy, 
not only for sales of their products, but also as an important channel for capital mobilization. The 
magnitude of the industrial concentration and overall imbalance of the economic structure can be 
gauged from the growing share of subcontracting firms among small and mid-sized 
manufacturing firms. The number of subcontractors who produce intermediate goods for larger 
firms was around 20% of the total in the late 1970s, but grew consistently throughout the 1980s, 
reaching over 50% in the mid-1980s and over 70% by the early 1990s (Cho, 2008a). In other 
words, a majority of small and mid-sized firms became firmly subordinated into the chaebol-
dominated production system. The vertical integration of small suppliers and large manufacturers 
was a policy designed to maximize efficiency by taking advantage of the division of labor in the 
production of export goods that require complicated stages of production of various parts and 
components, such as automobiles. The ultimate purpose of this policy was, therefore, to 
reinvigorate the competitiveness of the export industry in the early 1980s when the Korean 
economy faced some serious challenges. In 1980, both the real GDP and real merchandise 
exports recorded negative growth for the first time since the 1960s, sending a worrying signal to 
Korea’s policymakers. Along with the other stabilization and rationalization measures mentioned 
above, the new government hoped that this particular industrial policy would be transformative. 
Over time, however, the vertical integration, interacting with enterprise unionism, became a 
particularly difficult problem in later years, when the Korean economy degenerated into a 
production system with a highly segmented labor market.  
Enterprise unionism imposed by the Chun government, on the other hand, deprived not 
only workers of institutional mechanisms facilitating solidarity across firms and industries, but 
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also employers of coordinating mechanisms in dealing with workers’ wage demands. One 
consequence for labor movements became clear after the 1990s: a large disparity in 
organizational power between those employed by large firms and those who work at small firms. 
On the part of employers, it leads large manufacturers, in the face of formidable labor unions, to 
pursue technological and managerial devices such as automation to contain increasing labor costs 
and to outsource and subcontract greater parts of the production process to smaller firms whose 
employees, unable to mobilize organizational resources as workers at large firms could, have to 
accept lower wages and greater job insecurity. In addition, small manufacturers, operating on a 
thin margin, have limited resources to invest in research and development, which leads to 
deteriorating productivity, and in turn deters them to pay better wages to their employees. In sum, 
the Korean economy has evolved into segregated sectors demarcated by firm size, productivity, 
technology levels, wage levels and organizational capacity of workers.  
Thus, the broader economic context—democratization and workers becoming more 
organized—helps us to understand why employment protection emerged as a contested issue in 
the later period. By the time of the democratic transition, the economy had already recovered its 
vigor and flourished thanks to exceptionally favorable economic conditions that included falling 
oil prices, low interest rates and appreciation of Japanese yen. In 1987, the year marking a formal 
transition to democracy, the GDP growth rate exceeded 11%. The booming economy caused an 
economy-wide labor shortage and workers were able to capitalize on their latent collective power 
that was unleashed by democratization, achieving wage increases that would have been 
impossible under the Chun government. The wage differentials between firms with different 
sizes, as a result, were greatly reduced. This particular confluence of two circumstances— 
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democratization and the rise of democratic union movements coinciding with an unprecedented 
economic boom—sowed the seeds for the political conflict over employment protection.  
The most important developments of union organizations following the political 
transition to democracy were the rise of chaebol unions and the formation of a new national 
union organization, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU). The democratic union 
movements were led by independent unionists in opposition to the government-sanctioned 
monopolistic unions encompassed by the umbrella organization called the National Congress of 
Trade Unions (NCTU). Born from the alliance of chaebol unions (the Solidarity Council of 
Chaebol Unions formed in 1990), white collar unions (the Council of Occupational Unions 
formed in 1988) and progressive unions in manufacturing (the National Congress of Trade 
Unions formed in 1990), the FKTU became the focal point of progressive labor movements and 
an important player in labor politics, but it remained a loose umbrella organization, meaning that 
supremacy still rested with individual member unions at the level of the firm or factory.26 As a 
result, the disparity in unions’ organizational resources between firms was also replicated in the 
internal dynamic within the FKTU in their response to employment insecurity, which was 
already growing and would become an immediate threat to workers during the financial crisis. 
The earlier section discussed the concentration of unions in large firms, and the discussion of this 
section identifies the causes of disproportionate worker representation by connecting the 
industrial concentration to enterprise unionism.  
 
 
The Political Process of Reforming Employment Protection since the 1990s 
                                                          
26 The FKTU was formed in 1995 and recognized by the government as a legal labor organization in 1997. 
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It was at the turn of the decade when the issue of employment protection first entered 
national labor politics in the post-democratization period. Until then, the most salient issues in 
labor politics were the lifting of restrictions on collective labor rights such as rights to form 
unions and recognition of newly formed independent unions. In the wake of democratization, 
labor-related laws were modified along with the constitution, but changes were partial and 
incomplete. Some of the most problematic and undemocratic elements remained unchanged, 
leaving every party involved unsatisfied, and consequently, both employers and two national 
labor organizations, the NCTU and the FKTU, were focused on these issues. The labor reform 
movement soon added employment protection to its agenda. The first three quarters of the 1990s 
are characterized by continued political discussions and repeated attempts at labor reform 
without much success in bringing about actual legislative changes. However, this period provides 
ample materials that can be used to evaluate my hypotheses about the interaction between 
economic changes and labor market insecurity.  
From the early 1990s onwards, employers started to express various demands for labor 
market flexibility ranging from legalizing fixed-term employment and dispatched workers to 
collective dismissal. Such demands reflect the labor market changes that were already underway. 
Temporary workers were already being used extensively, and in the early 1990s the Supreme 
Court had ruled that collective dismissal for managerial reasons such as bankruptcy was “fair.” 
What employers were asking, therefore, was to explicitly incorporate those practices into law. 
From their perspective, the employment protection system not only failed to reflect the changing 
business environment, which required greater flexibility, but also was going backward. In fact, in 
1989, when a series of labor-related bills were submitted to President Roh Tae Woo, he vetoed 
bills related to collective labor rights, but to employers’ dismay he accepted a bill that reduced 
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working hours. As I have discussed earlier, large firms, in the absence of coordination 
mechanisms for collective wage bargaining, were instead individually pursuing a variety of 
strategies to minimize labor costs and seek both numerical and functional flexibility. Smaller 
firms, unable to pay competitive wages, had greater difficulty in dealing with workers. This 
decade, in fact, witnessed a widening disparity between large and small firms. On the part of 
workers, this meant decreased job security, leading them to oppose to any policy attempts to 
change the existing employment protections in employers’ favor. The NCTU, more active in 
engaging in policy discussions and lobbying than the militant FKTU, made a series of demands 
for strengthening job protections. For example, in response to the increasing incidence of 
collective dismissals following the court ruling in favor of employers, the NCTU demanded that 
a new clause mandating consultations with labor unions in case of collective dismissal be 
introduced to the existing law. It also demanded that the advance notice period be extended from 
30 to 90 days and temporary workers be granted permanent employment status after working for 
three months. Therefore, although there were no changes in employment protection at the time, 
this period witnessed rising market insecurity, which laid the foundation for political conflict 
over employment protection (Hypothesis 2).  
 
The political conflict over employment protection intensified still further under the Kim 
Young Sam government. The Kim government, which lauded itself as the first democratic 
government, was eager to incorporate labor unions into policy discussions about politically 
sensitive labor reforms. To this end, it created a consultative body and even invited the 
progressive FKTU to consultation meetings. The previous government’s failure to curb wage 
increases and regulate industrial relations taught the Kim government that any significant labor 
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market reform would be unattainable without cooperation of strong member unions within the 
FKTU. The consultative body was unable to reach a consensus, and the negotiations were 
particularly unsatisfying to the member unions of the FKTU, which had a keen interest in 
maintaining the existing employment protection institutions. 
The failure of negotiations and the ensuing heavy-handed attempts by the ruling party to 
pass a bill that was heavily skewed in favor of employers triggered national strikes of an 
unprecedented scale and intensity (Koo, 2000). Consequently, the immense opposition from 
labor brought the issue back to the negotiation table between major political parties. This rocky 
process of political negotiations and the repeated failure of reforming employment protection 
institutions demonstrate how difficult it was to effect change on that issue which the most 
powerful segment of workers had the most direct and immediate interest. Labor unions 
representing regular workers employed by big firms had the most powerful voice within the 
FKTU and found it exceedingly difficult to compromise on the measures lowering job insecurity. 
This internal dynamic within the labor movement is more vividly displayed in the second 
round of labor market reform attempts, which took place under much different circumstances. 
The financial crisis of 1997 necessitated political solutions to minimize social costs associated 
with imminent and avoidable collective dismissals at firms that were subject to drastic economic 
restructuring. In addition, the IMF demanded that the Korean government carry out labor market 
reform to increase flexibility. The Kim Dae Jung government, following the example of the 
previous government, decided to use a tripartite consultative forum to bring the relevant parties 
together to push the difficult reform through. However, as my hypotheses predict (Hypothesis 1 
and 4), internal opposition from powerful labor unions representing large firms in key 
manufacturing industries and financial services made it difficult for the FKTU to take a coherent 
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position regarding the specifics of institutional change regarding employment protection. When 
it finally agreed to the legalization of collective dismissals and dispatched workers, this led to a 
severe internal dispute within the FKTU. In particular, labor unions under the powerful 
metalworking industry federation, unions representing manufacturing workers of Hyundai 
chaebol and other unions representing bankrupt firms vehemently protested the agreement and 
declared it invalid, but to no avail (Noh, 2008: p.177). Finally, this long, turbulent phase of 
employment protection reform came to a close, particularly with respect to regular employment 
protection. 
However, due to the growing number of nonstandard workers, atypical employment 
protection remained a politically divisive and controversial issue. As already shown, Korea has 
had an unusual number of non-regular workers and a sizable informal sector. Jobs in large firms 
and the public sector, which used to be considered as virtually guaranteeing job security, became 
less secure amidst changes to employment protection policies. After the financial crisis, firms 
focused more intently on minimizing labor costs. The legalization of dispatched worker agencies 
and the increasing incidence of outsourcing and subcontracting reflect this changing labor market. 
The initial law introduced in 1998 allowed dispatched worker agencies in a limited number of 
sectors and job categories. Manufacturing, interestingly enough, was excluded from the list. 
Many employers in manufacturing industries have extensively used contingent workers and 
consistently demanded the dispatched work arrangement to be permitted in manufacturing as 
well. That it was excluded from the list against employers’ wishes and continues to remain so 
despite the persistent demands from the business community supports my arguments about 
skilled workers’ interest in employment protection and the service sector. Because skilled 
workers in manufacturing have a great interest in protecting their specific skills, they will tend to 
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seek employment protection and other institutional mechanisms to safeguard their jobs. The 
dispatched worker agencies are the most threatening and unacceptable in this regard. Facing 
opposition from skilled workers, employers in manufacturing have resorted to the illegal use of 
contingent workers, but they were unable to achieve a legal change that would allow for the use 
of contingent workers (Hypothesis 5). Employers in the service industry, in particular, have 
shown a greater tendency to employ atypical workers in place of regular workers (Hypothesis 3). 
These developments in the labor market have caused various social problems and have been 
criticized for exacerbating income inequality. As a result, policy makers started to consider 
strengthening protection of atypical employment arrangements. Against this backdrop, the Roh 
Moo Hyun government introduced a legislation designed to protect contingent workers. The 
intention of these legislations was to induce employers to extend regular employment contracts 
to contingent workers that they had already hired by limiting terms on employment contracts. 
However, not only employers but also workers have raised concerns about this legislation. Labor 
unions that primarily represent regular workers are particularly ambivalent about these measures, 
which contrasts with their active involvement in blocking the introduction of dispatched worker 




This purpose of this chapter was use the Korean case to show how interaction with the 
global economy and the growth of the service sector transform a country’s internal economic 
structure—changes which and in turn shape the politics surrounding employment protection 
policies. The chapter began with a discussion of the advantages of the case study: the effects of 
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macro variables on outcomes are best understood by examining the causal process in specific 
contexts. I developed a set of hypotheses about the politics of employment protection in Korea 
after identifying the causal pathways that international trade and deindustrialization could take. 
In particular, I focused on the industrial structure and labor market structure that link the effects 
of the two macro variables to employment protection. Increased trade changed Korea’s export 
composition and industrial structure. Interacting with the authoritarian governments’ repressive 
labor policy, this change helped skilled workers at large manufacturing firms to become more 
interested in employment protection and, as a result, to play a more influential role in the 
political process of changing employment protection policies. As for the service sector, I paid 
attention to how the growth of service employment from the 1990s onward could impact 
employment protection. The trajectory employment protection in Korea generally conforms to 
my predictions. As hypothesized, employment protection became a politically salient issue 
during the transformation of the economy and the labor market. The division within the labor 
movement also confirms my prediction about skilled workers’ preference and influence. 
This discussion provides the empirical background for the next chapter, which will 
analyze the politics of social policy change in Korea. In Chapter 3, I demonstrated that 
employment protection has a large impact on social spending across countries. Detailed analysis 
of Korea’s welfare state will elucidate the causal process in which change in employment 











From Employment Insecurity to the Welfare State 
 
Korea, until recently, had an underdeveloped welfare state, which many have attributed 
to its export-led industrialization and authoritarian history. Through a series of recent reforms, 
the country no longer resides in the category of residualistic welfare states. In a short span of 
time, social insurance for old-age, sickness and unemployment has been reformed to cover a 
greater number of the population, and social services have also expanded significantly. This 
development seems to challenge two prominent theories of the welfare state. First, the expansion 
of the Korean welfare state contradicts the pessimistic view about the welfare state advanced by 
globalization scholars. The most significant initiatives of social policy came about at a time 
either when Korea was making an aggressive move to engage with the international market or 
when the effects of the global economy were most acute as in the financial crisis of the late 
1990s. Second, power resources theorists would have a hard time explaining the Korean case, 
since key conditions of their theory—such as powerful labor organizations and social democratic 
parties—do not exist or did not play a major role in Korea.  
This chapter will demonstrate that employment insecurity has been a critical factor in 
shaping the institutions of social protection in Korea, and thereby provide further empirical 
support for the arguments presented in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 showed that employment protection 
is a strong predictor of the level of government’s commitment to social protection, trumping the 
effects of globalization and deindustrialization. But the causal relationship is reversed for the 
OECD and Latin American nations. In explaining these diverging, but systematic relationships, I 
hypothesized that pre-existing social protection institutions play a mediating role in connecting 
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employment insecurity to government-provided protection. If pre-existing social insurance is 
designed to protect a narrow segment of workers in the formal sector, who are also covered by 
protective labor codes (as is the case in many Latin American countries), then liberal labor 
reforms will threaten not only their job security but also the benefits that are attached to their job. 
The threat of liberalization, then, will motivate these workers to broaden the scope of social 
protection. In contrast, if pre-existing institutions of social protection are already extensive and 
reach a significant portion of the population (as is the case in many of advanced industrial 
economies), then weakening employment protection would make the welfare state less 
sustainable.  
The Korean case corresponds to the first scenario; at first, its social protection system 
was limited to a small, protected sector, but it later experienced a series of expansions that 
extended coverage to a broader segment of the economy and for a greater variety of social risks. 
In particular, major turns in social policy took place in conjunction with the political process of 
employment protection change, especially in later years of the period. I argue that the weakening 
of employment protection meant for regular workers employed by big firms a greater 
vulnerability to a variety of risks. They could no longer rely on two essential, interlinked 
instruments that helped them cope with contingencies of life such as illness, unemployment and 
retirement—a secure job in the formal sector and steady sources of income. This newly 
generated vulnerability led them to develop an interest in social protection programs.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, after summarizing the development of the Korean 
welfare state, I will discuss the limitations of existing explanations and articulate how my 
theoretical framework can explain the important patterns of social policy in Korea. In proposing 
an alternative approach to the development of the welfare state in Korea, I will emphasize the 
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role of regular, skilled workers by evoking the previous chapter’s discussion on the 
consequences of economic change for the labor market. The last part will provide further 
evidence for my arguments by examining recent welfare reforms.  
 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WELFARE STATE IN KOREA  
The level of the Korean government’s commitment to social protection has been 
conspicuously low and social protection remained rudimentary until the 1990s. The 1990s was a 
watershed decade, and Korea now has four national social insurance systems—old-age, health, 
industrial accident and unemployment—that cover, at least in principle, the majority of the 
population. In addition to contributory social insurance, the government expanded social 
assistance and services to reach out to those who are not covered by social insurance programs 
such as low-income families and the elderly. 
 
Industrial Accident Insurance 
The dangerous process of mining and industrial production typically necessitates some 
sort of compensation mechanisms from employers. Most governments come to recognize the 
advantage of dealing with frequent industrial accidents through collective means rather than 
leaving it to employers’ individual responsibility, and they typically acknowledge this that 
particular risk is social earlier than other types of risks. The Park Chung Hee government was no 
exception. After seizing power in 1960, his military government considered the introduction of 
social insurance for health care, unemployment and industrial accidents as part of a social reform 
package to stabilize the economy. It decided to adopt the industrial accident insurance program 
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first, persuading initially skeptical employers and labor unions that risk pooling would benefit 
both parties (Woo, 2008). Employers, at first wary about the additional financial burden on top 
of the existing liabilities mandated by the Labor Standards Act, accepted it with no difficulty 
once they saw its advantages over individual liabilities. The continued expansion of the program 
since its introduction in 1963 reflects the politically less divisive and uncontroversial 
characteristics of industrial accidents compared to other types of social insurance. Recently, the 
most noticeable developments include the expansion of coverage in 1989 stemming from the 
revised Labor Standards Act, passed in the wake of democratization under the Roh Tae Woo 
government, and another expansion in 1999, following the financial crisis.  
 
Health Insurance 
The introduction and expansion of other social insurance programs has been much more 
controversial. Mandatory health insurance was another social insurance program established by 
the Park government. As many welfare state scholars have pointed out, we need to pay attention 
to the specifics of social policy design, which are the real source of distributional conflict 
between different groups. In this regard, it is highly suggestive that the Park government chose to 
implement a system of large-employers-based provisions. As will be shown, these provisions 
received strong support from large businesses. The government mandated that large companies 
with more than 500 employees should provide workers with health insurance and that each 
employer must set up a separate insurance fund of its own. Each “health insurance society” was 
to set premiums according to the scope of coverage and to collect contributions. Although the 
system grew gradually over time to cover previously excluded groups—wage workers at smaller 
firms and non-wage workers in rural and urban sectors—this initial choice of a large-firm-
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centered system gave birth to highly unequal health care coverage and wide variations in costs 
depending on the insured’s labor market status. Because this segmentalist approach worked 
against workers at small firms, the self-employed and those in rural sectors covered under 
regional health insurance societies, and it worked in favor of regular workers at big companies, it 
generated political tensions between different social groups.27 Since risk was pooled only within 
each insurer, insurance societies exhibited differential financial capabilities. The wide 
differences between sectors in terms of premiums and medical coverage led disadvantaged 
groups to complain about unfairness and to demand major reforms.  
Although the democratic transition brought the issue of health care reform to the fore, the 
national health insurance program is a recent political product. In 1989, President Roh vetoed the 
reform bill passed in National Assembly, which was then dominated by the opposition parties. 
But in 2000, the Kim Dae Jung government finally put an end to the long, hard-fought battle 
over health insurance reform between those who benefited from the existing system and those 
who did not by integrating separate insurance funds into a government-run single payer system. 
The new system distinguishes between regular workers in the formal sector and atypical workers 
and the self-employed in the informal sector in calculating premium rates, but all are entitled to 
the same coverage. Specifically, the former group pays a fixed rate of their salary in conjunction 
with matched employer contributions, and the latter pays different premiums based on property 
ownership, income, age and gender (SSA, 2011). The latter includes highly heterogeneous 
groups, from low-income disadvantaged workers to high-income professionals. Because the 
unusually large size of the informal sector makes it difficult to levy a fair share of contributions 
                                                          
27 Three categories of health insurance societies were created: public employee insurance, employee-based insurance 
and regional insurance. The self-employed and rural sectors were covered under regional insurance societies. 
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on high-income groups underreporting their income and taking advantage of administrative 
loopholes, inequity between the formal and informal sectors persists.  
 
Old-Age Social Security 
The other two major social insurance systems—old-age social security and 
unemployment insurance—developed much later under democratic governments, which in itself 
raises an interesting question. In fact, the Park government considered the introduction of the two 
systems, but did not push them through as it did for industrial accident and medical insurance. 
With respect to old-age pensions, the Park government even passed a law and completed all 
necessary administrative preparations but in the face of the first Oil Shock, it indefinitely 
postponed enforcement of the law. Evidence suggests that the main motivation for the Park 
government was to secure an enormous and stable source of capital that was much needed for 
heavy industrialization. This plan, however, was met with strong opposition from businesses and 
workers who saw it as nothing more than another tax increase.28 There could be two main 
reasons why pensions were so strongly opposed, whereas health insurance had been so warmly 
welcomed. First, since pension benefits would be paid out in a distant future and are contingent 
on the government’s will and financial capacity to act on its promises, a new pension system was 
viewed with skepticism as an immediate burden, rather than as reliable insurance for the future.29 
The second reason is equally important: the main beneficiaries of the new system—
workers employed by big firms—already had an institutional mechanism intended to provide 
                                                          
28 Faced with strong opposition from the public and employers, the government decided to lower the contribution 
rate from the initially planned 8% to 7%, which would be shared by employers and employees (Yang, 2008). Yang 
also points out that North Korea’s publicized announcement of scrapping the income tax altogether in 1973 would 
have put an additional political burden on the Park government in the context of Cold War competition. 
 
29 In fact, concerns and skepticism were well founded since the inflation rate was rising consistently throughout the 
1970s, with the average at 13.4%, suggesting that future pensions would be highly depreciated. 
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retired workers with some measure of income security—mandatory severance payments. The 
Labor Standards Act of 1953 stipulated that employers pay retiring workers a lump-sum 
“retirement benefit” in proportion to the length of their employment. Until the national pension 
system was adopted later, this retirement benefits system was the functional equivalent of 
pensions for workers at firms regulated by Labor Standards Law. However, since the Labor 
Standards Act always made exceptions for small firms, only workers hired by large and mid-
sized firms were protected by the Labor Standards Act. To this day, small firms with less than 
five employees are exempt from the law and thus from the statutory requirement of providing 
retirement benefits. At a basic level, this reflects divisions between the formal and informal 
sectors and shows that firm size is a good indicator of labor market insecurity.  
Going back to the discussion at hand, given the costs and risks associated with a 
government-run pension system, employers and employees in the formal sector did not have a 
reason to support it, especially since they were already providing retirement benefits under the 
current system. In fact, when a national pension was created later, the retirement benefits system 
caused a dispute between employers who demanded its repeal and workers who sought to retain 
it. The postponed plan of the new national pension was taken up by the Chun government in 
1986 and finally implemented in 1988 under the Roh government. Starting from firms with 10 or 
more employees, it continued to extend coverage to smaller firms, rural areas, and finally the 
self-employed in urban areas, following the typical steps of expansion. But it emerged as a 
politically controversial issue when the long-term sustainability of the system was publicly called 
into question under the Kim Young Sam government. Consequently, the late 1990s were 
characterized by public debate over pension reforms. The conservative camp argued for a 
fundamental reform that would completely separate the earnings-related component from flat-
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rate basic pensions and would eventually privatize the former to reduce the financial burden for 
the government. The Kim Young Sam government decided on this option, but this decision was 
overturned in the midst of the financial crisis. The more liberal, incoming Kim Dae Jung 
government dropped the radical two-tier plan and instead settled on a more moderate course of 
parametric reform, which lowered the replacement ratio from 70% to 60% and raised the age of 
pension eligibility from 60 to 65.  
 
Unemployment Insurance 
It is an established fact that among social insurance programs, unemployment insurance 
is typically adopted last (Flora & Heidenheimer, 1981). Scholars attribute this tendency to the 
difficult political process through which unemployment comes to be recognized as social risk 
beyond individual responsibility. The Korean case exhibits the same process of overcoming 
concerns that unemployment insurance would be a disincentive for work. Bureaucrats who first 
came up with the idea and participated in designing unemployment insurance intentionally 
emphasized active labor market programs over unemployment benefits and even named it 
“employment insurance,” not unemployment insurance, in order to stave off possible objections 
from conservative voices inside and outside the government. It is also noteworthy that 
bureaucrats within the Ministry of Labor took the initiative to promote its adoption and that labor 
unions were not significantly involved in the initial process. But the early 1990s saw the issue 
evolve into a national agenda co-opted by politicians, and both workers and employers began to 
express their opinions. All major parties incorporated unemployment insurance into their 
electoral platforms, and both the labor confederation (NCTU) and the employers’ organization 
jointly called for an early implementation of the system in 1993. The newly elected Kim Young 
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Sam government swiftly set to work, and the national employment insurance system went 
operational in 1995. The financial crisis ushered in a series of major expansions to cope with 
massive layoffs. Throughout this process, there was no serious political clash among labor 
unions, employers and the government, as seen in the development of health insurance and old-
age pensions during this period. However, the level of unemployment benefits had been set low, 
and the active labor market programs were somewhat ineffective. 
 
Social Assistance and Social Services 
Finally, social assistance and services also have been significantly expanded since the 
Kim Dae Jung government. Social assistance has a different logic than social insurance. The four 
social insurance systems in Korea are employment-related and rely primarily on contributions 
from employers and employees. Social assistance is financed through general revenues and 
provides financial and other support to low-income households whose eligibility is determined 
by a means test. Korea’s social assistance had been minimalist until the Kim Dae Jung 
government undertook a major reform to broaden its accessibility in the wake of the financial 
crisis to anyone falling under a minimum income level. The reform invited a politically charged 
debate. Although the pro-reform coalition of liberal civic groups, labor unions and scholars 
ultimately prevailed over conservative concerns about work disincentives and budgetary 
constraints, the contentious process led to a compromise of restricted eligibility and work 
requirements.30 The new law was implemented in 2000. In the years that followed, government 
expenditures for income maintenance programs increased substantially, but to this day, a 
significant number of low-income households are still excluded. According to a 2005 
                                                          
30 Kim and Kwon (2008) provide a detailed account of the bureaucratic process and conclude that the adopted final 
version reflects the involvement of the powerful Ministry of Planning and Budget. 
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government report, the number of people living in poverty and eligible for cash benefits reached 
10.5% of the total population, but only 2.8% received government support and the remaining 7.7% 
did not (Kim & Kwon 2008: 228). 
As for social services, a major turn was taken by the Roh Moo Hyun government. The 
Roh government took a proactive approach to expand social services, departing from the reactive, 
gradual expansion of provisions by the preceding governments. In response to worsening income 
inequality and poverty and to the inability of social insurance systems to provide adequate 
protection to the most vulnerable and needy, the government introduced new programs and 
policy initiatives geared toward strengthening the administrative and institutional infrastructure. 
In addition, the government started viewing social services as a promising area of job creation. 
But it should be pointed out that the foremost feature of Korea’s social services system is its 
narrow targeting of low-income workers, rather than guaranteeing universal access to all in need 
of services regardless of income and resources (Lee & Moon, 2008). 
 
Summary 
To sum up, the development of social protection in Korea has the following 
characteristics. First, the institutions of social protection are strongly employment-centered. The 
rise of social insurance has primarily been attributed to increases in welfare provided by 
companies, which is premised on the stable employment relationship. Hence, labor market 
insiders at big firms or in the formal sector are the primary beneficiaries of social protection 
policies, including employment protection. The design of social assistance also demonstrates the 
employment-centeredness of the social protection system as a whole. Despite its recent 
expansion, social assistance and services are biased against universalism and are carefully 
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designed not to interfere with the labor market by providing limited protection to targeted low-
income groups.  
Second, the financing of Korea’s social protection system—designed to minimize the 
financial burden on the government—is heavily dependent on the contributions of employers and 
employees. This feature had an important consequence: those who are unable to contribute—
small employers with limited resources and labor market outsiders such as contingent workers—
could not benefit from the expansion of social insurance. Consequently, there is a wide gap in 
coverage between big and small firms and between regular and atypical workers.  
Third, the basic structure of social protection institutions was laid under the authoritarian 
Park government during its push for industrialization, and was focused on big manufacturing 
firms. Social insurance was launched from these big companies and the division between big 
firms and smaller employers has persisted despite the expansion of coverage and even under its 
development into a national system. The reason why the Korean welfare state has a strong 
employment-centered bias, therefore, is tightly related to its origin.  
Fourth, although democratic governments were more active in promoting social 
protection, Korea’s welfare institutions were first created and continuously grown under 
authoritarian governments.  
Lastly, the major expansion of the welfare state took place in the late 1990s. The 
financial crisis was undeniably instrumental in bringing decisive change to the minimalist 
welfare state, and yet, the public debate and political process of welfare reform were already 
underway well before the financial crisis. The integration of decentralized medical insurance 
funds was first considered in the 1980s and the reform of the national pension became a major 




THE PUZZLES OF THE KOREAN WELFARE STATE 
The developments of social protection institutions in Korea raise a number of 
theoretically challenging questions. First of all, it is puzzling that most of the current institutions 
have their origins in the period of authoritarian rule. Existing theories have emphasized that 
Korea’s past authoritarian governments were hostile toward workers and that their export-
oriented developmental strategy led them to keep supposedly “labor-friendly” social policy to a 
minimum (Haggard & Kaufman, 2008; Wibbels & Ahlquist, 2011). Although the level of 
government spending for social protection was relatively low, the authoritarian governments 
apparently did not shy away from promoting social insurance systems. Indeed, they were 
proactive in developing social insurance and persuaded initially reluctant social groups to 
participate in the state-initiated system.  
A second question concerns the role of employers. The power resources theory assumes 
the hostility of employers toward social protection and approaches the development of the 
welfare state as a highly confrontational process between capitalists and workers. This 
description does not fit well with the Korean case. Employers were not an obstructive force—
what Walter Korpi (2006) calls an “antagonist”—to the development of the welfare state. There 
were many cases in which employers and unions did not take confrontational, uncompromising 
positions.  
Third, as mentioned earlier, the timing of the sweeping institutional expansion for social 
protection goes against the pessimistic prediction of globalization theorists. Social insurance 
systems were gradually expanded throughout the 1980s and dramatically enlarged in the late 
1990s. Apparently, the coming of welfare reform coincided with rising levels of employment 
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insecurity, which I provided evidence for in Chapter 4. The literature suggests that globalization 
increases employment insecurity, with two possible implications for the welfare state. One group 
of scholars argues that in the wake of economic openness, workers will demand more active 
interventions by the government, which will result in the expansion of the welfare state. Another 
group argues that despite increased demands for social protection, governments around the world 
will find it difficult to provide protection due to financial constraints. At first glance, the Korean 
case seems to validate the first possibility; a closer look, however, suggests a more nuanced 
picture of policy responses to increasing worker insecurity. Changes in social policy involve 
choosing from among many different options, and linking worker insecurity to those specific 
choices requires more detailed analysis.  
This point leads to the fourth question. Despite the remarkable expansion of social 
protection, economic inequality has been growing and a significant part of the population 
remains excluded from the social safety net. In particular, a noticeable disparity in coverage 
exists between large and small firms, regular and contingent workers, and the formal and 
informal sectors. Why is the coverage so low and uneven, and why does it fail to reach out to the 
needy? An increased level of social spending does not tell us about how benefits and resources 
are distributed among different groups. The link between worker insecurity and the growth of the 
welfare state, therefore, needs to be more finely specified.  
 
 
EXPLAINING THE PUZZLES: A THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT INSECURITY 
The literature fails to provide adequate answers to four puzzles in the development of the 
welfare state in Korea—the authoritarian origin of social insurance, the absence of employers’ 
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antagonism, the timing of expansionary welfare reform and the disparities in coverage between 
sectors and workers. In this section, I discuss an alternative theory that can explain the distinct 
patterns of social protection institutions in Korea—including the most recent social policy 
change—and can account for the four puzzles. Rooted in the theoretical framework proposed in 
Chapter 3, this theory pays attention to the causal process through which an increase in 
employment insecurity led to social policy change in the specific context of Korea. In doing so, I 
rely on the accounts of employment protection change provided by the previous chapter and 
assume the variables that shaped employment protection institutions, such as the industrial 
structure and enterprise unionism, play a mediating role in the relationship between employment 
insecurity and social policy.  
As explicated earlier, my hypothesis about the effects of employment insecurity on social 
policy change is bifurcated, depending on the design of existing social protection policies. If the 
welfare state was already developed to protect a wide segment of the population, a downward 
shift in employment protection does not lead to social policy expansion; rather, a contraction of 
social programs is likely to follow (first outcome). In contrast, when pre-existing social policies 
are narrowly focused on regular, skilled workers, then a marked increase in employment 
insecurity will lead to an expansion of social protection (second outcome). In this case, benefits 
tend to be contingent on employment status. Therefore, a weakening of employment protection 
means not only greater risks of job loss, but also risks of losing benefits and the means to cope 
with a variety of labor market risks. Faced with these double risks, workers are likely to pursue 




How does the Korean case fit into this theoretical framework? We are likely to see the 
second outcome in Korea, according to  the criterion of initial social policy design. My previous 
discussion on Korea’s employment protection system and social policy institutions strongly 
suggests that the proposed political logic linking employment insecurity to social policy 
expansion is highly plausible. Chapter 4 demonstrated that Korea’s integration with the global 
market and its deindustrialization have produced a distinctive disparity between big firms and 
small employers. Regular or skilled workers at big firms enjoy better wages and more job 
security. With respect to welfare benefits, the previous section pointed out that the most defining 
feature of social protection in Korea is its employment-centeredness; the four major social 
insurance systems have grown from company-based provisions of benefits. In short, regular and 
skilled workers at big firms were protected by employment regulation and also received 
relatively favorable welfare benefits. When they began to experience heightened employment 
insecurity in the early 1990s, they became more interested in social insurance. The formal 
change in employment protection law in the late 1990s probably dealt regular and skilled 
workers a decisive blow. It does not seem far-fetched to interpret the remarkable welfare reform 
under the Kim Dae Jung government as a policy outcome triggered by lowered employment 
protection. Given the plausibility of this explanation, Korea is an excellent case to examine. The 
next question is: can this theory provide convincing answers to the four puzzles?  
 
Solving the Puzzles 
The first puzzle was why the authoritarian governments, otherwise hostile to labor 
movements, initiated social insurance. The proposed framework does seem to be able to explain 
this puzzle. The authoritarian leadership, especially the Park government, adopted a variety of 
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policy tools to develop comparative advantage in capital-intensive, high-skill industries in the 
pursuit of export-led industrialization. The production of heavy industrial goods requires skilled 
workers, which of course Korea was lacking in the 1970s. The shortage of skilled labor 
intensifzied with the deepening of industrialization, and the competition among manufacturing 
employers to secure skilled workers even became a major social problem by the mid-1970s 
(Yang, 2004).  
Faced with the need to nurture skilled workers, the government sought a number of 
measures, and the company-based provision of various welfare benefits was one of them. The 
introduction of mandatory medical insurance in 1976 is best understood as such an effort. First, it 
only applied to large employers with 500 or more workers. Second, the insurance was designed 
to be administered by each employer, guaranteeing employers’ discretion in administrative 
decisions. Therefore, the adoption of company-based medical insurance contributed to tightening 
the nexus between employment and medical benefits in the formal sector, and reinforced skilled 
workers’ dependence on employers. Additionally, large employers, taking advantage of their 
oligopolistic power granted by the government, were able to offer other fringe benefits to secure 
skilled workers. The divide between large and small employers would develop into a full 
segregation of internal and external labor markets in the 1980s. In short, it is not surprising that 
Korea’s authoritarian governments promoted social insurance, because this was not at all out of 
line with their developmental strategy. 
The second puzzle concerning employers’ compliant attitude toward social insurance is 
also well addressed in my theoretical framework. Given that social insurance was designed to 
foster workers’ dependence on employers, large firms did not have a particular reason to be 
resistant. Small firms did have a reason to raise objections, and accordingly were exempted from 
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statutory requirements until a late stage of the expansion. Large firms were indeed very actively 
involved in the process of designing the health insurance system. The National Association of 
Medical Insurance Societies, a coordinating body of decentralized insurance corporations, was 
put into the hands of the peak business organization, the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI), 
which worked in close consultation with the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (Cho, 2008a).  
The employers’ position on unemployment insurance, too, lends strong support to my 
theory connecting employment insecurity for regular, skilled workers to social policy change. 
Unemployment insurance has a very different logic than health insurance. Unemployment 
insurance aims to provide income support in case of a termination of employment, and thus 
unlike medical benefits—which are contingent on the relationship with employers—cannot be 
expected to facilitate workers’ dependence on employers. For this reason, Estevez et al. (2001) 
argue that employment protection is an institutional mechanism of firm-specific skills economies 
and that generous unemployment benefits tend to be found in economies geared toward industry-
specific skills such as Germany. In Korea, unemployment insurance was introduced in the 1990s. 
Initially, employers were mildly resistant, but later, they expressed their support for it. The 
reason why they came to view unemployment insurance more favorably is that they expected 
unemployment benefits to help soften workers’ resistance to collective dismissal (Chung, 2008). 
Conversely, we may presume that unemployment insurance was not adopted earlier like other 
social insurance systems since it did not correspond to the company-based orientation of the 
social protection system.  
The timing of unemployment insurance provides useful insight into the third puzzle. In 
light of the globalization debate in the literature, the expansion of welfare reform in the late 
1990s and early 2000s was puzzling. However, my job insecurity-centered perspective can 
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explain the expansion of social protection. This period saw the collapse of employment 
protection for regular, skilled workers and a concomitant breakdown of the company-provided 
welfare system. It led workers to seek a broader, more comprehensive insurance mechanism. 
Unemployment insurance represents such an institutional mechanism. Similarly, the integration 
of individually administered health insurance into a government-run single payer system in 1999 
was probably made possible because insecure workers saw it as better protection, now that they 
could no longer expect guaranteed “life-time employment” with a single employer.  
The last puzzle concerned the sustained disparity in coverage of social insurance between 
regular and contingent workers, large and small firms, and formal and informal sectors. These 
categories tend to overlap. For example, regular workers are likely to work at large firms in the 
formal sector. Indeed, the divide between labor market participants is substantial. Table 5-1 
confirms a significant difference in coverage between regular and atypical workers and between 
firms of different size. Generally speaking, regular workers are twice as likely to benefit from 
social insurance as atypical workers, and the gap between small and large firms is even bigger. 
 
Table 5-1. Social Insurance Coverage Rates in Korea, 2008 
 
Firm Size Social Insurance Non-Regular Workers (%) Regular Workers (%) 
Total Old-age 36.6 75.7 
Health 37.7 75.9 
Unemployment 34.5 63.8 
Firms with less than 5 
employees 
Old-age 7.8 25.6 
Health 8.3 25.0 
Unemployment 7.1 23.3 
Firms with 5 or more 
employees 
Old-age 47.5 85.0 
Health 48.8 85.2 
Unemployment 44.8 71.2 





Why do the national social insurance systems exhibit such a deep divide between labor 
market insiders and outsiders and why do tend to accrue more benefits than outsiders? The 
intertwined development of Korea’s employment and social protection system helps us 
understand the policy outcomes following the expansion of social insurance into the national 
system. In explaining the employment protection system, Chapter 4 emphasized that Korea’s 
concentrated industrial structure helped to solidify strong employment protection for regular 
workers and to maintain the division between internal and external labor markets. We can also 
detect the influence of industries on the development of social protection. Social insurance was 
initially built for the industrial sector, which required a stable supply of skilled workers, and it 
was designed to complement, rather than replace, company-based welfare benefits. The 
weakening of the stable employment system motivated regular, skilled workers to seek more 
comprehensive social policies. The expansion of social insurance, however, did not extend 
beyond the existing boundaries in the labor market; entitlements were determined by 
contributions, rather than offered as universal rights. Because the disadvantaged were not able to 
make contributions to social insurance, they did not receive protection from the system.  
In summary, the theoretical framework advanced by this dissertation can offer persuasive 
explanations to the four puzzles of social policy in Korea. Having confirmed that the patterns of 
Korea’ welfare state development fit comfortably with the logical consequences of my theory, in 
the next section, I turn to the most recent phase of social policy change to provide more direct 
evidence for my theory. In particular, I will analyze how employment insecurity shaped workers’ 
preferences for or against changes in broader social policies, and I show how threats to their job 
security motivated them to respond to and participate in the political debate surrounding old-age, 
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health care and unemployment insurance systems. If a weakening of employment protection is a 
direct cause of social policy expansion, we should be able to observe that it changed workers’ 
preferences regarding social policy and then caused them to act on their changed preference. 
 
 
EXPLAINING THE RECENT WELFARE REFORMS 
The expansion of old-age pensions and health insurance in Korea provides strong 
evidence that in some cases employment protection is not independent of other social policies. 
The modern industrial economy generates different types of labor market risks. Each form of 
social insurance is supposed to help people cope with particular risks: pensions for those who are 
too old to work, health insurance for those who are sick and unemployment insurance for those 
who lose their job. However, when social protection goes hand-in-hand with having a stable 
relationship with a particular employer, as in Korea, the rise of employment insecurity could 
generate a forceful societal impulse to change a variety of social protection institutions, not just 
unemployment insurance. In this section, I analyze momentous phases in the reforming process 
of health, old-age and unemployment insurance to examine the effects of employment insecurity. 
The reform processes of health and old-age insurance mobilized a wider array of social groups 
than did unemployment insurance. Unlike the risk of unemployment, sickness and old-age affect 
the population at large. Nonetheless, all three cases exhibit the central role of employment 
insecurity for regular workers in actually changing policy. 
 
Health Care Reform 
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First, I discuss the political process of health care reform. The key issue in health care 
reform was the integration of decentralized health insurance societies, and after a series of 
failures, it finally took place under the Kim Dae Jung government. Analyzing why reforms 
succeeded in 1999, when earlier attempts failed, will support my argument that employment 
insecurity among secure workers is an important factor in changing broader social policies. In 
particular, we can confirm how the preferences of pivotal workers shifted and, as a result, how 
the balance between opposing voices over the integration reform tipped in favor of reform.  
As discussed earlier, the health insurance system continuously grew throughout the 1980s, 
starting with employees at large urban companies and extending to rural areas and to the self-
employed in urban areas. The most important feature of the system, however, was an 
independently-operated insurance society for each new group of people to be covered. This was 
an addendum to the initial system, which was designed to provide benefits only to workers at big 
companies. The expansion of coverage involved no risk-pooling between insurance funds and 
minimal government subsidization. As a consequence, the protection system produced severe 
imbalances and inequities between “rich” and “poor” insurance societies.  
Table 5-2 illustrates the degree of disparity between public employees’ insurance, 
employed workers’ insurance and regional self-employed insurance by comparing the ratio of 
benefits to contributions. Big companies, due to the economy of scale and their low-risk 
employees, tended to have abundant funds, while small-sized insurance societies and those in 
rural areas were invariably on weak financial footing. Members of “poor” insurance societies had 
to pay higher premiums, but at the same time could not receive equal benefits and services. This 
particular group of people started to voice their complaints and to demand the integration of 




Table 5-2. Comparison of Benefits and Contributions in Health Insurance Societies in Korea, 
1998 
 
 Government Employees’ 
Insurance 
Employee Insurance Regional Self-employed 
Insurance 
Yearly Contribution per 
Person (in Korean Won) 
127,002 137,412 138,345 
Yearly Benefits per Person 
(in Korean Won) 
186,180 153,372 144,514 
Ratio of Benefits to 
Contributions 
1.47 1.12 1.04 





Other drawbacks of fragmentation included economic inefficiency and overall 
inadequacy of benefits. Since a decentralized system incurs higher administrative costs 
economy-wide, the overall level of benefits was lower than it would have been in a centralized 
system. In addition, since the determination of premium rates and benefits was up to each 
insurance fund, the insured were in a disadvantaged position vis-a-vis their insurers and 
healthcare providers. If the societies were integrated into a national system run by the 
government, their collective voice probably would be better represented. Indeed, despite the 
progress in expanding insurance coverage to a greater number of the population, both the 
average level of benefits and the scope of medical coverage remained very low. For example, 84% 
of the nation’s total health care bill was paid directly out-of-pocket, with only the remaining 16% 
paid by insurance in 1980, and these percentages did not change very much throughout the 1980s 
(Wong, 2004). Therefore, the much-touted universalization of heath care was achieved only at a 
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superficial level. Recognizing the economic efficiencies and structural weaknesses of the system, 
the government considered the integration option as early as 1980, only to push it aside. 
The most significant voice calling for health care reform first came from farmers, not 
long after the expansion of health insurance into rural areas in 1988. The disgruntled farmers, 
allied with social movement groups, made three demands: the integration of health insurance 
societies, an increase in government subsidies and an expansion of the range of benefits and 
health care services covered by insurance  Their effort for integration almost succeeded, but was 
ultimately thwarted when President Roh Tae Woo, pressured by opposition groups, vetoed the 
reform bill in 1989. Who opposed? Obviously, large businesses voiced strong opposition since 
the integration would deprive them of an enormous amount of funds.31 Workers at these 
companies, moreover, were equally unenthusiastic about integration. Their ambivalence about 
the integration measure was reflected on the position of the Korean Confederation of Trade 
Unions (KCTU). The KCTU expressed its opposition in 1980 when the integration first was 
being discussed, and in this second attempt at integration, they tried to distance themselves as far 
as possible from the pro-reform camp. Then, in the third attempt, it articulated its downright 
opposition, claiming that integration would be unfair for workers since their contributions would, 
in effect, be used to subsidize other high-risk groups (KCTU, 1999). Although the KCTU cannot 
be considered a legitimate voice representing workers at large in this period, its attitude parallels 
the general skepticism and disinterest of workers. Generally speaking, as long as workers had a 
stable, secure job, they were content with the existing system and felt that integration would not 
be in their interest.  
                                                          
31 The accumulated funds, which were significant sums for large companies, allowed them to loan from banks 10 
times the amount of funds, becoming an important source of capital for firms (Cho, 2008b).  
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The development of the labor market and the regulatory change in employment 
protection in the late 1990s, however, changed workers’ preference regarding integration and, as 
a result, and the balance of power between opposing voices. First, the democratic labor 
movement, represented by the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) joined the pro-reform 
camp.32 Due to widespread underreporting of income by the self-employed, there were 
significant concerns about potential unfairness for workers. The underreporting of income for 
self-employed professionals or those who draw their incomes from property had always been an 
administrative challenge for Korea’s tax authorities, but with respect to the integration of 
insurance societies, it was particularly disconcerting for wage earners. Since the premiums would 
be determined by income levels, high-income tax-evaders would likely be charged unfairly low 
rates at the expense of salaried workers. The opposition groups, including big business, waged 
public relations campaigns using this argument to persuade workers and the general public to 
oppose integration. This time, however, the pro-reform groups gained widespread support across 
society. But given the potential risk of unfairness, why did workers come to favor the integration 
of insurance societies?  
Unlike in the earlier period, many workers were now experiencing a greater level of labor 
market insecurity and would not benefit from the segmented system. As pointed out, the 
decentralized system produced economic inefficiency, decreasing benefits overall and 
suppressing the scope of medical coverage. In addition, it became increasingly clear that the 
system would no longer benefit workers at big firms. The insurance funds at big companies 
tended to record large surpluses that were not translated into an expansion of covered services or 
a decrease in co-payments. Given the increased risk of job loss and unstable employment, 
                                                          
32 The FKTU, even before its formal launching in 1995, announced that it would pursue two goals for the year 1995: 
labor reform and health care reform (ibid. :88). 
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workers at these large firms realized that integration could provide them with better protection if 
they fell ill and reduce their medical costs.33 In short, the success of the 1999 health reform was 
made possible with support from workers, who, amidst heightened labor market insecurity, 
began to prefer more expansive social protection policies.  
 
Pension Reform 
We now turn to changes in social security for the elderly. The first instance where we can 
confirm the central role of employment insecurity is the controversy over the relationship 
between severance payments and pensions. Mandatory severance payments have long been a key 
feature of Korea’s social protection system, even after the introduction of major social insurance 
systems. The 1953 Labor Standards Act established the statutory requirement that employers 
should set aside at least a month’s worth of salary per year of service for regular workers and 
give it to them as a retirement benefit when they leave their job, regardless of the cause of 
separation. This system is not common around the world, and in Estevez-Abe’s (2008) term, it is 
the “functional equivalent” of both unemployment insurance and old-age social security. The 
major difference is that the severance pay is employers’ liability and provided in a lump-sum 
upon separation. These two features made the Korean system of severance pay an ineffective 
safety net for many workers, especially during the financial crisis. The massive scale of 
bankruptcy in the late 1990s left unemployed workers with empty hands. Even before the 
financial crisis, one of the motivations for introducing social security was to provide retirees with 
more reliable protection to than severance benefits.  
                                                          
33 The Health Solidarity Coalition promoted a campaign to persuade workers to support the integration based on 
these arguments (Cho, 2008b). 
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However, the introduction of the pension system placed workers and employers at odds 
with one another. Employers, raising concerns of a double financial burden, argued that the 
pension system should completely replace the severance pay system. Workers strongly resisted, 
claiming that severance payments are deferred wages due to employees. As discussed earlier, the 
developmental strategy of the authoritarian governments encouraged large companies to 
introduce a variety of welfare benefits for their employees to attract skilled workers, and in the 
absence of effective social insurance systems, the company-based welfare system provided social 
protection to a narrow segment of workers in the formal sector. The reason why the pension 
system was introduced is because this firm-level provision of protection proved increasingly 
inadequate amidst increasing employment insecurity. In addition to their support for the pension 
system, workers sought a variety of insurance measures—including the preservation of the 
mandatory severance payment system—to cope with greater insecurity. To address the 
inadequacy of the severance payment system, a requirement that severance payments should take 
precedence over other financial obligations in the event of bankruptcy was instituted in 1989 
(KLI, 2000). However, the Constitutional Court ruled it “not constitutional” in August 1997, on 
the eve of the financial crisis. This decision led employers to reiterate their demands for the 
complete removal of the severance payment system, thus putting workers—who were 
increasingly concerned about the security of their jobs and income—on the defensive. 
The pension reform of the Kim Dae Jung government took place against this backdrop. 
As health insurance finally became universal by including the self-employed in urban areas, the 
pension system was approaching the last stages of its expansion into a national system—
extending its reach to urban, non-wage workers. However, preparatory studies revealed that with 
the addition of this vast group of people—estimated at ten million—the generously designed 
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pension system would be financially unsustainable (Yang, 2008). The fund, which had yet to 
reach maturity, was projected to go into deficit by 2022 and to be depleted by 2031 (OECD, 
2000). Before carrying out universalization, the Kim Young Sam government decided to take 
drastic measures to guarantee the financial soundness of reform. The plan included both 
parametric and structural reforms: adjusting the levels of contributions and benefits34 and 
contracting out earnings-related components. Not surprisingly, this plan was met with strong 
opposition from labor organizations and other NGOs. Workers were particularly upset about the 
curtailment of benefits, and blamed the government for its financial recklessness. In fact, the 
huge sum of accumulated funds was being appropriated by the government without any 
constraints since there were no effective mechanisms in place to make it responsible to the 
insured. Prior to any reform that might lower the level of benefits, workers wanted to place the 
pension fund under democratic supervision. 
Interestingly, they did not object to expanding pension benefits to the self-employed, 
unlike their opposition to the universalization of health insurance. The absence of workers’ 
resistance was the reason why the incoming Kim Dae Jung government was able to implement 
universalization while rolling back the structural reform plan which  the World Bank strongly 
recommended (Yang, ibid.). The difference in worker attitudes reflects the distinctive nature of 
pensions. Since the statutory expansion of coverage for health insurance would lead to an actual 
expansion in the number of the insured—as basically everyone needs medical care—any 
redistributive effects between regular workers in the formal sector and those in the informal 
sector would show up immediately. In contrast, pensions are typically paid out long after 
                                                          
34 The Kim Young Sam government’s plan was to lower the income replacement ratio from 70% to 40% on average, 
which is a radical reduction. The actual adjustment made under the succeeding Kim Dae Jung government was 
much milder; lowering to 60%. The government plan was 50% but compromised further in the National Assembly. 
The two national labor organizations were consistently opposed to the 50% plan (Yang, 2008). 
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workers begin to make contributions and therefore, the supposedly redistributive effects would 
be distant and uncertain. 
Moreover, the level of compliance was low among self-employed and atypical workers 
and small firms. In face, the pension system was designed to be “progressive,” that is, low 
income groups have  a higher income replacement ratio. Therefore, within the system, there 
would be redistributive effects from high income groups to low income ones. Unfortunately, it 
turns out that the disadvantaged, who would benefit from the system, could not afford to make 
contributions for the benefits that would only be realized in a distant future 20 to 30 years later. 
When comparing the actual coverage rates for labor market insiders and outsiders, it is insiders 
who are disproportionately covered (see Table 5-1). In other words, the national pension is a 
system that was introduced to provide regular workers with a better shield from the changed 
economic environment. 
 
The Introduction of Unemployment Insurance 
Lastly, the case of unemployment insurance demonstrates the key role of employment 
insecurity in effecting policy change. As the political process of introducing and expanding 
unemployment insurance moved forward, labor organizations approached reforms cautiously 
since they were worried about the possibility that introducing an unemployment benefit system 
insurance could provide an excuse for employers to liberally use collective dismissal.  
Accordingly, the democratic labor movement, now gathered under the National Congress of 
Trade Unions (NCTU), demanded that the introduction of unemployment insurance should be 
accompanied by statutory restrictions on collective dismissal (KLI 2000). In fact, this concern 
was not unfounded. The Korean Employers’ Federation (KEF), employers’ organization, indeed 
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viewed the introduction of unemployment insurance positively, anticipating that it might mitigate 
workers’ resistance to collective dismissal (Chung 2008: 182). On the other hand, the pro-
government, cooperative KCTU was more proactive than the democratic labor movement, and as 
early as 1989, it submitted a petition for the implementation of unemployment insurance. It also 
tried to strategically use the issue in negotiations with businesses. As a result of their mutual 
interest in unemployment insurance, the KEF and the KCTU made a public announcement for 
their joint support for the government plan in 1993. This consensus among the KEF, KCTU and 
the government invited criticisms from the NCTU. Although it was not opposed to 
unemployment insurance per se, the government plan, in its view, fell short of an effective 
mechanism to protect workers unemployment: the coverage was too narrowly targeted to large 
firms and the benefit levels too low. The superficiality of the plan seemed to come from the 
government’s unwillingness to assume any substantial financial responsibility, and was viewed 
as evidence that the real motivation was not to provide protection to workers but to buy them off 
in exchange for a flexible labor market. Specifically, the NCTU demanded that the coverage 
should be extended to firms with 5 or more employees, rather than 30 or more, and that the 
government should match employers’ and employees’ contributions to unemployment benefits, 
as well as pay for any deficits that might be incurred from extending coverage to small firms 
(KLI, ibid. p. 254-255). 
Despite this demand from the emerging labor movement, the government implemented a 
much weaker version of insurance, with limited coverage and benefits. Coverage expanded when 
the financial crisis forced the government to take prompt action. The IMF also demanded a 
strengthening of the system. However, recall that the previously thwarted labor reform—
attempts to introduce collective dismissal and dispatched worker agencies—was finally passed 
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during this period. In fact, the IMF’s demand for a stronger safety net was premised on the 
implementation of labor market liberalization. In the context of impending liberalization of labor 
market protection, Labor unions at the Tripartite Commission could not help but accept the offer 
of strengthening the system. 
Despite the rapid expansion of unemployment insurance, the disparity between workers, 
firms and sectors has persisted, following the distinct pattern observed in other social insurance 
systems. The development of political negotiations revealed diverging preferences between the 
two labor organizations and the employers’ organization, suggesting a certain level of 
replacement effects between employment protection and unemployment insurance. In summary, 
unemployment insurance was promoted as compensation or a bargaining chip for the loosening 
of employment protection by businesses and the government, and once labor reform exposed 





In this chapter, I have discussed the development of social protection policies in Korea to 
illustrate the political logic behind linking employment insecurity to social policy change. I 
began with a summary description of the Korean welfare state, noting important features that 
existing theories seem unable to explain. Then, I provided answers to the puzzles, using the 
theoretical framework this dissertation proposes. Specifically, my main hypothesis was that 
when protection against labor market risks is inseparable from stable employment, an increase in 
employment insecurity will lead workers to support an expansion of social protection beyond 
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employment-based protection. I have shown that the key role of regular, skilled workers in the 
economy can account for the authoritarian origin of social insurance, the compliant attitude of 
businesses, the timing of social protection expansion and the limitation of that expansion. I have 
further demonstrated that in recent instances of major social policy reform, workers’ concerns 
about job security were a major impetus.  
The traditional explanations of social policy reform in Korea tend to emphasize the shock 
of the financial crisis, the ideological orientation of the Kim Dae Jung government or the role of 
bureaucrats. First of all, it is true that bureaucrats played a major role in drawing up the specific 
details of social policy and in some instances they introduced the idea of social insurance in the 
absence of significant societal demands. However, it should be pointed out that politicians 
embrace the recommendations of bureaucrats only selectively and strategically. Even if 
politicians decided to push for a specific policy submitted by bureaucrats, powerful political 
elites including presidents were also constrained by the preferences of important social groups, in 
particular, workers in key sectors of the economy. Finally, the financial crisis and President Kim 
were undeniably instrumental in bringing about welfare reforms. However, the expansion of 
social protection was already underway as a consequence of economic and structural changes in 
Korea. As this chapter has shown, increased employment insecurity not only caused workers to 
change their preferences to favor social policy expansion, but also it affected specific choices 










The process of changing labor laws is not easy. It is invariably a highly politicized 
process with workers, employers and the government colliding with each other. It is a fair 
description that “labor law is a highly visible and concrete policy statement around which 
political battles are fought, won and lost, and around which political support is attracted, granted 
and withheld” (Collier & Collier, 1979: 971). Many governments in developing democracies 
have been pressured to lift restrictions on and better protect workers’ rights to establish unions, 
strike and bargain collectively. Accordingly, recent scholarship has begun to investigate the 
patterns of labor law regimes and the sources of variation across countries and time.  
This dissertation has examined one particular type of labor law that has increasing 
importance in labor politics for a number of nations—laws concerning workers’ job security. 
Regulations for labor contract terms have a direct impact on workers and firms. They could 
influence employment opportunities, the quality of jobs available in the labor market, and 
workers’ income stability and human capital development over the course of their career. 
Employment protection laws, therefore, in various ways affect workers’ economic insecurity. 
They could also shape firms’ decisions not only regarding the hiring and firing of workers, but 
also regarding investments in employees’ skills and even overall business strategies.  
Employment protection laws have emerged as contentious issues not just in nascent 
democracies, but also in established democracies. It is indeed interesting and noteworthy that 
employment protection is widely used across countries with varied levels of economic 
development and democracy. At the same time, the degree of cross-national variation is 
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substantial and each country’s level of protection is considerably stable over time. Yet, pressures 
to liberalize employment protection have intensified in recent years and a number of 
governments have attempted to reform various aspects of employment protection institutions. 
The numerous episodes of deregulatory reform serve as illustrative testaments that employment 
protection is indeed a focal point for political battles between different social groups.  
Workers tend to oppose the liberalization of employment protection, but they view it 
more negatively in some cases than in others. Some governments have pursued a more drastic 
approach to changing regulations while others have maintained a protective regime. Some 
attempts at liberalization were successful whereas other attempts were met with immense 
protests and opposition from workers and consequently failed. There has been little research to 
help us understand these dynamics.  
This dissertation is an effort to fill this lacuna. Paying attention to the direct impact of 
employment protection law on workers’ job insecurity, it attempted to provide an explanation for 
the determinants of employment protection and the consequences of employment protection 
change for social protection. In particular, it examined two important factors that have been 
considered to be influential on worker insecurity—international  trade and the growth of the 
service sector– and found that both are important determinants of the level of employment 
protection. However, their effects do not appear to be uniformly negative, as has customarily 
been assumed. Trade seems to have had a positive impact on employment protection in countries 
with an abundance of skilled labor while skilled workers in Latin America have seen 
employment protections decline in the wake of economic openness.  
In addition, because previous studies of the welfare state have emphasized labor market 
insecurity, this dissertation examined the relationship between employment protection and social 
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protection. First of all, I found consistently strong effects of employment protection on social 
spending. Second, employment protection also seems to have opposite effects on social 
protection for the OECD nations and Latin American countries. To demonstrate the causal 
mechanisms suggested through the two sets of quantitative analysis, I used a case study of Korea. 
In the remainder of this concluding chapter, I discuss some implications of these findings, the 




This dissertation research started by finding the current literature inadequate in offering 
empirical evidence for the role of employment insecurity, which is supposedly a key mechanism 
connecting external and internal economic changes to social protection. If, as is conventionally 
postulated, globalization and deindustrialization are to be major sources of worker insecurity, 
their effects must be manifested in institutions of employment protection. On the other hand, it is 
reasonable to assume that the effects of globalization and deindustrialization on social protection 
are mediated by labor market institutions such as employment protection. Furthermore, 
employment protection in its own right could shape societal demand for social protection.  
The findings of this dissertation strongly suggest the significance of employment 
protection both as an independent and a dependent variable. The role of other labor market 
institutions and labor movements in providing workers with protection has been well noted. 
Centralized collective bargaining, the extension of collective bargaining coverage and strong, 
unified labor movements have been shown to help counteract the negative effects of market 
forces in different ways. However, the effect of employment protection laws, which have 
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immediate relevance for workers’ individual and collective security, has been largely neglected. 
One of the primary contributions of this research is to show that it occupies a central place in the 
politics of social protection. Using the two large-N quantitative analyses, I probed the effects of 
globalization and deindustrialization on employment protection and the role of employment 
protection in social protection respectively, demonstrating the mediating role of employment 
protection linking economic and technological changes to governments’ intervention to shelter 
workers from labor market insecurity generated from those changes. 
The findings of this research also call into question the prevalent view of globalization 
and deindustrialization. The conventional approach in the literature depicts global market 
integration as unequivocally disadvantageous to workers in terms of job security. Both 
quantitative and qualitative evidence in this dissertation challenge this view and show that policy 
responses to global forces vary across countries and that in some cases, active involvements in 
the global market may have strengthened employment protection.  
Similarly, my findings raise an objection to the revisionist view, which stresses that 
deindustrialization, not globalization, is the real source of growing labor market insecurity. The 
statistical results in this dissertation differentiate between the OECD and Latin America and I 
proposed an explanation that highlights the different process of structural change for developed 
and developing worlds. To support my argument, the case study illustrated that despite continued 
growth over a long period, the service industry has evolved internally in terms of inter-industry 
labor movements and the industrial compositions of the service sectors. This dissertation, 
therefore, makes a case for a nuanced approach to the role of globalization and 
deindustrialization in the politics of social protection, and highlights the need for the “thick” 
analysis of causal mechanisms that lurk within statistical relationships. 
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In addition, this dissertation contributes to the ongoing debate on the effects of 
globalization on the welfare state in the developing world. Recent scholarship has begun to pay 
attention to the different pressures that less-developed nations face and to their diversity of social 
protection institutions. The statistical results in Chapters 2 and 3 suggest that worker insecurity 
might increase as a result of globalization, but it could also trigger social policy expansion. The 
transformation of social protection in Korea illustrates how change in employment protection 
could lead to social policy innovation. These findings reject the simplistic view that in countries 
with less developed social protection institutions, globalization entails decreasing social 
protection.  
In summary, this dissertation has substantial implications for the study of social 
protection. It enhances our understanding of the role of worker insecurity in the welfare state by 
bringing to attention the significance of employment protection. The role of worker insecurity in 
the political conflict over the welfare state across developed and developing countries is 
confirmed by this study. However, this dissertation also raises a number of important questions 
regarding the conventional assumption that highlights the negative impact of globalization and 





This dissertation has several limitations, which suggest directions that future research 
could take to strengthen the arguments and empirical analysis presented here. 
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 First, the statistical testing could be refined and made more rigorous. Due to data 
constraints, I had to rely on crude measures or proxies for some variables. For example, union 
density, which presumably captures organized labor’s power, was not controlled for in the 
analysis of Latin American countries. If it indeed plays a significant role, leaving it out might 
have biased the results. In addition, the level of total social expenditures might not be the best 
way to capture political processes that follow change in employment protection. In particular, I 
advanced an argument that a decrease in job security could motivate labor market “insiders” to 
seek the expansion of social protection coverage. However, an institutional change might not 
necessarily involve an increase in total expenditures.  
I also emphasized the role of pre-existing institutions of social protection in shaping 
social policy responses to employment protection change. My explanation for the different 
causal arrows for the OECD and Latin American samples in the relationship between 
employment protection and social spending was built around the assumption that social 
protection systems in the less developed world tend to have more “insider” bias than mature 
welfare states in the developed world. This assumption might over-generalize variation in the 
welfare regimes across developing countries and not hold true in some of them. 
 Furthermore, the reliability of my statistical results will be enhanced if they are 
corroborated by different estimation models. 
 These limitations together suggest that the results from my statistical tests should not be 
taken as conclusive evidence. Nonetheless, the preliminary support from the somewhat limited 
statistical analysis is quite encouraging. For example, in spite of the disadvantage of using the 
level of total social spending, the employment protection variable emerged as a good predictor in 
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the Latin American sample. It is also encouraging that two different datasets of employment 
protection produced similar results for the OECD cases .  
Based on this initial evidence, quantitative research could be improved in several ways. 
Disaggregated measures of social spending might provide important information that can 
determine whether the insider bias in the old system of social protection in less developed 
economies is transformed by change in employment protection. Some welfare programs and 
social policy have more insider bias than others. For example, pensions in many countries tend to 
benefit the middle-class. Investments in tertiary education also tend to deepen labor market 
inequality by benefitting the relatively well-to-do. Therefore, a shift in budgetary priorities 
between different welfare programs could help uncover characteristics of social policy change.  
Another improvement could be made by incorporating some measure of pre-existing 
social protection institutions. I argued that they inhibit the expansion of mature welfare states 
and facilitate the growth of emerging welfare states. If statistical tests can capture the scope and 
coverage of social protection and the financial constraints of pre-existing welfare programs, the 
validity of my argument could be better assessed.  
 
Qualitative Research 
To compensate for the limitations of statistical testing, I have used the case study method. 
Qualitative analysis enabled me to go beyond the limited scope of employment protection data 
and to explore the causal linkages in a more nuanced way. Although I provided justification for 
using one case in Chapter 4, there might be objections to this strategy. Since the samples used for 
statistical testing were dictated by the availability of data for employment protection, it was 
crucial to find a case that could reveal whether different causal processes unfold in developed 
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and developing economies and would not be subject to any unobserved idiosyncrasies that might 
be present in Western democracies and Latin America. By these criteria, Korea is an excellent 
choice, but adding more cases would greatly expand the external validity of this study.  
Future research would benefit from studying cases drawn from Latin America, Western 
democracies and East Asia. Latin American nations are the most extensively studied cases in the 
literature on labor reform. A comparison with Latin American cases will reinforce the statistical 
findings of this dissertation.  
There is variation in employment protection, even among advanced democracies, ranging 
from liberal regimes with almost no restrictions on the dismissal of workers to highly protective 
systems such as Southern European nations. Countries with strong employment protection have 
felt great pressure to liberalize and some of them, most notably Spain and the Netherlands, 
undertook labor reforms. These cases would provide important information that could be used to 
evaluate my hypothesis about the causal mechanism between globalization and 
deindustrialization and employment protection and the impact of employment protection change 
on the welfare state.  
Additionally, given the assumed commonality of the East Asian NICs (Newly 
Industrializing Countries) and Japan, as purported in the literature of developmental states in 
East Asia, comparing Korea’s experience with another East Asian country could also expand the 
analytical horizon. For example, Japan’s labor market and industrial relations are often assumed 
to be a proxy for understanding the Korean system. Enterprise unionism, strong employment 
protection for regular workers in big companies and the recent growth of contingent workers are 
often references as features that  the two economies share. But differences between the two 
countries have been also noted. Although the number of contingent workers has increased 
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significantly in Japan, regular workers do not seem to have experienced a drop in employment 
security. Japanese firms tend to value stability in their employment relationships with core 
workers and are reluctant to dismiss them during economic downturns (Genda & Rebick, 2000; 
Thelen, 2002; Thelen & Kume, 1999, 2006). This could be related to the greater stability of 
employment protection for regular workers in Japan, compared to Korea. 
To sum up, there are multiple ways in which this research project could be developed to 
enhance our understanding of the role of employment insecurity in labor politics and welfare 
politics. This dissertation showed that looking into employment protection institutions can help 
us to better understand the impact of globalization and deindustrialization on worker insecurity 
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